I try to identify the characteristic and distinguishing features of a theory of natural beauty (as opposed to the sublime) that can be found in Kant's Critique of Judgement. Lest this may seem superfluous, I argue first that, contrary to a common view, Kant's theory does not take the experience of beauty in nature as theoretically basic and that he does not deal with beauty in art only as a derivative case of aesthetic experience. I then try to understand what (...) it means to require, as Kant famously does, that beautiful nature has to look as if it were art. Does this commit him to a projectionist view, according to which we appreciate nature aesthetically only for what it really is not (namely art) rather than for what it is? Pursuing this question we find that for Kant nature can be the object of pure judgements of taste only insofar as nature can be explained scientifically, which in Kant's framework means purely mechanically. This ‘blind mechanism’ of nature plays an important role in Kant's explication of the moral significance the experience of beautiful nature has for us. (shrink)

I interpret Kant's distinction between free and dependent beauty in a way that makes it possible for an object to be judged dependently beautiful without being judged freely beautiful. This is an alternative to the analyses provided by Malcolm Budd and Christopher Janaway, which both face a dilemma because they entail that an object must be judged freely beautiful in order to be judged dependently beautiful. The dilemma is that either the determinant of a judgement of dependent beauty is based (...) upon non-aesthetic criteria (if the object is not freely beautiful), or else the judgement is superfluous for an account of aesthetic value. My analysis of the distinction allows both kinds of beauty to play a meaningful role in a theory of aesthetic value. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Why is there a Third Critique? The Critique of the Aesthetic Power of Judgment The Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgment Conclusion.

Name der Zeitschrift: Kant-Studien Jahrgang: 109 Heft: 1 Seiten: 72-100.

When we judge something to be beautiful, do we identify an inherent feature of the object, or only our subjective response to it? This paper argues that, for Kant, pure aesthetic judgment occupies a middle ground. Such judgments are based upon affective responses to our own cognitive faculties. Thus, pure aesthetic judgment is subjective insofar as it concerns our feeling ourselves to be engaged in a certain task; it is objective insofar as the task we are engaged in is cognition (...) of an object, and the faculties that we are feeling to be at work are the cognitive faculties of the understanding and the imagination. This paper locates this interpretation in the text of the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment in the third Critique and uses it to make sense of many otherwise opaque features of Kant’s account of pure aesthetic judgment. (shrink)

Wittgenstein’s private language argument claims that language and meaning generally are public. It also contends with our appreciation of artworks and reveals the deep connection in our minds between originality and the temptation to think of original meaning as private. This problematic connection of ideas is found in Kant’s theory of fine art. For Kant conceives of the capacity of artistic genius for imaginatively envisioning original content as prior to and independent of finding the artistic means of communicating this content (...) to others. This raises the question of whether we can conceive of art as both original and meaningful without succumbing to privacy. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that, on Kant's view, the work of genius serves as a sensible exhibition of the Idea of the highest good. In other words, the work of genius serves as a special sign that the world is hospitable to our moral ends and that the realization of our moral vocation in such a world may indeed be possible. In the first part of the paper, I demonstrate that the purpose of the highest good is not to (...) strengthen our motivation to accept the moral law as binding for us but, rather, to strengthen our motivation to persist in our already existent moral dispositions. In the second part, I show that the works of genius exhibit the Idea of the highest good and, consequently, strengthen our hope in its realization. Drawing on the results of the second part, the third part of the paper demonstrates that beauty, of both art and nature, symbolizes morality in a more substantive sense than that suggested by Henry Allison's “formalistic” interpretation. Since, on my view, fine art in Kant serves as a sensible representation of an undetermined conceptual content, or the Idea of the highest good, the fourth part of the paper addresses the vexed question of whether Kant's account of fine art already anticipates the cognitive role later attributed to it by the German Idealists. (shrink)

This essay argues that §49 of Kant’s third Critique pursues the question of the nature of genius through an analysis of the spectator’s response to beautiful art. It presents and defends a spectator-centered interpretation of §49’s opening paragraphs, which clarifies Kant’s notion of aesthetic ideas and reveals that beautiful art provokes a productive imaginative activity in its spectators. This interpretation is significant because it elucidates the character of Kant’s account of genius and his understanding of art criticism. Moreover, it suggests (...) that the imagination’s productive activity may provide a certain satisfaction to theoretical reason’s natural but unrequited desire for knowledge of the transcendent. (shrink)

In the earlier sections of part one of the "critique of judgment," discussing natural beauty, Kant describes the aesthetical or beautiful in strongly formalistic terms. In the closing sections of this part, Discussing fine art, He characterizes the aesthetical or beautiful in predominantly expressionistic terms. The puzzle is not that these views are different but that our philosopher seems to think they are identical. Various hypotheses that claim to explain this puzzle are examined. The key suggested is kant's background or (...) approach. In analysing the aesthetical, Kant is looking for evidence of a harmony between natural fact and moral aspiration, Nature and freedom. For this purpose the aesthetical as form seems best in the field of natural beauty, And the aesthetical as expression in the field of fine art. (shrink)