The Analytic of the Beautiful in Kant's Critique of Aesthetic Judgment is a text of unparalleled importance in the history of philosophical aesthetics. Its main claims are adopted by some and rejected by others. A significant number of responses, of both kinds, take the Analytic to apply to all experiences of beauty—most notably, to the beauty of both nature and fine art. Our principal claim is that this assumption is mistaken. The analysis in the misleadingly titled Analytic of the Beautiful (...) applies paradigmatically to judgments of natural beauty. The experience of the beauty of most artworks is different and requires a separate analysis. We detail the modifications required in all four moments of the Analytic and thereby explicate the experience of artistic beauty. This reveals that Kant holds an interesting and historically consequential account of the experience of artistic beauty, which is significantly different from the experience of natural beauty. The analysis further reveals that despite these significant differences, the experiences are both species of a single genus. (shrink)

The notion of aesthetic ideas is of great importance to Kant's thinking about art. Despite its importance, he says little about it. He characterizes aesthetic ideas as representations of the imagination and says that the gift of artistic genius is the inscrutable capacity to envision them. Furthermore, they are counterparts of rational ideas. Works of art thus sensibly present rational ideas; the pleasure they occasion is a consequence of the enriching process of reflection upon the wealth of content they sensibly (...) present. The purpose of this article is to ask whether all rational ideas have aesthetic ideas as counterparts, and so can be presented in art, or whether only some do and which. The answer should reveal what, for Kant, is the subject-matter of art. I argue that for Kant art is concerned with the range and variety of human freedom as well as with its highest fulfillment in morality. (shrink)

In the present paper, it is shown that Kant in his theory of fine art from the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment proves to be a proponent of aesthetic cognitivism, according to which art is, first, a source of non-trivial knowledge and, second, this knowledge also has aesthetic relevance. This issue has been raised several times in the recent research literature, but has not been substantiated, or only briefly. Central to this is Kant's conception of aesthetic ideas, with which fine art (...) symbolizes intellectual ideas of various genesis and with which his theory of art acquires a content-aesthetic dimension. Discussing recent research literature, an interpretation for the conception of aesthetic ideas and the accompanying expressive dimension of fine art is offered in a first part. Based on this, it will be shown in a second part that Kant hereby proves to be a representative of aesthetic cognitivism; this is shown by the fact that his theory of art confirms both criteria of aesthetic cognitivism. (shrink)

En este artículo examino el soporte textual para la hipótesis de que, dentro del marco de la teoría estética de Kant, la belleza artística no es necesariamente de tipo adherente –y puede ser, por consiguiente, de tipo libre. Tal examen está dividido en dos partes: en la primera parte cito y reflexiono en base a pasajes de la Crítica del juicio que sugieren que la belleza artística no es necesariamente una belleza adherente. En la segunda parte presento tres lecturas emprendidas (...) por intérpretes de Kant que proponen, las primeras, que la belleza artística puede ser de tipo libre, mientras la última, que la belleza artística, si es de arte bello, del arte del genio que se trata, es una belleza libre. (shrink)

In § 60 of the Critique of Judgment, entitled ‘On the doctrine of method of taste,’ Kant suggests that the study of so-called humaniora (ancient Roman and Greek literature) will help one to become a good artist. I will argue that a proper, namely emotional, engagement with humaniora will further the two components of humanity in ourselves: the feeling of sympathy and the ability to communicate feelings. I will discuss two options of how a strengthening of these two components might (...) contribute to the creation of good artworks: it will help one to create artworks that arouse the universal communicable pleasure in the beautiful, or it will help one to create artworks that arouse sympathetic feelings. Siding with the latter option, I will argue that emotions can contribute to the enlivening of aesthetic ideas and, thus, to good art. (shrink)