Peter Sloterdijk presented a reading of Heidegger's Letter on Humanism at a conference held at Elmau in 1999. Reinterpreting the meaning of humanism in the light of Heidegger's Letter, Sloterdijk focused his presentation on the need to redefine education as a form of genetic ‘taming’ and proposed what seemed to be support for positive eugenics. Although Sloterdijk claimed that he only wanted to open a debate on the issue, he could not have been surprised at the level of opposition this (...) suggestion aroused. In the weeks following, he blamed Habermas for raising this opposition and for refusing to engage with him openly. Although Luis Arenas has chronicled the aftermath of Sloterdijk's paper, it may be of interest to educators to examine how Heidegger's text is presented. What is this new humanism? If Heidegger's new humanism was based on a mystical attitude towards Being, so Sloterdijk's new humanism was to be based on the materialist principles of a biotechnological age. Unlike Heidegger who rejected technology as yet one further example of the forgetfulness of Being, Sloterdijk seems to embrace technology and the enhancement of the human body and mind as the next great step forward in educational theory. Could he possibly be right? Is education in these times a partner or an opponent of the technological enhancement of the human being? This article tries to identify Sloterdijk's disagreements with Heidegger on the question of the human. (shrink)

As the international genomic research community moves from the tool-making efforts of the Human Genome Project into biomedical applications of those tools, new metaphors are being suggested as useful to understanding how our genes work - and for understanding who we are as biological organisms. In this essay we focus on the Human Microbiome Project as one such translational initiative. The HMP is a new 'metagenomic' research effort to sequence the genomes of human microbiological flora, in order to pursue the (...) interesting hypothesis that our 'microbiome' plays a vital and interactive role with our human genome in normal human physiology. Rather than describing the human genome as the 'blueprint' for human nature, the promoters of the HMP stress the ways in which our primate lineage DNA is interdependent with the genomes of our microbiological flora. They argue that the human body should be understood as an ecosystem with multiple ecological niches and habitats in which a variety of cellular species collaborate and compete, and that human beings should be understood as 'superorganisms' that incorporate multiple symbiotic cell species into a single individual with very blurry boundaries. These metaphors carry interesting philosophical messages, but their inspiration is not entirely ideological. Instead, part of their cachet within genome science stems from the ways in which they are rooted in genomic research techniques, in what philosophers of science have called a 'tools-to-theory' heuristic. Their emergence within genome science illustrates the complexity of conceptual change in translational research, by showing how it reflects both aspirational and methodological influences. (shrink)

The transhumanist movement is much more than a simple utopia, a new school of thought or a fashionable ideology; as a matter of fact, it is a scientific and philosophical project that is already underway, and defends the use of the most advanced emerging new technologies —from biogenetics to computing, from nanotechnology to cognitive sciences, to robotics and Artificial Intelligence— with the clear goal to exponentially increase the physical, cognitive, sensory, moral and emotional capabilities of human beings. Transhumanism entails a (...) change in the anthropocentric paradigm defended by humanism, and aims to break through the limits of nature, which until recently we deemed insurmountable, in order to create a new species that is more evolved than the Homo sapiens: the Homo excelsior, a posthuman species which is superior to ours, composed by exceptionally gifted beings that have been genetically selected, designed and improved and which —according to the transhumanist imaginary— will dominate the posthuman future and will be happier, more virtuous, long-lived and intelligent than us. In this article, we propose technological humanism as an intermediate formula in the doctrinal debate between bioprogressive and bioconservative legal philosophers, so as to make possible the development of scientific research and the advancement of new technologies, although without ever having to sacrifice dignity and liberty, which are inherent qualities of the human being (who has to be viewed, in Kantian terms, as an end in itself). Received: 22 May 2019 Accepted: 10 September 2019 Published online: 20 December 2019. (shrink)

Advocates of cognitive enhancement maintain that technological advances would augment autonomy indirectly by expanding the range of options available to individuals, while, in a recent article in this journal, Schaefer, Kahane, and Savulescu propose that cognitive enhancement would improve it more directly. Here, autonomy, construed in broad procedural terms, is at the fore. In contrast, when lauding the goodness of enhancement expressly, supporters’ line of argument is utilitarian, of an ideal variety. An inherent conflict results, for, within their utilitarian frame, (...) the content of rational, hence autonomous, choices is quite restricted. Further, advocates do not clearly indicate their relative emphasis between the often conflicting goals of maximizing benefit and avoiding harm. In practice, their construction of harms is highly expansive, for disabilities include any constraints that “rational” people would decline if it were technically possible to do so. For advocates, this means that where enhancement measures are available, those constraints become avoidable limitations, and not to remove them is to harm. The centrality of harm-avoidance and their ideal utilitarian frame entail sociopolitical requirements that enhancement defenders disallow when trumpeting autonomy in the vein of individual choice. Advocates have thus not done enough to support the claim that their views are wholly separate from earlier eugenics. (shrink)

In his book, The Case Against Perfection, Michael J. Sandel has offered several arguments against biomedical human enhancements. However, his views have been forcefully criticized by Frances M. Kamm. This paper argues that while Kamm is correct in arguing that Sandel fails to establish the moral impermissibility of enhancements, he, nevertheless, offers resources for articulating our unease with enhancements. In particular, this paper argues that being willing to enhance oneself in any way is incompatible with having an identity as a (...) person. (shrink)

Sex selection, which refers to the attempt to choose or control the sex of a child prior to its birth, has become the subject of increasing ethical scrutiny and many jurisdictions have criminalized it except for serious sex-linked diseases or conditions that cannot easily be ameliorated or remedied. This paper argues that such a blanket prohibition is ethically unwarranted because it is based on a flawed understanding of the difference between sexist values and mere sex-oriented preferences. It distinguishes between ethics (...) and public policy, and suggests a way of allowing preference-based sex selection as a matter of public policy without permitting value-based sex selection. It further argues that medically-based sex selection should be publicly funded but that preference-base sex selection should not be paid for by society, and that the prohibition against value-based sex selection should be enforced through legislation that controls the licensing of health care facilities and through disciplinary procedures against health care professionals. (shrink)

This paper critically engages with how life not worth living (LNWL) and cognate concepts are used in the field of beginning-of-life bioethics as the basis of arguments for morally requiring the application of preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) and/or germline genome editing (GGE). It is argued that an objective conceptualization of LNWL is largely too unreliable in beginning-of-life cases for deriving decisive normative reasons that would constitute a moral duty on the part of intending parents. Subjective frameworks are found to be (...) more suitable to determine LNWL, but they are not accessible in beginning-of-life cases because there is no subject yet. Conceptual and sociopolitical problems are additionally pointed out regarding the common usage of clear case exemplars. The paper concludes that a moral requirement for the usage of PGD and GGE cannot be derived from the conceptual base of LNWL, as strong reasons that can be reliably determined are required to limit reproductive freedom on moral grounds. Educated predictions on prospective well-being might still be useful regarding the determination of moral permissibility of PGD and/or GGE. It is suggested that due to the high significance of subjective experience in the normativity of beginning-of-life bioethics, the discipline is called to more actively realize the inclusion of people with disabilities. This regards for instance research design, citation practices, and language choices to increase the accessibility of societal debates on the reproductive ethics of genetic technologies. (shrink)

Should a society oriented towards justice provide parents with the possibility of enhancing their children’s genes? The opposing arguments of authors in the Rawls School and of the theorist of communicative action, Jürgen Habermas, are analysed in terms of their key concepts. Their positions are then assessed from the point of view of the principles of the pedagogical task to educate towards autonomy under conditions of asymmetry. They each call for respect both of children’s difference and of their dependence, and (...) they ask for parents to moderate their expectations. In the light of this, Habermas’s critique of genetic intervention, based on a Kantian understanding of autonomy as the capacity to be moral, on Kierkegaard’s concept of being able to be oneself, and on respect for finitude, is here to be justified. (shrink)

This essay is part of a special issue celebrating 50 years of Political Theory. The ambition of the editors was to mark this half century not with a retrospective but with a confabulation of futures. Contributors were asked: What will political theory look and sound like in the next century and beyond? What claims might political theorists or their descendants be making in ten, twenty-five, fifty, a hundred years’ time? How might they vindicate those claims in their future contexts? How (...) will the consistent concerns of political theorists evolve into the questions critical for people decades or centuries from now? What new problems will engage the political theorists (or their rough equivalents) of the future? What forms might those take? What follows is one of the many confabulations published in response to these queries. Our earth is approaching its end. Through Project Arcadia our species has a chance at escape. In this paper, I want to argue that Arcadia is all things considered unjustifiable and unadvisable. It is unjustifiable because human beings have proven themselves incapable of stewarding sentient life on planet earth; for example, our collective response to climate change has been dire, handled almost exclusively through adaptation, committing vast areas of the world to desolation, desertification, or disappearance. Basic respect for life, and what we likely will make of some other instances of it, should counsel humility as we contemplate relocating ourselves to other life-supporting domains. It is inadvisable because our species, like the world, is impermanent. We will, at some point, have to contemplate the ceasing of our existence, and it is my argument that we contemplate this ceasing on the terra firm of our own planet. In conclusion, and drawing on the work of Samuel Scheffler and the Japanese concept of mono no aware, I will argue that there is considerable value, admittedly tainted with considerable melancholy, to be had in grasping the opportunity provided by planetary devastation to achieve some semblance of narrative completion. (shrink)

A preimplantation genetic test to discriminate between severe and mild autism spectrum disorder might be developed in the foreseeable future. Recently, the philosophers Julian Savulescu and Guy Kahane claimed that there are strong reasons for prospective parents to make use of such a test to prevent the birth of children who are disposed to autism or Asperger’s disorder. In this paper we will criticize this claim. We will discuss the morality of selection for mild autism in embryo selection in a (...) hypothetical in vitro fertilization (IVF) situation where preimplantation genetic diagnosis is performed and compare this with a similar selection for congenital deafness. To do this we first discuss relevant human differences. We then introduce the principle of human capabilities (PC) and compare this principle with the principle of procreative beneficence (PB) introduced by Savulescu and Kahane. We apply the two principles to selection for mild autism and selection for congenital deafness. We argue that PC allows for the selection for mild autism but rules out selection for congenital deafness. PB will not give clear answers; the ruling of PB depends to a large extent on expected social, cultural and political developments. We will argue that PC is preferable to PB. We will discuss arguments for the value of mild autism for individuals who have this condition and argue that they are able to lead a life with human dignity provided autism-friendly social circumstances are present. Neither PC nor PB yields strong reasons for prospective parents to seek to prevent the birth of children who are disposed to mild autism spectrum disorder. (shrink)

Abstrak Arendt banyak dikenal, baik sebagai seorang ilmuwan politik, maupun seorang filsuf. Para sarjana mendiskusikan ide-idenya, beserta korespondensi ide-ide tersebut dengan situasi politik kontemporer; baik di Indonesia, maupun di tempat lain di dunia. Gagasan Arendt tentang banalitas kejahatan, tentang kekerasan dan tentang asal usul totalitarianisme telah mendorong penelitian dan analisis lebih lanjut tentang masalah fenomena populisme, intoleransi dan polarisasi politik di Indonesia kontemporer, serta di belahan dunia lainnya. Tulisan ini membahas korespondensi antara filsafat politik Arendtian dengan Pancasila dan Undang-Undang Dasar (...) Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 1945, beserta ragam interpretasi kontemporernya. Makalah ini akan signifikan dalam memperkuat pembentukan karakter bangsa dan persatuan nasional Indonesia, baik secara konseptual maupun praktis. Tulisan ini didasarkan pada penelitian konseptual dengan metode penelitian kualitatif. Tulisan ini diharapkan dapat menjawab permasalahan kebangkitan populisme, retorika politik intoleran dan polarisasi politik yang saat ini terjadi di tanah air. Kata Kunci: Demokrasi Pancasila; Filsafat Politik; Filsafat Politik Arendtian; Hannah Arendt. (shrink)

Public bioethics focuses on deliberating about, recommending, or establishing social policies or practices concerning health care and biotechnology. A brace of premises underlies much of the work of public bioethics. First, there is the view that, if one approaches reality and human life as if both were without ultimate significance, one will find that one shares a common public bioethics. That is, if one abstains not only from any religious concerns, but even from philosophical reflections on the circumstance that life (...) might have ultimate meaning, one will be able to articulate a common neutral moral perspective that all persons can share and that can be the basis of a common public bioethics. The second premise is that the controversies in bioethics arise from the presence of religious belief, especially Christian belief, which supports a set of moral commitments that generate controversies that make the framing of public policy difficult. The view is that there is significant disagreement among persons who hold religious positions, particularly Christians, and that in public bioethics we should strive to eliminate these controversies by relying on a neutral moral framework. This paper documents and challenges these premises. It demonstrates that Christian bioethics finds itself already embedded in the field of secular moral controversy before it adds the perspectives it brings. (shrink)

A critical theory of controversy would require the integration ofthe normative study of argumentation with critical studies of practices. Jiirgen Habermas has made a substantial contribution to such a project by embedding argumentation in a theory of communication, while critically engaging academic and public debates. This essay explicates core concepts in Habermas's theory of argumentation, including his distinction between theory and practice, the different validity requirements for argumentation in general, the norms of moral and ethical-political argumentation and of bargaining. Argument (...) predicaments are posited as ways to discover and assess different types of validity claims competing as "the force ofthe better argument". Habermas's criticism of "administrative power" and "communicative power" illustrates a potential yield of critical inquiry into social controversy. (shrink)

In 1928, a German zoologist and philosopher named Helmuth Plessner published a book titled Die Stufen des Organischen und der Mensch: Einleitung in die philosophische Anthropologie. Almost a 100 years later, Jos de Mul has edited a collection of 26 new essays on Plessner’s text, titled Plessner’s Philosophical Anthropology: Perspectives and Prospects. The volume offers a variety of advanced discussions of its theme. In this review essay of de Mul’s collection, I provide a critical overview of the contents of the (...) new volume and some speculations on the possible motives and future directions of the current “Plessner renaissance.”. (shrink)

Bakgrunn: Preimplantasjonsgenetisk diagnostikk er en genetisk undersøkelse av befruktede egg før de settes inn i livmoren i forbindelse med assistert reproduksjon. Hensikten med PGD er å unngå at det fremtidige barnet får en alvorlig arvelig sykdom, og at par som på grunn av arvelig sykdom har vansker med å få barn, kan få avkom. PGD er kontroversielt og et sentralt tema for den pågående vurderingen og revisjonen av bioteknologiloven.Metode: Paradoksteori anvendes for å identifisere og analysere noen av kontroversene ved PGD. (...) Det skilles mellom tilsynelatende paradokser, antinomier og aporier. Materialet er offentlige dokumenter, debattinnlegg og faglitteratur.Resultater: Det finnes en rekke tilsynelatende paradokser på PGD-ens område, slik som at PGD gjøres selv om det er svært liten sannsynlighet for at det blir født et alvorlig sykt barn, og at det gjøres PGD for mindre alvorlige sykdommer når forutsetningen for PGD er alvorlig arvelig sykdom. Samtidig finnes det også antinomier: At PGD gir rett til helsehjelp uten at det eksisterer noen pasient, og at PGD gjennomføres selv ved høye kostnader og lav suksessrate. Om embryoet og fosteret har moralsk status og rett på beskyttelse, synes å utgjøre en apori.Konklusjon: Å formulere moralske utfordringer som paradokser kan være en fruktbar måte å tydeliggjøre utfordringer og motsetninger på. Dessuten kan det styre innsatsen: Vi bør bestrebe oss på å rydde opp i tilsynelatende paradokser, jobbe hardere med grunnlagsutfordringene ved antinomier og til en viss grad akseptere motsetningene ved aporiene.Nøkkelord: Preimplantasjonsgenetisk diagnostikk, paradoks, antinomi, aporiEnglish summary: PGD's ParadoxesBackground: Pre-implantation genetic diagnosis is a genetic test of embryos before implantation as part of in vitro fertilization. The purpose of using PGD is to help people avoid having children with serious genetic disease and to help those with genetically based infertility to have children. PGD has been controversial and is assessed as part of the revision of the Norwegian biotechnology act.Method: Paradox theory is used to identify and analyse controversies with PGD. It distinguishes between resolvable paradoxes, antinomies and aporias. The material comprises official documents, public debates, and professional publications.Results: Many resolvable paradoxes are identified with PGD, such as that PGD is done even in cases where there is very little chance that a seriously ill child will be born and in case of diseases that are not considered to be «serious inheritable disease,» as required by the law. At the same time, there are antinomies: PGD is subsumed within a patient's rights even if there is no patient, and PGD is done even when the success rate is low and the expenses are high. Whether the embryo and the foetus have a right to protection appears to be an aporia.Conclusion: Analysing moral problems in terms of paradoxes may be a fruitful way of displaying challenges and conflicts. Moreover, it may give focus and direction to our endeavours. That is, we should try to resolve the resolvable paradoxes and work harder with the conflicts of the antinomies, and, to a certain extent, to accept the antagonisms of the aporias. (shrink)

The concept of sex selection for “family balancing” is based on the notion that a family is “balanced” when it includes children of “both genders.” Clinics that offer IVF for family balancing present it as an option for couples who “want to experience the joy of raising both a male and female child”. Families with at least one child of each gender are claimed to have gender diversity and to provide more enriching experiences to all family members. Some theorists call (...) these families “balanced”, while others acknowledge that such a term could be pejorative, implying that families with children of one gender are unbalanced and, thereby, lesser. These theorists... (shrink)

Ideas about freedom and related concepts like autonomy and self-determination play a prominent role in the moral debate about human enhancement interventions. However, there is not a single understanding of freedom available, and arguments referring to freedom are simultaneously used to argue both for and against enhancement interventions. This gives rise to misunderstandings and polemical arguments. The paper attempts to disentangle the different distinguishable concepts, classifies them and shows how they relate to one another in order to allow for a (...) more structured and clearer debate. It concludes in identifying the individual underpinnings and the social conditions of choice and decision-making as particularly salient dimensions of freedom in the ethical debate about human enhancement. (shrink)

The prospect of creating and using human–animal chimeras and hybrids that are significantly human-like in their composition, phenotype, cognition, or behavior meets with divergent moral judgments: on the one side, it is claimed that such beings might be candidates for human-analogous rights to protection and care; on the other side, it is supposed that their existence might disturb fundamental natural and social orders. This paper tries to show that both positions are paradoxically intertwined: they rely on two kinds of species (...) arguments, “individual species arguments” and “group species arguments,” which formulate opposing demands but are conceptually interdependent. As a consequence, the existence of HACHs may challenge exactly those normative standards on which the protection of HACHs may eventually be based. This ethical paradox could constitute the ultimate source of the “moral confusion” that some authors have suspected HACHs to provoke. (shrink)

In this article, I present what I believe to be the core of Jürgen Habermas’s views on the morality, ethics, and regulation of emerging genetic and reproductive technologies in his bookThe Future of Human Nature.

While I agree in principle both with Banja's (2011) moral relativist claim that there are no absolute moral categories and with his anti-essentialist position (Hauskeller 2009b), it seems to me tha...

:It has been argued that moral bioenhancement is desirable even if it would make it impossible for us to do what is morally required. Others find this apparent loss of freedom deplorable. However, it is difficult to see how a world in which there is no moral evil can plausibly be regarded as worse than a world in which people are not only free to do evil, but also where they actually do it, which would commit us to the seemingly (...) paradoxical view that, under certain circumstances, the bad can be better than the good. Notwithstanding, this view is defended here. (shrink)

This article explores solidarity as an ethical concept underpinning rules in the global health context. First, it considers the theoretical conceptualisation of the value and some specific duties it supports (ie: its expression in the broadest sense and its derivative action-guiding duties). Second, it considers the manifestation of solidarity in two international regulatory instruments. It concludes that, although solidarity is represented in these instruments, it is often incidental. This fact, their emphasis on other values and their internal weaknesses diminishes the (...) action-guiding impact of the solidarity rules. The global health and human subject research scene needs a completely new instrument specifically directed at means by which solidarity can be achieved, and a reformed infrastructure dedicated to realising that value. (shrink)

Bioethics influences public policy, scientific research, and clinical practice. Thinkers in Continental traditions have increasingly contributed scholarship to this field, and their approaches allow new insights and alternative normative guidance. In this essay, examples of the following Continental approaches in bioethics are presented and considered: phenomenology and existentialism; deconstruction; Foucauldian methodologies; and biopolitical analyses. Also highlighted are Continental feminisms and the philosophy of disability. Continental approaches are importantly diverse, but those I focus upon here reveal embedded models of individualized autonomy (...) in medical discourses and encourage awareness of medicine's normalizing edges, thereby drawing attention to lacunae in traditional bioethical frameworks. (shrink)

There must be few philosophical projects more serious than Jürgen Habermas’s lifelong effort to realize the lofty universalist ambitions of the Enlightenment in his communicative theory of rational discourse and deliberative democracy.

Matti Häyry’s new book Rationality and the Genetic Challenge discusses the ethics of human genetic modification and the bioethical rationalities that inform the different ethical conclusions authors have advanced. It is aimed at correcting the belief that “only one rationality exists or one morality exists; that those that disagree [with them] are unreasonable or evil.” Häyry argues that there are multiple rationalities, and that even though ethical issues may have solutions within individual rationalities, disagreements that have their root in separate (...) rational approaches cannot be universally solved by intellectual arguments. In debates about the ethics of using new biotechnologies to genetically modify human beings, the normal state is one of fundamental disagreement over almost all of the anticipated uses to which the technology could be put. Häyry’s point is that such a state of affairs is not necessarily due to a lack of reason because there are many, equally valid, ways of being reasonable. (shrink)

Reason, religion, and public culture have been of significant interest recently, with critics reevaluating modernity's conception of secularism and calling for a “postsecular” public discourse. Simultaneously, one sees rising religious fundamentalisms and a growing style of antirationalism in public debate. These conditions make a reconceptualization of public reason necessary. The main goals of this article are to establish agnostic public reason as the conceptual guide and normative ethic for public debate in liberal democracies by considering the secular/religious reason boundary explicitly (...) and to argue that this ethic of public reason requires a commitment to reason giving and a particular epistemic attitude but that it does not, nor should it, take precedence over first-order judgments. An ethics of citizenship based on the process of reason giving with the appropriate epistemic stance might be one step toward rectifying the problem of an increasing separation between enclave publics, even if, by design, it cannot solve fundamental disagreement. (shrink)

Anthropocene jurisprudence amounts to a legal attitude that posits human beings as the ultimate subject to which the legal ontology, epistemology, and language serve. This attitude inevitably leads to exceptionalism not only in terminology but also in the impact which legal verdicts incur, especially on the natural environment and species. In this paper, we make a coupled reading of jurisprudence and environmental science while suggesting a post-Anthropocene model of law which can be made philosophically consistent by appropriating a new theory (...) of human as a 'biocultural creature' to outgrow the attitude of exceptionalism in law. In doing so, we take recourse of dynamic systems and complexity theory for a law to account for the ontology, epistemology and linguistics of post-Anthropocene jurisprudence. (shrink)

Volume 19, Issue 7, July 2019, Page 24-26.

Recent developments in the study of our brain and neurochemical maps have sparked much enthusiasm in some scholars, making room for speculations over the possibility to shape our morality from within ourselves rather than through [failed] socio-political projects. This paper aims at criticising the prospected scenario put forward by some scholars supporting a specific version of Moral Enhancement as an overly optimistically described manipulative tools. To do so, I will focus on a specific version of Moral Enhancers, namely Emotional Enhancers. (...) By looking from close at this group of enhancers and the potential results of their implementation, I will underline the risks that those could pose to sexual minorities, and I will use this analysis to support a much more cautious assessment of these drugs and a broader assessment of what their social acceptance would mean. (shrink)

With the hope of somehow contributing to the ongoing discussion on the topic, this paper is loosely based on the debate that emerged from Rob Sparrow's article “Should human beings have sex? Sexual dimorphism and human enhancement”. Building on some of his arguments, my claim is that we should not refer to gender when discussing not-yet-born agents. More broadly still, my intention is to provide a further analysis of the intersection of the concepts of gender and autonomy. I will begin (...) by briefly highlighting Sparrow's article and critiques, with special emphasis on the poststructuralist attack. In doing so, I will consider the differences between structuralism and poststructuralism in relation to this debate. Subsequently, I will draw a parallel between Judith Butler's notion of the performativity of gender, sex and Ronald Dworkin's distinction between zoe and bios. The next move will then be to re-divert attention to the crucial role that health plays in the discussion, suggesting that one of the substantial differences between human enhancers and non-enhancers is the ranking that health has in their corresponding scale of values. Setting the bar for how an organism functions “normally” will be the last step necessary to create the basis for my main claim: building on Butler's description of the singular agent in relation to others, I will suggest Jürgen Habermas and Onora O'Neill as credible and valuable expansions of a position willing to reconcile individual and relational autonomy, supporting this final claim with the words of Immanuel Kant. If we aim to use genetic engineering and preimplantation genetic diagnosis to prevent unhealthy children from being born – as I shall state we should – we can use this notion of normality in a way that will be accepted also by those who are historically critical of such a way of conceptualising a human being, only if we understand the parallel need for society to shift to a more inclusive and shared definition of autonomy. (shrink)

According to advocates and authors from different disciplines interested in biomedicine, biomedical research in genetics and genomics has the potential to transform medicine, the economy, society, and humanity as a whole. Believing in this potential, biomedical scientists produce knowledge and participate in the decisions concerning the orientation of this research and its applications. Through a qualitative analysis of scientists' practice-related discourse, we identified three main sources of complexity in their involvement in the "commercial revolution" of science. First, scientists insist on (...) the existence of different types of university-industry relationships. Second, they urge that the multiple realities of genetic and genomic research be acknowledged. Third, they present themselves as individuals in a diverse scientific community, each with a unique position in this commercial revolution. This paper draws attention to these complexities because they must be considered when engaging in a study of genetics and genomics advances from a research ethics perspective. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to compare two reports on human cloning, one by the US President’s Council on Bioethics and one by the Italian Comitato Nazionale per la Bioetica. I shall focus on those arguments against human cloning, in both reports, which are articulated in terms of (a) the development of human identity, (b) the meaning of human reproduction, and (c) the nature of family relationships. My general conclusion will be that the arguments against human cloning put forth (...) by both reports are not sound, because they are grounded on the dubious assumption that there is a “natural way” of thinking about identity, reproduction, and family relationships. (shrink)

Fundamental differences between current and past knowledge in the field of biotechnology mean that we now have at our disposal the means to irreversibly change what is meant by ‘human nature’. This paper explores some of the ethical issues that accompany the attempt to increase scientific control over the human genetic code in what amounts to a diminishing of difference and the reduction of human life to scientific explanations at the expense of spiritual, cultural and communal considerations. Within such a (...) limited view, the critical role of education is reduced in favour of promoting psychological efficiency, with the possibility of accelerating learning and increasing intellectual capacity through genetic manipulation. A major concern expressed in the paper is the fine line between corrective therapy and psychological enhancement: Who should be defining the normal range of human difference? And what degree of caution should be required in redesigning future generations? The unknown dangers inherent in the application of genetic technology to human life suggests that current precautions may not go far enough in recognising that education is a contestable field. (shrink)

In _Vulnerability and Critical Theory_, Estelle Ferrarese identifies contemporary developments on the theme of vulnerability within critical theory while also seeking to reconstruct an idea of vulnerability that enables an articulation of the political and demonstrates how it is socially produced.

Issues concerning naturalism have increasingly become the subject of philosophical reflections involving ontological, epistemological, and even ethics affairs. The most popular topic for contemporary philosophy has been the relationship between ontological results of Darwinism and epistemology. Despite the varied circumstances of its establishment, naturalism almost always produces recommendations that reflect a worldview much “weaker” (as in the case of Habermas) than the strong one more common among scientism. There are good structural reasons for this difference. The aim of this paper (...) is to elucidate some of distinctive social features of Habermas's conception of the human being and its implications in the Theory of Communicative Action (1982). Therefore, it is shown that his anthropology takes a naturalistic and Darwinist perspective in the weak naturalism perspective. In the first part, Darwin ́s legacy is analysed as a research program, and Habermas ́s studies on biological anthropology are compared with the latest research in genetics and palaeontology. In the second part, we will show Habermas's proposal to confront an epistemological dualism through a weak non‐reductionist naturalism as a critique of modern metaphysics, which structures a new pragmatic realism. (shrink)

I show how a notion of the political as emerging reality which does not derive from any other logic — as a phenomenon devoid of foundations, of predetermined elements — features in Habermas’s theory of society. There is certainly nothing obvious about such a claim, insofar as the political is conceived, across his entire oeuvre, in relation to the public sphere, which is presented as a social space in which the functions and properties he attributes to language in general are (...) made explicit and catalysed. It appears the public sphere coincides with the constitutive rules of universal pragmatics. More generally, the motif of the public sphere is bound up with topics which all curb the political “mode” — i.e., the validity attributed to political statements (1), the weight given, in myriad ways, to morality in the public sphere (2), and the concern to preserve science and complexity no matter what (3). I examine each one in turn, in order to demonstrate how, precisely, through the limits imposed on them, they enable us to grasp the specificity of the public sphere as political instance and, from this basis, identify a place for the political in Jürgen Habermas’s theory. (shrink)

When reflecting on the human condition, vulnerability is a characteristic which is clearly evident, because anyone is exposed to the possibility of being wounded (and is, therefore, vulnerable, from the Latin word "vulnus", wound). In fact, human vulnerability, intended as a universal condition affecting finite and mortal human beings, is closely linked to embodiment, intended as the constitutive bond every human has with a physical body, subject to changes and to the passing of time. In today’s cultural context, permeated by (...) emerging technologies, theories in favor of the so-called human enhancement through the use of the Genetics–Nanotechnology–Robotics (GNR) Revolution or NBIC Convergence technologies, in particular transhumanism, are emerging in the bioethical debate and seem to question the fundamentally vulnerable nature of human beings, by proposing not only abstract theories, but also concrete techno-scientific projects for its overcoming. Such a project, however, could turn out to be fallacious and inconsistent and could lead to ethically unacceptable consequences. Instead, a coherent (and ethical) way of responding to constitutive human vulnerability seems to be its understanding and acceptance. (shrink)

The contents of what we transmit in colleges and universities as philosophic traditions need upgrading. But so do the methods of transmission.

The human being’s mastery of itself, on which the self is founded, practically always involves the annihilation of the subject in whose service that mastery is maintained, because the substance which is mastered, suppressed, and disintegrated by self-preservation is nothing other than the living entity.

Face transplants have been performed, in a small number, since 2005. Popular concern over the morality of the face transplant has tended to focus on the role that one’s face plays in one’s sense of self or one’s personal identity. In order to address this concern, the current paper will explore the significance of face transplants in the light of a theory of the self that draws on symbolic interactionism, narrative theory, and accounts of embodiment. The paper will respond to (...) certain presuppositions concerning personal identity made by Huxtable and Woodley. A theory of the self will be articulated that draws on the work of Merleau-Ponty and G. H. Mead, in order to place embodiment and social interaction centrally to an understanding of self-identity. This will allow an account of the nature of the suffering that a face transplant seeks to remedy, and its worth as an operation, and crucially the impact that it may have on the sense of personal identity of the recipient of the transplant. The conclusion will review the treatment in the context of the prejudices that members of contemporary societies may hold against those with disfigurements. (shrink)

Debate concerning human enhancement often revolves around the question of whether there is a common “nature” that all human beings share and which is unwarrantedly violated by enhancing one’s capabilities beyond the “species-typical” norm. I explicate Thomas Aquinas’s influential theory of human nature, noting certain key traits commonly shared among human beings that define each as a “person” who possesses inviolable moral status. Understanding the specific qualities that define the nature of human persons, which includes self-conscious awareness, capacity for intellective (...) thought, and volitional autonomy, informs the ethical assessment of various forms of enhancement. Some forms of cognitive and physical enhancement may be desirable from the perspective of what constitutes the “flourishing” of human persons in our fundamental nature; while other forms of enhancement, such as emotive or so-called “moral” enhancement, run the risk of detracting from human flourishing when evaluated from the virtue-theoretic perspective Aquinas promotes. (shrink)