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  1. Some Laws of Nature Are Metaphysically Contingent.John T. Roberts - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):445-457.
    Laws of nature are puzzling because they have a 'modal character'—they seem to be 'necessary-ish'—even though they also seem to be metaphysically contingent. And it is hard to understand how contingent truths could have such a modal character. Scientific essentialism is a doctrine that seems to dissolve this puzzle, by showing that laws of nature are actually metaphysically necessary. I argue that even if the metaphysics of natural kinds and properties offered by scientific essentialism is correct, there are still some (...)
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  • Could the Laws of Nature Change?Marc Lange - 2008 - Philosophy of Science 75 (1):69-92.
    After reviewing several failed arguments that laws cannot change, I use the laws' special relation to counterfactuals to show how temporary laws would have to differ from eternal but time-dependent laws. Then I argue that temporary laws are impossible and that neither Lewis's nor Armstrong's analyses of law nicely accounts for the laws' immutability. *Received September 2006; revised September 2007. ‡Many thanks to John Roberts and John Carroll for valuable comments on earlier drafts, as well as to several anonymous referees (...)
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  • Emergence and Embodiment: New Essays on Second‐Order Systems Theory.Ana Teixeira Pinto - 2011 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 25 (1):86 - 89.
    International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume 25, Issue 1, Page 86-89, March 2011.
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  • Reply to Ellis and to Handfield on Essentialism, Laws, and Counterfactuals.Marc Lange - 2005 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (4):581 – 588.
    In Lange 2004a, I argued that 'scientific essentialism' [Ellis 2001 cannot account for the characteristic relation between laws and counterfactuals without undergoing considerable ad hoc tinkering. In recent papers, Brian Ellis 2005 and Toby Handfield 2005 have defended essentialism against my charge. Here I argue that Ellis's and Handfield's replies fail. Even in ordinary counterfactual reasoning, the 'closest possible world' where the electron's electric charge is 5% greater may have less overlap with the actual world in its fundamental natural kinds (...)
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  • Laws and Lawmakers: Science, Metaphysics, and the Laws of Nature.Barbara Vetter - 2011 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 25 (1):83 - 86.
    International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume 25, Issue 1, Page 83-86, March 2011.
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  • Using Natural-Kind Essentialism to Defend Dispositionalism.Travis Dumsday - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (4):869-880.
    Marc Lange and Ann Whittle have independently developed an important challenge to dispositionalism, arguing that dispositions are reducible to primitive subjunctive facts. I argue in reply that by pairing dispositionalism with a certain version of natural-kind essentialism, their objection can be overcome. Moreover, such a marriage carries further advantages for the dispositionalist. My aim is therefore two-fold: to defend dispositionalism, and to give the dispositionalist some new motivation to adopt natural-kind essentialism.
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