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  1. Are Employees Safer When the CEO Looks Greedy?Don O’Sullivan, Leon Zolotoy, Madhu Veeraraghavan & Jennifer R. Overbeck - forthcoming - Journal of Business Ethics:1-19.
    In this study, we explore the relationship between perceived CEO greed and workplace safety. Drawing on insights from the social psychology literature, we theorize that CEOs are cognizant that their perceived greed has implications for how observers respond to failures in workplace safety. Our theorizing points to a somewhat counterintuitive positive relationship between perceived CEO greed and workplace safety. Consistent with our theorizing, we find that the relationship is attenuated when the CEO is insulated from how observers respond to firm (...)
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  • CEO Inside Debt and Employee Workplace Safety.Xuan Wu, Yueting Li & Yangxin Yu - 2022 - Journal of Business Ethics 182 (1):159-175.
    Theoretical studies suggest that, when determining the workplace safety level, CEOs face a trade-off between ex ante safety-improving expenditures and the expected losses due to ex post injury and illness occurrences. We examine whether firms with higher CEO inside debt holdings have safer workplaces. Using establishment-level employee workplace injury and illness data, we find that CEOs’ inside debt holdings are negatively associated with employee workplace injury and illness cases. This relationship is more pronounced if workers’ compensation premiums are more sensitive (...)
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  • Geographic Concentration of Institutional Blockholders and Workplace Safety Violations.Xin Cheng, Orhun Guldiken & Wei Shi - 2023 - Journal of Business Ethics 186 (3):593-613.
    This study uses insights from the political perspective on corporate governance to investigate the influence of geographic concentration of institutional blockholders on workplace safety violations. When institutional investors who have a blockholding stake (i.e., institutional blockholders) are geographically concentrated, corporate managers are more likely to pursue efficiency at the expense of employee interests because these blockholders may find it easier to coordinate their actions, strengthening their power over corporate managers and ultimately giving rise to more workplace safety violations. We also (...)
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