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  1. A Comparative Defense of Self-initiated Prospective Moral Answerability for Autonomous Robot harm.Marc Champagne & Ryan Tonkens - 2023 - Science and Engineering Ethics 29 (4):1-26.
    As artificial intelligence becomes more sophisticated and robots approach autonomous decision-making, debates about how to assign moral responsibility have gained importance, urgency, and sophistication. Answering Stenseke’s (2022a) call for scaffolds that can help us classify views and commitments, we think the current debate space can be represented hierarchically, as answers to key questions. We use the resulting taxonomy of five stances to differentiate—and defend—what is known as the “blank check” proposal. According to this proposal, a person activating a robot could (...)
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  • Can Autonomous Agents Without Phenomenal Consciousness Be Morally Responsible?László Bernáth - 2021 - Philosophy and Technology 34 (4):1363-1382.
    It is an increasingly popular view among philosophers that moral responsibility can, in principle, be attributed to unconscious autonomous agents. This trend is already remarkable in itself, but it is even more interesting that most proponents of this view provide more or less the same argument to support their position. I argue that as it stands, the Extension Argument, as I call it, is not sufficient to establish the thesis that unconscious autonomous agents can be morally responsible. I attempt to (...)
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  • The Spectrum of Responsibility Ascription for End Users of Neurotechnologies.Andreas Schönau - 2021 - Neuroethics 14 (3):423-435.
    Invasive neural devices offer novel prospects for motor rehabilitation on different levels of agentive behavior. From a functional perspective, they interact with, support, or enable human intentional actions in such a way that movement capabilities are regained. However, when there is a technical malfunction resulting in an unintended movement, the complexity of the relationship between the end user and the device sometimes makes it difficult to determine who is responsible for the outcome – a circumstance that has been coined as (...)
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  • (2 other versions)The ethics of crashes with self‐driving cars: A roadmap, II.Sven Nyholm - 2018 - Philosophy Compass 13 (7):e12506.
    Self‐driving cars hold out the promise of being much safer than regular cars. Yet they cannot be 100% safe. Accordingly, we need to think about who should be held responsible when self‐driving cars crash and people are injured or killed. We also need to examine what new ethical obligations might be created for car users by the safety potential of self‐driving cars. The article first considers what lessons might be learned from the growing legal literature on responsibility for crashes with (...)
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  • On the legal responsibility of autonomous machines.Bartosz Brożek & Marek Jakubiec - 2017 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 25 (3):293-304.
    The paper concerns the problem of the legal responsibility of autonomous machines. In our opinion it boils down to the question of whether such machines can be seen as real agents through the prism of folk-psychology. We argue that autonomous machines cannot be granted the status of legal agents. Although this is quite possible from purely technical point of view, since the law is a conventional tool of regulating social interactions and as such can accommodate various legislative constructs, including legal (...)
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  • Moral Judgments in the Age of Artificial Intelligence.Yulia W. Sullivan & Samuel Fosso Wamba - 2022 - Journal of Business Ethics 178 (4):917-943.
    The current research aims to answer the following question: “who will be held responsible for harm involving an artificial intelligence system?” Drawing upon the literature on moral judgments, we assert that when people perceive an AI system’s action as causing harm to others, they will assign blame to different entity groups involved in an AI’s life cycle, including the company, the developer team, and even the AI system itself, especially when such harm is perceived to be intentional. Drawing upon the (...)
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