Why, if at all, should we object to economic inequality? Some central arguments – the argument from decreasing marginal utility for example – invoke instrumental reasons and object to inequality because of its effects. Such instrumental arguments, however, often concern only the static effects of inequality and neglect its intertemporal conse- quences. In this article, we address this striking gap and investigate income inequality’s intertemporal consequences, including its potential effects on humanity’s (very) long-term future. Following recent arguments around future generations (...) and so-called longtermism, those effects might arguably matter more than inequality’s short-term con- sequences. We assess whether we have instrumental reason to reduce economic inequality based on its intertemporal effects in the short, medium, and the very long term. We find a good short and medium-term instrumental case for lower economic inequality. We then argue, somewhat speculatively, that we have instrumental reasons for inequality reduction from a longtermist perspective too, primarily because greater inequality could increase existential risk. We thus have instrumental reasons to reduce inequality, regardless of which time-horizon we take. We then argue that from most consequentialist perspectives, this pro tanto reason also gives us all-things-considered reason. And even across most non-consequentialist views in philosophy, this argument gives us either an all-things-considered or at least weighty pro tanto reason against inequality. (shrink)

Moral contextualism is the view that claims like ‘A ought to X’ are implicitly relative to some (contextually variable) standard. This leads to a problem: what are fundamental moral claims like ‘You ought to maximize happiness’ relative to? If this claim is relative to a utilitarian standard, then its truth conditions are trivial: ‘Relative to utilitarianism, you ought to maximize happiness’. But it certainly doesn’t seem trivial that you ought to maximize happiness (utilitarianism is a highly controversial position). Some people (...) believe this problem is a reason to prefer a realist or error theoretic semantics of morals. I argue two things: first, that plausible versions of all these theories are afflicted by the problem equally, and second, that any solution available to the realist and error theorist is also available to the contextualist. So the problem of triviality does not favour noncontextualist views of moral language. (shrink)

Aesthetic non-naturalism is the view that there are objective aesthetic truths that hold in virtue of sui generis facts. This view is seldom explicitly endorsed in philosophical aesthetics. I argue that many aestheticians should treat it as the view to beat, since (a) their commitments favour aesthetic realism, (b) non-naturalistic forms of aesthetic realism are particularly promising and (c) non-naturalists have reasonable answers to four important objections.

In his recent book Slaves of the Passions , Mark Schroeder defends a Humean account of practical reasons ( hypotheticalism ). He argues that it is compatible with 'genuinely agent-neutral reasons'. These are reasons that any agent whatsoever has. According to Schroeder, they may well include moral reasons. Furthermore, he proposes a novel account of a reason's weight, which is supposed to vindicate the claim that agent-neutral reasons ( if they exist), would be weighty irrespective of anyone's desires. If the (...) argument is successful, it could help avoid an error-theory of moral language. I argue that it isn't, and that we should reject a Humean approach to reasons. (shrink)

According to Stephen Finlay, ‘A ought to X’ means that X-ing is more conducive to contextually salient ends than relevant alternatives. This in turn is analysed in terms of probability. I show why this theory of ‘ought’ is hard to square with a theory of a reason’s weight which could explain why ‘A ought to X’ logically entails that the balance of reasons favours that A X-es. I develop two theories of weight to illustrate my point. I first look at (...) the prospects of a theory of weight based on expected utility theory. I then suggest a simpler theory. Although neither allows that ‘A ought to X’ logically entails that the balance of reasons favours that A X-es, this price may be accepted. For there remains a strong pragmatic relation between these claims. (shrink)

This report aims to offer insights into cutting-edge research on digital well-being. Many of these insights come from a 2-day academic-impact event, The Future of Digital Well-Being, hosted by a team of researchers working with the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW) in February 2024. Today, achieving and maintaining well-being in the face of online technologies is a multifaceted challenge that we believe requires using theoretical resources of different research disciplines. This report explores diverse perspectives on how digital (...) well-being can be actively cultivated, while also emphasising the importance of considering individual differences, societal contexts, and nuanced cultural factors. We aim to offer a holistic view of the future of digital well-being, one that will inspire the next generation of designers of online tools, as well as policymakers who will regulate these tools. We start by asking what digital well-being is – how we can best define a concept that is used by diverse stakeholders and researchers from many disciplines in various ways. To do this, we explore the classic ethical theories of well-being, showing how they can give us insights into how the term digital well-being is currently deployed. We then move to look at the existing strategies that have been proposed to actively cultivate digital well-being, exploring the business models that threaten digital well-being and the relative advantages of the digital and non-digital solutions that are currently proposed. On the one hand, digital tools – such as Apple’s Screen Time and app blockers such as Opal and Forest – integrate seamlessly with the digital lifestyles of users. They also create precise metrics for digital well-being, which facilitates their solutions to reduce screen time. On the other hand, non-digital solutions, including mindfulness practices, digital detoxes, and digital well-being coaching, offer a new set of tools to reconnect individuals to their natural rhythms and help to actively promote offline activities. We then move to discuss diversity and how various groups of users have strikingly different digital well-being needs. Embracing neurodiversity in digital well-being is crucial as it strongly impacts the users’ experience of online technologies. When designing for diversity, organisations and designers alike need to prioritise customization for people with physical disabilities, mitigate harmful content for users with mental well-being conditions, address gender stereotypes and online harassment, and be designed in ways that recognize the very real risks of online technologies. This report closes by examining cultural differences. We believe that non-Western conceptions of well-being offer rich sources for enhancing digital well-being insofar as these traditions can inform and inspire the designers of future online technologies. We focus on East-Asian and South-Asian traditions, although in further work we recognise it would be useful to investigate conceptions of well-being that are influential in the Gulf region, Africa, and South America. Each of these areas have ethical frameworks that discuss well-being in depth as well as a rich cultural heritage. In conclusion, this report’s insights underscore the imperative of recognizing diversity in digital well-being, both in terms of cultural contexts and disciplinary perspectives. It emphasises the need for culturally responsive design methodologies and the integration of non-Western philosophical perspectives into current digital well-being research. Embracing this diversity, we believe, offers the best chance to create digital environments that prioritise well-being for users and the societies they live in across the world. Ultimately, we believe that it is not only about designing better online products; it’s about shaping a digital landscape that promotes well-being and flourishing for everyone. (shrink)

Farbod Akhlaghi (2021) argues that noncognitivists and naturalists cannot explain the epistemic possibility of wholesale moral error. This would show that noncognitivism and naturalism are false. I argue that noncognitivists and naturalists have no trouble explaining the epistemic possibility of wholesale moral error and that the requirement to explain this possibility is plausible only on one particular conception of epistemic possibility.

I argue that relativists about aesthetic and other evaluative language face some of the same objections as non-naturalists in ethics. These objections concern the metaphysics required to make it work. Unlike contextualists, relativists believe that evaluative propositions are not about the relation in which things stand to certain standards. Nevertheless, the truth of such propositions would depend on variable standards. I argue that relativism requires the existence of states of affairs very different from other things known to exist. Furthermore, there (...) seems to be no convincing reason to postulate such entities. However, if they do not exist, then relativism leads to an error theory. That is unattractive, as relativism was meant to preserve the truth of many evaluative claims. (shrink)

Wide-scopers argue that the detachment of intuitively false ‘ought’ claims from hypothetical imperatives is blocked because ‘ought’ takes wide, as opposed to narrow, scope. I present two arguments against this view. The first questions the premise that natural language conditionals are true just in case the antecedent is false. The second shows that intuitively false ‘ought’s can still be detached even WITH wide-scope readings. This weakens the motivation for wide-scoping.

According to subjectivist views about a meaningful life, one's life is meaningful in virtue of desire satisfaction or feelings of fulfilment. Standard counterexamples consist of satisfaction found through trivial or immoral tasks. In response to such examples, many philosophers require that the tasks one is devoted to are objectively valuable, or have objectively valuable consequences. I argue that the counterexamples to subjectivism do not require objective value for meaning in life. I also consider other reasons for thinking that meaning in (...) life requires objective value and raise doubts about their strength. Finally, I argue that beauty is not plausibly objective, but that it seems important for meaning. This puts pressure on the objectivist to explain why objectivity matters in the case of other values. (shrink)

In his book Slaves of the Passions, Mark Schroeder defends a Humean theory of reasons. Humeanism is the view that you have a reason to X only if X‐ing promotes at least one of your desires. But Schroeder rejects a natural companion theory of the weight of reasons, which he calls proportionalism. According to it, the weight of a reason is proportionate to the strength of the desire that grounds it and the extent to which the act promotes the object (...) of that desire. In this paper, I aim to do three things: (1) to show why Schroeder's arguments against proportionalism do not refute it; (2) to identify the real trouble with proportionalism; and (3) to suggest a better way of understanding it (preferentialism). According to this theory, the overall strength of reasons is determined by the agent's preferences. (shrink)

Stephen Finlay analyses ‘ought’ in terms of probability. According to him, normative ‘ought's are statements about the likelihood that an act will realize some (contextually supplied) end. I raise a problem for this theory. It concerns the relation between ‘ought’ and the balance of reasons. ‘A ought to Φ’ seems to entail that the balance of reasons favours that A Φ-es, and vice versa. Given Finlay's semantics for ‘ought’, it also makes sense to think of reasons and their weight in (...) terms of probability. In this paper, I develop such a theory of weight. It turns out, however, that it cannot explain the entailments. This leaves Finlay with a challenge: to explain these entailments in some other way consistent with his theory, or to show why the appearances deceive and there are no such entailments. (shrink)

I first show how one might argue for a mind-independent conception of beauty and artistic merit. I then discuss whether this makes aesthetic judgements suitable to undermine skeptical worries about the existence of mind-independent moral value and categorical reasons.

Sharon Street argues that realism about epistemic normativity is false. Realists believe there are truths about epistemic reasons that hold independently of the agent’s attitudes. Street argues by dilemma. Either the realist accepts a certain account of the nature of belief, or she does not. If she does, then she cannot consistently accept realism. If she does not, then she has no scientifically credible explanation of the fact that our epistemic behaviours or beliefs about epistemic reasons align with independent normative (...) truths. I argue that neither horn is very sharp for realists about epistemic normativity. (shrink)

The idea that normative statements implicitly refer to standards has been around for quite some time. It is usually defended by normative antirealists, who tend to be attracted to Humean theories of reasons. But this is an awkward combination: 'A ought to X' entails that there are reasons for A to X, and 'A ought to X all things considered' entails that the balance of reasons favours X-ing. If the standards implicitly referred to are not those of the agent, then (...) why would these entailments hold? After all, Humeanism says that 'A has a reason to X' is true if and only if A has some desire which is furthered by X-ing. In this paper, I develop a standard-relational theory of 'ought' and a non-Humean theory of reasons (oughtism). Together, they explain why 'A ought to X' entails not only that there are reasons for A to X, but also that the balance of reasons favours X-ing. The latter explanation depends on a theory of weight, in which the weight of a reason depends on the position of a rule (standard) in an order of priorities. The theories are truth-conditional, but do not require objective normative facts for the truth of 'ought' judgments and judgments about reasons. (shrink)

In this chapter, we describe three areas within the broad field of ecogenomics or postgenomics: epigenetics, proteomics, and microbiomics. We argue that these fields challenge traditional bioethics in different ways. Since epigenetic, proteomic, and microbiomic data may contain phenotypical information, they may intensify discussions about consent, privacy, and return of results. But these fields also firmly position organisms, including human beings, as deeply entangled with their environments, as constituted by context, history, and experiences as much as genes. This yields new (...) insights into concepts of health and development. We discuss precision medicine as an example of a systemic approach to health. We argue that acknowledging the entanglement of organism and environment also means recognizing the importance of interdisciplinarity for bioethics and thinking together biomedical ethics and environmental ethics. (shrink)

Peter Kivy claims that expressivists in aesthetics cannot explain why we argue about art. The situation would be different in the case of morals. Moral attitudes lead to action, and since actions affect people, we have a strong incentive to change people’s moral attitudes. This can explain why we argue about morals, even if moral language is expressive of our feelings. However, judgements about what is beautiful and elegant need not significantly affect our lives. So why be concerned with other (...) people’s feelings about art? Kivy thinks the best explanation of our tendency to argue about art is that we implicitly believe in objective facts about aesthetics. This would count against expressivism. I argue two things: that there is no good reason to think that we don’t care about preferences and emotions unless they have significant practical consequences and that the truth of expressivism about aesthetic language is compatible with beliefs about objective aesthetic facts. (shrink)

Bart Streumer believes that the following principle is true of all normative judgements: When two people make conflicting normative judgements, at most one of them is correct. Streumer argues that noncognitivists are unable to explain why is true, or our acceptance of it. I argue that his arguments are inconclusive. I also argue that our acceptance of is limited in the case of instrumental and epistemic normative judgements, and that the extent to which we do accept for such judgements can (...) be explained by an assumption of shared standards of correctness. Finally, I argue that reductivists can appeal to the same ideas to defend their view that instrumental and epistemic normative judgements describe non-normative relations. (shrink)

Review of Mark Schroeder's book Noncognitivism in Ethics.

In a recent article in this journal, Daan Evers and Gerlinde Emma van Smeden () defend Wolf's hybridism against objectivist counterexamples advanced by Metz, Smuts, and Bramble. They also offer their own new hybridism, which they take to be even less vulnerable to such counterexamples. In this paper, I argue that Evers and van Smeden's defense of their and Wolf's hybridizing from objectivist counterexamples is problematic and that they do not, in fact, succeed in meeting the challenge the objectivist (...) counterexamples pose. Evers and van Smeden do not read the counterexamples charitably and, hence, are not coping with the strongest challenges the counterexamples have to offer. I conclude that Metz's, Smuts's and Bramble's objectivist counterexamples continue to pose serious challenges to hybridism, both in Wolf's and in Evers and van Smeden's versions. (shrink)

Sa pagtuturo ng asignaturang Filipino, na tumutuon ng pansin sa wika at panitikan. Bahagi ng usaping pampanitikan ang iba’t ibang halimbawa nito, magmula sa maikling kuwento, kuwentong-bayan, tula, epiko at marami pang iba. Layunin ng pag-aaral na: (1) matuklasan ang nararapat na halimbawang kuwentong-bayan na maaaring maging karagdagang kagamitang pampagtuturo at pagkatuto para sa mga guro at mag-aaral sa sekondarya sa Silangang Distrito sa bayan ng Labo, (2) malaman ang uri ng kagamitang pampagtuturo na paglalapatan ng nasabing kuwentong-bayan batay sa (...) panlasa ng mga gagamit nito, (3) malaman ang antas ng katanggapan batay sa ginagawang karagdagang kagamitang pampagtuturo. Mula sa ginawang pangangalap ng datos mula sa inisyal na sarbey na sinagutan ng mga mag-aaral mula sa ikapitong baytang at mga guro na nagtuturo ng asignaturang Filipino sa antas sekondarya, lumabas na ang alamat ang pinakabasahin at ninanais na makalap at mabuo bilang isang modyul na karagdagang kagamitang pampagtuturo at pagkatuto. Samantala sa kagamitang panturo ay nanguna ang modyul dito upang paglagyan ng napiling uri ng kuwentong-bayan para sa pag-aaral na ito. Sa pangangalap ng mga alamat, napag-alaman na may mga alamat o kasaysayan ang bawat barangay. Malaki ang tyansa na ang kagamitang nabuo sa pag-aaral na ito ang magsilbing daan upang mapreserba at manatiling buhay ang ganitong uri ng akda na sasalamin pamumuhay ng lugar na pinagmulan nito kahit lumipas man ang mahabang panahon. Ang natapos na modyul ng mga alamat ay sinuri at pinagtibay ng mga Filipinong guro mula sa Silangang Distrito sa bayan ng Labo sa pamamagitan ng pagsagot sa sarbey ng antas ng katanggapan. (shrink)

Nabigyan ng pagpapahalaga ang komprehensibong pagdalumat sa relasyong Tsino at Pilipino sa buhay at kamatayan sa isang aklat na pinamagatang Himlayan, Pantiyon, Kampo Santo, Sementeryo: Exploring Philippine Cemeteries (2016) na pinamamatnugutan ni Dr. Grace Barretto-Tesoro ng Programa sa Araling Arkeolohiya ng Unibersidad ng Pilipinas. Ito ay binubuo ng isang daan at apatnapu’t dalawang (242) pahina at limang (5) kabanata-- [1] Angels on Earth: Investigating Infant and Children Burials in Manila Cemeteries ni Grace Barreto-Tesoro (pah. 1-39); [2] Angels and Dragons (...) in the Manila Chinese Cemetery nina Donna Mae N. Arriola at Eleanor Marie S. Lim (pah. 41-80); [3] Ang Mamatay ng Dahil sa iyo: Patriots’ Graves at Manila Cemeteries and Neighboring Provinces ni Andrea Malaya M. Ragragio (pah. 81-153); [4] Death, Grief, and Memorial: A Review of the Boy Scouts Tragedy of 1963 nina Kathleen D.C. Tantuico at Omar K. Choa (pah. 155-168); at [5] Colonial Period Cemeteries as Filipino Heritage ni Michelle S. Eusebio (pah. 169-197). Sa limang kabanatang ito, mas higit na binigyan ng pansin at lapatan ng anotasyon ang ikalawa dahil tahasan tumatalakay ang artikulong ito sa mayaman at makakultural na ugnayan ng Pilipinas at Tsina bilang mga Asyanong bansa pagdating sa konseptwalisasyon ng kamatayan. (shrink)

Hugot mula sa ideang geopolitikang pangkalinangang subersyon, tatangkaing uunawain sa papel na ito ang naging hakbanging kolonyal ng mga Espanyol at Amerikano sa kanilang ginawang pananakop sa Pilipinas.`Ito’y bagamat may subersyon ding isinagawa si Jose Rizal sa kolonyalismo, hindi nangangahulugang pagtutuunan sa papel ang nasabing paksa upang higit na makita ang naging hakbanging koloyal ng mga mananakop sa Pilipinas. Gamit ang lapit na singkroniko at diakroniko, sisipatin sa gagawing pag-aaral ang materyal na kulturang pinagkaugatan ng ginawang pangkalinangang subersyon kay Jose (...) Rizal ng mga mananakop. Uunawain sa ginawang pananaliksik ang naging saysay niya sa loob ng pangkalinangang pamana at sagisag na panlahi ng mga Pilipino. Sa pamamagitan ng pagsasawalang bisa at pagpapahina sa damdaming bayan o nasyonalismong isinasagisag ni Rizal, nagtagumpay ang mga Amerikano na demoralisahin iyon gamit ang kinagisnang idea sa pamana. Sa pagsusuri, ang panlipunang halagahin mula sa pangkalinangang pamana sa anito ang ginamit ng kolonyal na estadong Espanyol para sa mitipikasyon o pagsasaalamat ukol sa kapangyarihan ng ikonograpiyang panrelihiyon. Iniangkas ng mga Espanyol ang kanilang dala-dalang santo sa naririyang pumapaimbulog na gawain sa pag-aanito upang saklutin mula rito ang espiritwal na kapangyarihan sa loob ng kalinangan at lipunang Pilipino. Sa ganitong diwa, tinularan ng US ang kanilang ideang sekular gamit ang pagbabantayog o pagtatag ng monumento para kay Rizal upang maisingkaw rito ang pagkauhaw sa edukasyon ng mga Pilipono. Naging daan ang pangkalinangang subersyong ito para dominahin ng US ang larang na intelektwal sa Pilipinas gamit si Rizal bilang geopolitikal na pananagisag. Nilalayon ng papel na ito sa pangkalahatan na tayahin ang praktikang geopolitikal ng imperyalistang kapangyarihan. Mag-aambag sa madaling salita sa partikular ang pag-aaral hinggil sa pagpapalawak, pagpapayabong, at paglalaman sa pampamanang pag-aaral (Heritage Studies), pagpapalawig sa diskursong Rizal (Rizal Discourse), at pagpapaunlad ng historiograpiyang Pilipino (Philippine Historiography). (shrink)