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  1. Introduction to the Special Issue.Fabrizio Macagno & Alice Toniolo - 2022 - Informal Logic 43 (3):1-23.
    Douglas Walton’s work is extremely vast, multifaceted, and interdisciplinary. He developed theoretical proposals that have been used in disciplines that are not traditionally related to philosophy, such as law, education, discourse analysis, artificial intelligence, or medical communication. Through his papers and books, Walton redefined the boundaries not only of argumentation theory, but also logic and philosophy. He was a philosopher in the sense that his interest was developing theoretical models that can help explain reality, and more importantly interact with it. (...)
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  • Reasonable Doubt and Alternative Hypotheses: A Bayesian Analysis.Stephan Hartmann & Ulrike Hahn - forthcoming - Journal.
    A longstanding question is the extent to which "reasonable doubt" may be expressed simply in terms of a threshold degree of belief. In this context, we examine the extent to which learning about possible alternatives may alter one's beliefs about a target hypothesis, even when no new "evidence" linking them to the hypothesis is acquired. Imagine the following scenario: a crime has been committed and Alice, the police's main suspect has been brought to trial. There are several pieces of evidence (...)
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  • Presumptions, and How They Relate to Arguments from Ignorance.Petar Bodlović - 2019 - Argumentation 33 (4):579-604.
    By explaining the argument from ignorance in terms of the presumption of innocence, many textbooks in argumentation theory suggest that some arguments from ignorance might share essential features with some types of presumptive reasoning. The stronger version of this view, suggesting that arguments from ignorance and presumptive reasoning are almost indistinguishable, is occasionally proposed by Douglas Walton. This paper explores the nature and limits of the stronger proposal and argues that initial presumptions and arguments from ignorance are not closely connected. (...)
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  • Peer Disagreement and the Bridge Principle.Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2021 - Topoi 40 (5):1213-1223.
    One explanation of rational peer disagreement is that agents find themselves in an epistemically permissive situation. In fact, some authors have suggested that, while evidence could be impermissive at the intrapersonal level, it is permissive at the interpersonal level. In this paper, I challenge such a claim. I will argue that, at least in cases of rational disagreement under full disclosure, there cannot be more interpersonal epistemically permissive situations than there are intrapersonal epistemically permissive situations. In other words, with respect (...)
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  • Presumption as a Modal Qualifier: Presumption, Inference, and Managing Epistemic Risk.David Godden - 2017 - Argumentation 31 (3):485-511.
    Standards and norms for reasoning function, in part, to manage epistemic risk. Properly used, modal qualifiers like presumably have a role in systematically managing epistemic risk by flagging and tracking type-specific epistemic merits and risks of the claims they modify. Yet, argumentation-theoretic accounts of presumption often define it in terms of modalities of other kinds, thereby failing to recognize the unique risk profile of each. This paper offers a stipulative account of presumption, inspired by Ullmann-Margalit, as an inferentially generated modal (...)
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  • The Nature and the Place of Presumptions in Law and Legal Argumentation.Raymundo Gama - 2017 - Argumentation 31 (3):555-572.
    This paper explores two persistent questions in the literature on presumptions: the place and the nature of presumptions in law and legal argumentation. These questions were originally raised by James Bradley Thayer, one of the masters of the Law of Evidence and the author of the classic chapter devoted this subject in A preliminary treatise on Evidence. Like Thayer, I believe that these questions deserve attention. First the paper shows that the connection between presumptions and argumentation is a constant feature (...)
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  • The Appeal to Expert Opinion: Quantitative Support for a Bayesian Network Approach.Adam J. L. Harris, Ulrike Hahn, Jens K. Madsen & Anne S. Hsu - 2016 - Cognitive Science 40 (6):1496-1533.
    The appeal to expert opinion is an argument form that uses the verdict of an expert to support a position or hypothesis. A previous scheme-based treatment of the argument form is formalized within a Bayesian network that is able to capture the critical aspects of the argument form, including the central considerations of the expert's expertise and trustworthiness. We propose this as an appropriate normative framework for the argument form, enabling the development and testing of quantitative predictions as to how (...)
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  • Causal Argument.Ulrike Hahn, Frank Zenker & Roland Bluhm - 2017 - In Michael Waldmann (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Causal Reasoning. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. pp. 475-494.
    In this chapter, we outline the range of argument forms involving causation that can be found in everyday discourse. We also survey empirical work concerned with the generation and evaluation of such arguments. This survey makes clear that there is presently no unified body of research concerned with causal argument. We highlight the benefits of a unified treatment both for those interested in causal cognition and those interested in argumentation, and identify the key challenges that must be met for a (...)
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  • The Oxford Handbook of Causal Reasoning.Michael Waldmann (ed.) - 2017 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
    Causal reasoning is one of our most central cognitive competencies, enabling us to adapt to our world. Causal knowledge allows us to predict future events, or diagnose the causes of observed facts. We plan actions and solve problems using knowledge about cause-effect relations. Without our ability to discover and empirically test causal theories, we would not have made progress in various empirical sciences. In the past decades, the important role of causal knowledge has been discovered in many areas of cognitive (...)
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  • Reasoning from paradigms and negative evidence.Fabrizio Macagno & Douglas N. Walton - 2011 - Pragmatics and Cognition 19 (1):92-116.
    Reasoning from negative evidence takes place where an expected outcome is tested for, and when it is not found, a conclusion is drawn based on the significance of the failure to find it. By using Gricean maxims and implicatures, we show how a set of alternatives, which we call a paradigm, provides the deep inferential structure on which reasoning from lack of evidence is based. We show that the strength of reasoning from negative evidence depends on how the arguer defines (...)
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  • Burdens of Proof and the Case for Unevenness.Imran Aijaz, Jonathan McKeown-Green & Aness Webster - 2013 - Argumentation 27 (3):259-282.
    How is the burden of proof to be distributed among individuals who are involved in resolving a particular issue? Under what conditions should the burden of proof be distributed unevenly? We distinguish attitudinal from dialectical burdens and argue that these questions should be answered differently, depending on which is in play. One has an attitudinal burden with respect to some proposition when one is required to possess sufficient evidence for it. One has a dialectical burden with respect to some proposition (...)
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  • Because Hitler did it! Quantitative tests of Bayesian argumentation using ad hominem.Adam J. L. Harris, Anne S. Hsu & Jens K. Madsen - 2012 - Thinking and Reasoning 18 (3):311 - 343.
    Bayesian probability has recently been proposed as a normative theory of argumentation. In this article, we provide a Bayesian formalisation of the ad Hitlerum argument, as a special case of the ad hominem argument. Across three experiments, we demonstrate that people's evaluation of the argument is sensitive to probabilistic factors deemed relevant on a Bayesian formalisation. Moreover, we provide the first parameter-free quantitative evidence in favour of the Bayesian approach to argumentation. Quantitative Bayesian prescriptions were derived from participants' stated subjective (...)
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  • On argument strength.Niki Pfeifer - 2012 - In Frank Zenker (ed.), Bayesian Argumentation – The Practical Side of Probability. Springer. pp. 185-193.
    Everyday life reasoning and argumentation is defeasible and uncertain. I present a probability logic framework to rationally reconstruct everyday life reasoning and argumentation. Coherence in the sense of de Finetti is used as the basic rationality norm. I discuss two basic classes of approaches to construct measures of argument strength. The first class imposes a probabilistic relation between the premises and the conclusion. The second class imposes a deductive relation. I argue for the second class, as the first class is (...)
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  • The Conditional Feasibility of Global Egalitarian Justice.Dominik Zahrnt - 2013 - Res Cogitans 9 (1).
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  • Reasoning and argumentation: Towards an integrated psychology of argumentation.Jos Hornikx & Ulrike Hahn - 2012 - Thinking and Reasoning 18 (3):225 - 243.
    Although argumentation plays an essential role in our lives, there is no integrated area of research on the psychology of argumentation. Instead research on argumentation is conducted in a number of separate research communities that are spread across disciplines and have only limited interaction. With a view to bridging these different strands, we first distinguish between three meanings of the word ?argument?: argument as a reason, argument as a structured sequence of reasons and claims, and argument as a social exchange. (...)
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  • Certainty Beyond a Reasonable Doubt.Giovanni Tuzet - 2023 - Contemporary Pragmatism 20 (4):398-423.
    The paper argues for a pragmatist understanding of the reasonable doubt standard in law. It builds on the idea that our dispositions to act signal the epistemic states we are in. This helps clarify the notion of a reasonable doubt and the idea of being certain beyond it. More specifically, the paper points out three major standards of proof used in legal contexts and the rationale of their distinction. It articulates the received view according to which the reasonable doubt standard (...)
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  • A normative framework for argument quality: argumentation schemes with a Bayesian foundation.Ulrike Hahn & Jos Hornikx - 2016 - Synthese 193 (6):1833-1873.
    In this paper, it is argued that the most fruitful approach to developing normative models of argument quality is one that combines the argumentation scheme approach with Bayesian argumentation. Three sample argumentation schemes from the literature are discussed: the argument from sign, the argument from expert opinion, and the appeal to popular opinion. Limitations of the scheme-based treatment of these argument forms are identified and it is shown how a Bayesian perspective may help to overcome these. At the same time, (...)
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  • Rational argument, rational inference.Ulrike Hahn, Adam J. L. Harris & Mike Oaksford - 2012 - Argument and Computation 4 (1):21 - 35.
    (2013). Rational argument, rational inference. Argument & Computation: Vol. 4, Formal Models of Reasoning in Cognitive Psychology, pp. 21-35. doi: 10.1080/19462166.2012.689327.
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  • El manejo de la carga de la prueba en declaraciones públicas de empresas chilenas involucradas en escándalos.Millaray Salas - 2016 - Logos: Revista de Lingüística, Filosofía y Literatura 26 (2):260-277.
    Cuando enfrentan un escándalo, las empresas deben entablar una comunicación efectiva para intentar aminorar los efectos de la publicidad negativa sobre su imagen corporativa. Uno de los géneros empleados por las empresas como formas de discurso de reparación de la imagen es la declaración pública, que corresponde a un texto escrito corto emitido por una empresa con el propósito de comunicar su versión de la crisis que enfrenta directamente al público general, publicándola en el sitio web de la compañía, o (...)
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  • (2 other versions)Burden of Proof in a Modified Hamblin Dialogue System.Douglas Walton - 2011 - Informal Logic 31 (4):279-304.
    In his book on fallacies, Hamblin built a very simple system for argumentation in dialogue he called the Why Because System with Questions. In his discussion of this system, he replaced the concept of burden of proof with a simpler concept of initiative, which could be described as something like getting the upper hand as the argumentation moves back and forth in the dialogue between the one party and the other. No doubt he realized that the concept of burden of (...)
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  • Abductive conditionals as a test case for inferentialism.Patricia Mirabile & Igor Douven - 2020 - Cognition 200 (C):104232.
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  • On Presumptions, Burdens of Proof, and Explanations.Petar Bodlović - 2020 - Informal Logic 40 (2):255-294.
    On the standard view, all presumptions share the same deontic function: they asymmetrically allocate the burden of proof. But what, exactly, does this function amount to? Once presumptions are rejected, do they place the burden of arguing, the burden of explanation, or the most general burden of reasoning on their opponents? In this paper, I take into account the differences between cognitive and practical presumptions and argue that the standard accounts of deontic function are at least ambiguous, and likely implausible. (...)
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  • Dr Livingstone, I Presume?Pascal Engel - 2021 - Episteme 18 (3):477-491.
    Presumption is often discussed in law, less often in epistemology. Is it an attitude? If so where can we locate it within the taxonomy of epistemic attitudes? Is it a kind of belief, a judgment, an assumption or a supposition? Or is it a species of inference? There are two basic models of presumption: judgmental, as a kind of judgment, and legal, taken from the use of presumptions in law. The legal model suggests that presumption is a practical inference, whereas (...)
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  • In the Space of Reasonable Doubt.Marion Vorms & Ulrike Hahn - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 15):3609-3633.
    This paper explores ‘reasonable doubt’ as an enlightening notion to think of reasoning and decision-making generally, beyond the judicial domain. The paper starts from a decision-theoretic understanding of the notion, whereby it can be defined in terms of degrees of belief and a probabilistic confirmation threshold for action. It then highlights some of the limits of this notion, and proposes a richer analysis of epistemic states and reasoning through the lens of ‘reasonable doubt’, which in turn is likely to supplement (...)
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  • On the strength of presumptions.Petar Bodlović - 2022 - Pragmatics and Cognition 29 (1):82-110.
    Traditionally, a presumption is a dialogically privileged, yet defeasible proposition that allocates the burden of proof to a party who challenges it. This paper investigates the strength of presumptions. First, it explains how ‘strength’ contributes to defining the concept of presumption. Second, it provides an overview of (contextual, justificatory, and deontic) factors determining a presumption’s strength. Finally, it analyses the predominant view that defines strength in terms of the Challenger’s burden of proof: the stronger (weaker) the presumptionp, the more (less) (...)
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  • On the presumption of equality.Juha Räikkä - 2019 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 22 (7):809-822.
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  • (2 other versions)Speech Act Rules for Burden of Proof in a Modified Hamblin Dialogue System.Douglas Walton - 2011 - Informal Logic 31 (4):279-304.
    In his book on fallacies, Hamblin built a very simple system for argumentation in dialogue he called the Why Because System with Questions. In his discussion of this system, he replaced the concept of burden of proof with a simpler concept of initiative, which could be described as something like getting the upper hand as the argumentation moves back and forth in the dialogue between the one party and the other. No doubt he realized that the concept of burden of (...)
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