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Switch to: References
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This article takes off from Johan van Benthem’s ruminations on the interface between logic and cognitive science in his position paper “Logic and reasoning: Do the facts matter?”. When trying to answer Van Benthem’s question whether logic can be fruitfully combined with psychological experiments, this article focuses on a specific domain of reasoning, namely higher-order social cognition, including attributions such as “Bob knows that Alice knows that he wrote a novel under pseudonym”. For intelligent interaction, it is important that the (...) |
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In the paper we consider complexity of intuitionistic propositional logic and its natural fragments such as implicative fragment, finite-variable fragments, and some others. Most facts we mention here are known and obtained by logicians from different countries and in different time since 1920s; we present these results together to see the whole picture. |
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Epistemic closure has been a central issue in epistemology over the last forty years. According to versions of the relevant alternatives and subjunctivist theories of knowledge, epistemic closure can fail: an agent who knows some propositions can fail to know a logical consequence of those propositions, even if the agent explicitly believes the consequence (having “competently deduced” it from the known propositions). In this sense, the claim that epistemic closure can fail must be distinguished from the fact that agents do (...) |
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In the 1970s Codd introduced the relational algebra, with operators selection, projection, union, difference and product, and showed that it is equivalent to first-order logic. In this paper, we show that if we replace in Codd’s relational algebra the product operator by the “semijoin” operator, then the resulting “semijoin algebra” is equivalent to the guarded fragment of first-order logic. We also define a fixed point extension of the semijoin algebra that corresponds to μGF. |
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Defeasible conditionals are statements of the form ‘if A then normally B’. One plausible interpretation introduced in nonmonotonic reasoning dictates that ) is true iff B is true in ‘most’ A-worlds. In this paper, we investigate defeasible conditionals constructed upon a notion of ‘overwhelming majority’, defined as ‘truth in a cofinite subset of \’, the first infinite ordinal. One approach employs the modal logic of the frame \\), used in the temporal logic of discrete linear time. We introduce and investigate (...) |
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The main result of the present paper is that the variable-free fragment of logic K*, the logic with a single K-style modality and its “reflexive and transitive closure,” is EXPTIMEcomplete. It is then shown that this immediately gives EXPTIME-completeness of variable-free fragments of a number of known EXPTIME-complete logics. Our proof contains a general idea of how to construct a polynomial-time reduction of a propositional logic to its n-variable—and even, in the cases of K*, PDL, CTL, ATL, and some others, (...) |
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In the early 1960s, to prove undecidability of monadic fragments of sublogics of the predicate modal logic $$\textbf{QS5}$$ QS 5 that include the classical predicate logic $$\textbf{QCl}$$ QCl, Saul Kripke showed how a classical atomic formula with a binary predicate letter can be simulated by a monadic modal formula. We consider adaptations of Kripke’s simulation, which we call the Kripke trick, to various modal and superintuitionistic predicate logics not considered by Kripke. We also discuss settings where the Kripke trick does (...) |
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S4.2 is the modal logic of directed partial pre-orders and/or the modal logic of reflexive and transitive relational frames with a final cluster. It holds a distinguished position in philosophical... |
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In this paper, the predicate counterparts, defined both axiomatically and semantically by means of Kripke frames, of the modal propositional logics $\textbf {GL}$, $\textbf {Grz}$, $\textbf {wGrz}$ and their extensions are considered. It is proved that the set of semantical consequences on Kripke frames of every logic between $\textbf {QwGrz}$ and $\textbf {QGL.3}$ or between $\textbf {QwGrz}$ and $\textbf {QGrz.3}$ is $\Pi ^1_1$-hard even in languages with three (sometimes, two) individual variables, two (sometimes, one) unary predicate letters, and a single (...) |
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We obtain an effective embedding of the classical predicate logic into the logic of partial quasiary predicates. The embedding has the property that an image of a non-theorem of the classical logic is refutable in a model of the logic of partial quasiary predicates that has the same cardinality as the classical countermodel of the non-theorem. Therefore, we also obtain an embedding of the classical predicate logic of finite models into the logic of partial quasiary predicates over finite structures. As (...) |
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In the 1970s Codd introduced the relational algebra, with operators selection, projection, union, difference and product, and showed that it is equivalent to first-order logic. In this paper, we show that if we replace in Codd’s relational algebra the product operator by the “semijoin” operator, then the resulting “semijoin algebra” is equivalent to the guarded fragment of first-order logic. We also define a fixed point extension of the semijoin algebra that corresponds to μGF. |
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We prove that the positive fragment of first-order intuitionistic logic in the language with two individual variables and a single monadic predicate letter, without functional symbols, constants, and equality, is undecidable. This holds true regardless of whether we consider semantics with expanding or constant domains. We then generalise this result to intervals \ and \, where QKC is the logic of the weak law of the excluded middle and QBL and QFL are first-order counterparts of Visser’s basic and formal logics, (...) |
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Primal infon logic was introduced in 2009 in connection with access control. In addition to traditional logic constructs, it contains unary connectives p said indispensable in the intended access control applications. Propositional primal infon logic is decidable in linear time, yet suffices for many common access control scenarios. The most obvious limitation on its expressivity is the failure of the transitivity law for implication: \$$ \to \$$ and \$$ \to \$$ do not necessarily yield \$$ \to \$$. Here we introduce (...) |
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Partly motivated by description logics, poor man's logics have been proposed as an interesting fragment of modal logics. A poor man's logic is a propositional modal logic where only literals and the connectives ∧, □, and ◊ are allowed. It is known that the complexity of the satisfiability problem may drop dramatically when going from a full modal logic to the corresponding poor man's logic, e.g., in the case of modal logic K one goes from PSPACE-complete to coNP-complete. We prove (...) |
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ABSTRACT This paper follows on previous papers which present and evaluate various decision procedures for modal logics. We consider new test sets and systems that have been recently proposed in the literature. This new experimental analysis confirm previous experimental results in showing that SAT based decision procedures, i.e., the procedures built on top of decision procedures for propositional satisfiability, are more efficient than tableau based decision procedures. They also confirm previous evidence of an easy-hard-easy pattern in the satisfiability curve for (...) |
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