Why, if at all, should we object to economic inequality? Some central arguments – the argument from decreasing marginal utility for example – invoke instrumental reasons and object to inequality because of its effects. Such instrumental arguments, however, often concern only the static effects of inequality and neglect its intertemporal consequences. In this article, we address this striking gap and investigate income inequality's intertemporal consequences, including its potential effects on humanity's (very) long-term future. Following recent arguments around future generations and (...) so-called longtermism, those effects might arguably matter more than inequality's short-term consequences. We assess whether we have instrumental reason to reduce economic inequality based on its intertemporal effects in the short, medium, and the very long term. We find a good short and medium-term instrumental case for lower economic inequality. We then argue, somewhat speculatively, that we have instrumental reasons for inequality reduction from a longtermist perspective too, primarily because greater inequality could increase existential risk. We thus have instrumental reasons to reduce inequality, regardless of which time-horizon we take. We then argue that from most consequentialist perspectives, this pro tanto reason also gives us all-things-considered reason. And even across most non-consequentialist views in philosophy, this argument gives us either an all-things-considered or at least weighty pro tanto reason against inequality. (shrink)

RESUMEN Este artículo sostiene que la desobediencia coercitiva motivada por el cambio climático a veces es antidemocrática, pero no por eso es impermisible. El cambio climático representa un peligro tan grave para los derechos básicos de millones de personas en todo el mundo, que incluso el derecho básico a la democracia puede verse justificadamente desplazado como medio para disminuir el riesgo de una catástrofe climática. El articulo responde también a quienes afirman que la desobediencia coercitiva climática es siempre democrática porque (...) sirve para igualar la influencia informal sobre las decisiones públicas o protege las precondiciones de la democracia. Estos argumentos solo rescatan algunos actos de desobediencia climática coercitiva. Los demás son antidemocráticos, pero no por eso impermisibles. ABSTRACT This article argues that when coercive disobedience is motivated by climate change, it is sometimes permissible, even if it is undemocratic. Climate change poses such a serious danger to the basic rights of millions of people worldwide that even the basic right to democracy can be justifiably displaced as a means to reduce the risks posed by a climate catastrophe. The article also replies to the claim that coercive climate disobedience is always democratic because it equalizes informal influence over public decisions, or protects the preconditions of democracy; these arguments only rescue some acts of coercive climate disobedience. The rest are still undemocratic, but they are not for this reason impermissible. (shrink)

Some moral value is transparent just in case an agent with average mental capacities can feasibly come to know whether some entity does, or does not, possess that value. In this paper, I consider whether legitimacy—that is, the property of exercises of political power to be permissible—is transparent. Implicit in much theorising about legitimacy is the idea that it is. I will offer two counter-arguments. First, injustice can defeat legitimacy, and injustice can be intransparent. Second, legitimacy can play a critical (...) function in our practical thought, which sometimes requires intransparency. (shrink)

There are two bodies of literature, one offering theories of the legitimacy of domestic institutions like states, another offering theories of the legitimacy of international institutions like the IMF. Accounts of domestic legitimacy stress the importance of democratic procedure, while few to no theorists make democracy a necessary condition for the legitimacy of international institutions. In this paper, I ask whether this asymmetry can be defended. Is there a unified higher-order theory which can explain why legitimacy requires democracy in the (...) domestic context, but not in the international context? I argue that no proceduralist higher-order theory succeeds, and that we need to look for other solutions. (shrink)