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Multiple Selves and Culpability

Legal Theory 3 (3):249-272 (1997)

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  1. Can self-validating neuroenhancement be autonomous?Jukka Varelius - 2020 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 23 (1):51-59.
    Consider that an individual improves her capacities by neuroscientific means. It turns out that, besides altering her in the way(s) she intended, the enhancement also changes her personality in significant way(s) she did not foresee. Yet the person endorses her new self because the neuroenhancement she underwent changed her. Can the person’s approval of her new personality be autonomous? While questions of autonomy have already gathered a significant amount of attention in philosophical literature on human enhancement, the problem just described—henceforth (...)
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