Noah McKay provides a novel argument for theism over naturalism. The argument is novel because it connects metaphysical issues to issues regarding moral epistemology. The connection concerns the power of theism and naturalism, respectively, to explain the human capacity to obtain correct beliefs about the domain of morality. The gist of McKay’s argument is that theism provides a much more plausible account of this capacity than naturalism. The reason for this superiority, according to McKay, is that theism secures an intimate (...) connection between human moral intuitions and truths within the domain of morality while naturalistic explanations sever the connection between human moral intuitions and truths within the domain of morality. A central contention of McKay’s argument is that there are exactly two plausible and naturalistic explanations for the content of human moral intuitions—one appealing to evolutionary considerations, the other appealing to social conventions. I argue that this contention is incorrect. Some Buddhist traditions locate veridical moral intuitions in a kind of experience available to those who achieve freedom from ignorance and attachment. This explanation is naturalistic (as McKay understands that term) and no less plausible than the theistic explanation that McKay considers. (shrink)

This is an open-access textbook designed for introduction to philosophy courses that contain a section on ethics, or for introductory courses in moral theory. In this edited work, chapter authors explore both historical and contemporary approaches to understanding and justifying moral and ethical norms. The chapters cover a wide range of topics, including moral relativism, the relationship between ethics and religion, virtue ethics in the Western and Eastern traditions, the question of self-interest and ethics, utilitarianism, Kantian deontological ethics, and recent (...) work in feminist ethics and evolutionary ethics. -/- Introduction to Philosophy: Ethics, edited by George Matthews (Plymouth State University), is one of a series of open-access textbooks for introduction to philosophy courses edited by Christina Hendricks (University of British Columbia), published with the support of The Rebus Community. (shrink)

Although Theravada Buddhism and Roman Catholicism agree on the moral justification for palliative sedation, they differ on the premises underlying the justification. While Catholicism justifies palliative sedation on the ground of the Principle of Double Effect, Buddhism does so on the basis of the Third Noble Truth. Despite their theological differences, Buddhism and Catholicism both value the moral significance of the physician’s intent to reduce suffering and both respect the sanctity of life. This blurs the demarcation line between Buddhism and (...) Catholicism regarding the moral justification of palliative sedation. -/- . (shrink)

In recent decades, there has been growing interest among philosophers in what the various Buddhist traditions have said, can say, and should say, in response to the traditional problem of free will. This article investigates the relationship between Buddhist philosophy and the historical problem of free will. It begins by critically examining Rick Repetti's Buddhism, Meditation, and Free Will (2019), in which he argues for a conception of “agentless agency” and defends a view he calls “Buddhist soft compatibilism.” It then (...) turns to a more wide‐ranging discussion of Buddhism and free will—one that foregrounds Buddhist ethics and takes seriously what the various Buddhist traditions have said about desert, punishment, and the reactive attitudes of resentment, indignation, and moral anger. The article aims to show that, not only is Buddhism best conceived as endorsing a kind of free will skepticism, Buddhist ethics can provide a helpful guide to living without basic desert moral responsibility and free will. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis paper is an exploration of the ethical significance of Sengzhao’s concept of the sage as exhibited through a Buddhist practitioner’s expanded understanding and cognition of reality. From a philosophical point of view, I aim to show that the ethical significance of his concept of the sage comprises a shift first from ontology to epistemology, and then from epistemology to ethics. I firstly define Sengzhao’s concept of the sage and present a preliminary account of this concept before elaborating on its (...) philosophical aspects. Next, I attempt to illustrate how ethical implications can be derived from Sengzhao’s ethical shift, and lastly, I shed light on the value and significance of this philosophical standpoint within Buddhist philosophy. (shrink)

It is a common view in modern scholarship on Buddhist ethics, that attachment to the self constitutes a hindrance to ethics, whereas rejecting this type of attachment is a necessary condition for acting morally. The present article argues that in Vasubandhu's theory of agency, as formulated in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (Treasury of Metaphysics with Self-Commentary), a cognitive and psychological identification with a conventional, persisting self is a requisite for exercising moral agency. As such, this identification is essential for embracing the ethics (...) of Buddhism and its way of life. The article delineates the method that Vasubandhu employs to account for the notion of a selfless moral agent, with particular emphasis on his strategies for dealing with one central aspect of agency, self-interested concern for the future. (shrink)

A critical overview to the bulk of extant Buddhist theories of free will.

This paper answers the question ‘what does Buddhism say about free will?’ I begin by investigating Charles Goodman’s influential answer, according to which Buddhists reject getting angry at wrongdoers because they believe that people are not morally responsible. Despite putative evidence to the contrary, Goodman’s interpretation of Buddhism is problematic on three counts: Buddhist texts do not actually support rejection of moral responsibility; Goodman’s argument has the unwanted upshot of undermining positive attitudes like compassion, which Buddhism unambiguously endorses; and his (...) argument overlooks crucial developments in current literature on moral responsibility. I propose instead to understand Buddhism as implicating a quality of will theory, on which agents can be morally responsible and their underlying motivation determines whether they are praiseworthy or blameworthy. (shrink)

This paper is an effort to present the mind-body problem from a Buddhist point of view. Firstly, I show that the Buddhist distinction between mind and body is not absolute, but instead merely employed as a communicative tool to aid the understanding of human beings in a holistic light. Since Buddhism acknowledges a mind-body distinction only on a conventional level, it would not be fair to claim that the tradition necessarily advocates mind-body dualism. Secondly, I briefly discuss a response to (...) Cartesian dualism from a Buddhist perspective and suggest that in this particular regard, the Buddhist approach may be likened to the ‘category mistake’ argument formulated by Gilbert Ryle. The fact that the Buddhist view does not accord with Cartesian dualism, however, does not imply that a monistic approach to the mind-body problem such as behaviourism, physicalism or biological naturalism is necessarily assumed. The Buddhist position could perhaps be best described as a middle way approach of ‘neither-duality-nor-identity’. Thirdly, I remain sceptical about the reductionist approach of accounting for mind merely on the level of brain or behaviour. In overlooking crucial ethical and axiological implications of mind, I argue that such an approach necessarily fails to impart a complete picture of mind. The Buddhist soteriological approach furthermore reveals certain law-like connections between mental attitudes and suffering which are for the most part overlooked in mainstream metaphysical explorations into the relation between mind and body. I thus endeavour to show why exploration into the link between mental phenomena, spiritual cultivation and the accumulation of karma is imperative to any comprehensive inquiry into the human mind. (shrink)

This dissertation examines the idea of _ethical revaluation_ — taking things we normally see as good for our flourishing and seeing them as neutral or bad, and vice versa — in the Mahāyāna Buddhist thinker Śāntideva. It shows how Śāntideva’s thought on the matter is more coherent than it might otherwise appear, first by examining the consistency of Śāntideva’s own claims and then by applying them to contemporary ethical thought. In so doing, it makes four significant contributions. Śāntideva claims that (...) property and relationships are bad for us because they promote attachment, and that others’ wrongdoing is good for us because it allows us to generate patient endurance. Yet he also urges his readers to give property to others, and to prevent their wrongdoing. Is he caught in contradiction? The dissertation argues that he is not, because giving to others is not intended to benefit them materially, but rather to produce beneficial mental states in them, and preventing wrongdoing is intended to benefit the wrongdoer and not the victim. In both cases, Śāntideva emphasizes individual action in a way that makes social or political action more difficult to justify. The dissertation’s first contribution is to show how this interpretation of Śāntideva contrasts notably with standard presentations of Mahāyāna ethics. Its second contribution is to refute claims that Buddhists have no normative ethics. Śāntideva’s resolutions of these apparent contradictions also have relevance for contemporary ethical thought. Martha Nussbaum argues against an ethical revaluation similar to Śāntideva’s, on the grounds that such a revaluation makes it contradictory to argue for providing goods to others, preventing others’ wrongdoing or engaging in political action. Śāntideva’s views show that ethical revaluation is a more sustainable position than these criticisms of Nussbaum’s would imply; if it is to be rejected, it must be rejected on other grounds. To show this point is the dissertation’s third contribution. The fourth contribution is methodological; by finding similarities of concern and differences of opinion between Śāntideva and a contemporary thinker, it helps bridge the gap between normative and comparative religious ethics. (shrink)

The success of assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs) worldwide has led to an accumulation of frozen embryos that are surplus to the reproductive needs of those for whom they were created. In these situations, couples must decide whether to discard them or donate them for scientific research or for use by other infertile couples. While legislation and regulation may limit the decisions that couples make, their decisions are often shaped by their religious beliefs. Unfortunately, health professionals, scientists and policy-makers are often (...) unaware of the way in which faith traditions view ART and decisions concerning the ‘fate’ of surplus embryos. In this paper scholars representing six major religious traditions provide a commentary on a hypothetical case concerning the donation or destruction of excess ART embryos. These commentaries provide a rich account of religious perspectives on the status of the human embryo and an insight into the relevance of faith to health and policy decisions, particularly in reproductive medicine, ART and embryo research. (shrink)

_Since arguably Bodhisattva Practice (bodhisattva-carya) is the foundation of Mahayana Buddhist ethics, it is significantly important for Bodhisattva compassion to be compatible with other Buddhist doctrines, specifically with the doctrine of 'no-self ' (anatta). There are two thoughts on the relation between compassion and 'no-self ': they are compatible or incompatibility. Most Buddhist authors accept the former view. However, the principal problem with the two views is that their arguments have not been singled out. So the acceptance or denial of (...) the compatibility may not be well grounded. This paper is to identify and evaluate the arguments for and against the agreeability, and to defend the compatible view_. (shrink)

In If You Meet the Buddha on the Road: Buddhism, Politics, and Violence, Michael Jerryson reports that his research on Buddhist violence frequently elicits two responses. The first is that the violence he has analyzed is not really Buddhist because true Buddhists are non-violent. The second is that instances of putatively Buddhist violence are not really Buddhist because they are ultimately about something besides religion, such as ethnicity, politics, or economics. This paper offers a thoroughgoing refutation of both of these (...) responses. First, there is no principled way to establish the claim that true Buddhists are non-violent. Second, the claim that putatively Buddhist violence is ultimately about something besides religion does not provide reason against classifying the violence as “Buddhist.”. (shrink)

This essay is to identify two views of Buddhist ethics: egalitarianism and non-egalitarianism. In the time of the Buddha, there was no conflict between the concept of equality and the Buddha’s teac...

This chapter first introduces naturalistic approaches to ethics more generally and distinguishes methodological ethical naturalism (the focus of this chapter), from metaphysical ethical naturalism. The second part then discusses evolutionary ethics as a specific variant of methodological ethical naturalism. After introducing the concepts of evolutionary theory that are relevant for evolutionary ethics, I will sketch the history of evolutionary ethics, which offers an interesting lesson about why it became a controversial topic, and then focus on four central questions about ethics (...) that can be approached from within the framework of evolutionary ethics: 1. What should we do? 2. Why are we moral? 3. Are there moral facts? 4. Can we have justified moral beliefs and moral knowledge? (shrink)

At Chithurst Buddhist Monastery, in the UK, in 1979, four women joined the newly formed community of Theravada monks. They lived initially as novices, and their wish to engage more fully with the life of renunciation, combined with the support and commitment of the community leader Ajahn Sumedho and other monks, led to the formation of a unique order of Theravada Buddhist nuns, who became known as siladhara. This paper will appear in two parts. This first part begins with a (...) brief contextual overview of Theravada nuns, from the founding and decline of the order of bhikkhunis to the various forms of ordination available for women in the Theravada world today. It then gives a history of the order of siladhaa? from its inception until approximately 2000, focusing on the development of their rule and ordination procedures, the way the order has changed over the years and issues and conflicts it has had to deal with, as well as a period when some nuns lived in a women-only community. My research was undertaken by personal interview with founding members of the order as well as by e-mail, telephone and written communications with nuns past and present and with a senior monk involved in the order’s early days. The history until the present day and consideration of future developments will form the second part of the paper. (shrink)

As scientists advance knowledge of the brain and develop technologies to measure, evaluate, and manipulate brain function, numerous questions arise for religious adherents. If neuroscientists can conclusively establish that there is a functional network between neural impulses and an individual’s capacity for moral evaluation of situations, this will naturally lead to questions about the relationship between such a network and constructions of moral value and ethical human behavior. For example, if cognitive neuroscience can show that there is a neurophysiological basis (...) for the moral appraisal of situations, it may be argued that the world’s religions, which have traditionally been the keepers and purveyors of ethical values, are rendered either spurious or irrelevant. The questions point up broader dilemmas in the interface between science and religion, and raise concerns about the ethics of neurological research and experimentation. Since human beings will still arbitrate what is “moral” or “ethical,” how can religious perspectives enrich the dialogue on neuroethical issues and how can neuroscience enrich dialogue on religion? Buddhist views on the nature of consciousness and methods of practice, especially meditation practice, may contribute to discussions on neuroscience and theories about the interrelationship between consciousness and ethical awareness by exploring the role that karma, intentionality, and compassion play in Buddhist understandings of the interrelationship between consciousness and ethics. (shrink)

This article brings together mindfulness and habitus theory in relation to developing wise leaders. In particular, we present new insights about the intersection of time, subjective and intersubjective experience, and mindfulness that are relevant to developing embodied wisdom in leaders. We show that temporal competence is essential for shaping habitus and developing embodied wisdom. Further, and to extend theoretical understandings of mindfulness in leadership, we argue that temporal capabilities developed through mindfulness can foster embodied wisdom by creating a specific ‘wisdom (...) habitus’ that includes values and ethics. The system of dispositions that comprise one’s habitus is, however, largely unconscious and implicit and we discuss how mindfulness renders habitus, including ethical conation accessible to development for the bodily ability to act wisely. This article then establishes a framework that leadership development programs in business schools can adopt for understanding habitus and mindfulness to enable embodied wisdom to develop in leaders. Finally, we show that a mindfulness perspective offers valuable contributions to research on leadership. (shrink)

The advancement of human reproductive technology has made it possible for parents with a child affected by a haematological disorder to select and bring into being, a prospective child who can act as a matched stem cell donor. This can be done through the use of preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) coupled with human leukocyte antigen (HLA) typing (PGD-HLA typing), or HLA tying as a standalone procedure, where a healthy embryo, which is an HLA match to the existing sick sibling, is (...) chosen for implantation. The creation of such a sibling (saviour sibling) is normally taken as a last resort when there is no related or unrelated matched donor. While the conception of a saviour sibling may serve as a reliable and realistic treatment option for the ailing child, it also poses new moral questions that challenge a religiously pluralistic society such as Malaysia. The use of PGD-HLA typing may be controversial as it involves creating a life to save a life, selection of compatible human embryos and destruction of the unselected embryos. At present, there is no legal framework regulating the conception of saviour siblings. The development of ethically sound and appropriate local laws and policies should consider the views of religious communities, especially when it involves a controversial subject such as the conception of saviour siblings. This article seeks to explore the perceptions of religious scholars and representatives of the major religions professed and practised in Malaysia, namely Islam, Buddhism, Christianity and Hinduism, through qualitative interviews. (shrink)

Prima facie, Confucianism does not explicitly encourage war given its emphasis on humanity. This, however, may be overlooked. This paper is to examine the correlation between war and Confucianism and to argue that Confucianism should take some, if not primary, blame for the vicious circles of China's war and chaos for more than two millennia. To see the correlation, we explore two readings—top-down and bottom-up—from two sources of Confucianism—Great Learning and Mencius respectively. The top-down reading is this: from a ruler's (...) point of view, a czar has a moral obligation to maintain world peace by force if necessary, whereas the bottom-up is this: from the people's point of view, war is a necessary means to remove non-ren (or atrocious) kings. Since Confucianism is the cardinal philosophy in the second half of Chinese history plus the interaction of its two momentums (or readings), it is not too hard to realize that it could easily sustain war. If so, it makes no sense to say that Confucianism should not bear any responsibility for the vicious circles of war and chaos in the second half. Finally, given the account, we also explore an intriguing and imminent worry—whether the rise of China will threaten world peace. (shrink)

Several trends in contemporary philosophy have revived the question of the good life. This article addresses the more elaborate notion of an “art of living” in the specific context of the technosphere on the basis of recent works in philosophy of technology. It also brings ideas from Asian philosophy and from Buddhism in particular into the discussion. The focus is on the notion of non-confrontation, which could lead to a decisive change in the methods and scope of technology assessment within (...) the humanities. The art of living in the technosphere emerges as an existential virtuosity that pertains to practical wisdom. (shrink)

Life is ever-changing and unpredictable. Because of drastic changes in our society, numerous people are under pressure from various sources at school, in the workplace, or in their families. People...

Several trends in contemporary philosophy have revived the question of the good life. This article addresses the more elaborate notion of an “art of living” in the specific context of the technosphere on the basis of recent works in philosophy of technology. It also brings ideas from Asian philosophy and from Buddhism in particular into the discussion. The focus is on the notion of non-confrontation, which could lead to a decisive change in the methods and scope of technology assessment within (...) the humanities. The art of living in the technosphere emerges as an existential virtuosity that pertains to practical wisdom. (shrink)

The paper offers a close examination of the Mahābhārata’s adhyāya 5,70, one of the more interesting and representative chapters to analyse Yudhiṣṭhira’s attitude on the dharma of the king and warfare. In this long chapter addressing Kṛṣṇa, the king deprived of his kingdom presents two different attitudes. On one hand, he states that even though peaceful conflict resolution would be the best to regain the kingdom, the war must be accepted if it is inevitable. On the other hand, he expresses (...) his disapproval of war as evil in any form. Yudhiṣṭhira’s ambivalent utterance is analysed against the background of early Buddhist ethics, totally condemning war, and other passages from the Mahābhārata, especially those glorifying the dharma of kṣatriyas. (shrink)

Dieser Beitrag untersucht die Schnittstelle zwischen queeren Subjektivitäten und psychischer Gesundheit und Suizidalität; der angeblich positive Einfluss von Religiosität auf psychische Gesundheit und buddhistische Antworten und Wege zu Befreiungspraktiken werden diskutiert. Ausgehend vom Freitod des 26-jährigen schwulen Burmesen Kyaw Zin Win wird untersucht, wie Buddhistische Traditionen konzeptionell und sozial-systemisch zu queerem Leiden und Suizidalität beigetragen haben. Durch kritische Hermeneutik werden Möglichkeiten für engagierte buddhistische inklusive Praktiken für soziale Gerechtigkeit aufgezeigt; buddhistische Perspektiven auf queere Diskriminierung und Suizidalität können so hinterfragt und (...) überdacht werden. (shrink)