In this article, I present different readings of Confucius's irony in the Analects (or Lunyu 論語) and expand on the implications of irony for how we perceive Confucius. Scholars who have appreciated the irony of Confucius tend to see it as distinctive of an unsagely, everyday man, often juxtaposed to the dominant image of the Master as a hyperserious sage. Moreover, irony is considered a pedagogical tool. These readings mainly recognize verbal irony (Confucius means the opposite of what he says). (...) I discuss a second type of irony: complex irony (Confucius both means and does not mean what he says). I argue that sageliness is not incompatible with irony, and further propose that complex irony can be found beyond the sentence level; it can be the feature of the relation between specific sayings. Adapting to his interlocutors' diverse personalities and needs, and to a constantly changing world, Confucius sometimes provides different and even conflicting answers to the same questions, based on contextual appropriateness. Each answer is meant to be taken literally and fits one concrete situation. The same answer, however, can be simultaneously ineffective or even dangerous in another albeit seemingly similar context. Thus Confucius sometimes both means what he says and does not mean it in an absolute sense. (shrink)

_A much-needed consideration of methodology in comparative philosophy._.

Many scholars note that the Analects, and Confucian philosophy more generally, hold a conception of knowing that more closely approximates ‘knowing-how’ than ‘knowing-that’. However, I argue that this description is not sufficiently sensitive to the concerns of the early Confucians and their focus on self-cultivation. I propose that a particular conception of knowing—knowing to act in the moment—is better suited to capturing the Analects’ emphasis on exemplary lives in actual contexts. These investigations might also contribute to discussions on know-how in (...) epistemology in western philosophy. (shrink)

This article suggests how Mengzian ideas of the way [dao], rightness [yi] and rites [li], as related to the presupposition that human nature is moral, respond to rigid notions of “truth” and “law,” which tolerate a banalization of evil. It further suggests that the Mengzian attitude is both rooted in human empathy and draws clear limits to it. This is demonstrated by responding to arguments raised by the protagonist Max Aue in Jonathan Little’s book The Kindly Ones.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Hawaii at Manoa, 1991.

To the question “What normative ethical theory does early Confucianism best represent?” researchers in the history of early Confucian philosophy respond with more than half a dozen different answers. They include sentimentalism, amoralism, pragmatism, Kantianism, Aristotelian virtue theory, care ethics, and role ethics. The lack of consensus is concerning, as three considerations make clear. First, fully trained, often leading, scholars advocate each of the theories. Second, nearly all participants in the debate believe that the central feature of early Confucianism is (...) its moral thought. However, these normative ethical theories are logically inconsistent with one another, the third point. The entailment is unavoidable: the majority of scholars of early Confucian normative ethics must be incorrect about their attributions of a normative theory to early Confucianism. It would appear, then, that we need a new dao 道 or pathway for the study of early Confucian moral thought. One alternative is to adopt an immersively interdisciplinary research methodology that pivots on the recognition that early Confucianism is a social-functional system the governing purpose of which is to influence cultural leaders. (shrink)

A much-needed consideration of methodology in comparative philosophy.