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  1. On market Maker functions.Robin Hanson - unknown
    Since market scoring rules have become popular as a form of market maker, it seems worth reviewing just what such mechanisms are intended to do. The main function performed by most market makers is to serve as an intermediary between people who prefer to trade at different times. Traders who have the same favorite times to trade can show up together to an ordinary continuous double auction, and then make and accept offers to trade. But when traders have different favorite (...)
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  • Mechanism design for the truthful elicitation of costly probabilistic estimates in distributed information systems.Athanasios Papakonstantinou, Alex Rogers, Enrico H. Gerding & Nicholas R. Jennings - 2011 - Artificial Intelligence 175 (2):648-672.
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  • Combinatorial Information Market Design.Robin Hanson - unknown
    Department of Economics, George Mason University, MSN 1D3, Carow Hall, Fairfax VA 22030, USA E-mail: [email protected] (http://hanson.gmu.edu).
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  • An Experimental Test of Combinatorial Information Markets.Robin Hanson - unknown
    While a simple information market lets one trade on the probability of each value of a single variable, a full combinatorial information market lets one trade on any combination of values of a set of variables, including any conditional or joint probability. In laboratory experiments, we compare the accuracy of simple markets, two kinds of combinatorial markets, a call market and a market maker, isolated individuals who report to a scoring rule, and two ways to combine those individual reports into (...)
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