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  1. Justifying morality: The right and the wrong ways.James P. Sterba - 1987 - Synthese 72 (1):45 - 69.
    Contemporary philosophers offer three kinds of justification for morality. Some, following plato, claim that morality is justified by self-interest. Others, following hume as he is frequently interpreted, claim that morality is justified in terms of other-regarding interests, wants or intentions that people happen to have. And still others, following kant, claim that morality is justified in terms of the requirements of practical reason. In "the moral point of view" published in 1958 and in a series of articles continuing to the (...)
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  • Internalism about reasons: sad but true?Kate Manne - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (1):89-117.
    Internalists about reasons following Bernard Williams claim that an agent’s normative reasons for action are constrained in some interesting way by her desires or motivations. In this paper, I offer a new argument for such a position—although one that resonates, I believe, with certain key elements of Williams’ original view. I initially draw on P.F. Strawson’s famous distinction between the interpersonal and the objective stances that we can take to other people, from the second-person point of view. I suggest that (...)
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  • Realism about the Nature of Law.Torben Spaak - 2016 - Ratio Juris 29 (4).
    Legal realism comes in two main versions, namely American legal realism and Scandinavian legal realism. In this article, I shall be concerned with the Scandinavian realists, who were naturalists and non-cognitivists, and who maintained that conceptual analysis is a central task of legal philosophers, and that such analysis must proceed in a naturalist, anti-metaphysical spirit. Specifically, I want to consider the commitment to ontological naturalism and non-cognitivism on the part of the Scandinavians and its implications for their view of the (...)
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  • Moral contractualism.Nicholas Southwood - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (6):926-937.
    This article provides a critical introduction to contractualism as a moral or ethical theory, that is, as a theory of the rightness and wrongness of individual conduct – focusing specifically on the influential 'Kantian' version of contractualism due to T. M. Scanlon. I begin by elucidating the key features of Scanlon's contractualism: justifiability to others; reasonable rejectability; the individualist restriction; and mutual recognition. I then turn to discuss both its appeal and the main objections that have been raised to it (...)
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  • II—Objectivity and Idolatry.Yonatan Shemmer - 2016 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 90 (1):191-216.
    The attempt to vindicate the objectivity of morality tops the list of philosophical obsessions. In this paper I consider the rationality of searching for such a vindication. I argue that the only justification of our efforts lies in our belief in moral objectivity; that this belief can be as well, if not better, explained by wishful thinking and other cognitive biases; that as a research community we have failed to take precautions against such biases; and that as a result we (...)
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  • The argument from agreement: How universal values undermine moral realism.Hanno Sauer - 2019 - Ratio 32 (4):339-352.
    The most popular argument against moral realism is the argument from disagreement: if there are mind‐independent moral facts, then we would not expect to find as much moral disagreement as we in fact do; therefore, moral realism is false. In this paper, I develop the flipside of this argument. According to this argument from agreement, we would expect to find lots of moral disagreement if there were mind‐independent moral facts. But we do not, in fact, find much moral disagreement; therefore, (...)
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  • What Does Cultural Difference Require of Human Rights.Claudio Corradetti - 2013 - In Cindy Holder & David Reidy (eds.), Human Rights. The Hard Questions, Cambridge University Press.
    Th e contemporary right to freedom of thought together with all its further declinations into freedom of speech, religion, conscience and expression, had one of its earliest historical recognitions at the end of the Wars of Religion with the Edict of Nantes (1598). In several respects one can saythat the right to freedom of thought is virtually “co-original” with the endof the Wars of Religion. Following this thought further, one might think that human rights defi ne the boundaries of our (...)
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  • Review article.Nathan Rutenstreich - 1981 - Journal of Value Inquiry 15 (3):253-263.
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  • Naturalizing the normative and the bridges between “is” and “ought”.Katinka J. P. Quintelier & Daniel M. T. Fessler - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (5):266.
    Elqayam & Evans (E&E) suggest descriptivism as a way to avoid fallacies and research biases. We argue, first, that descriptive and prescriptive theories might be better off with a closer interaction between and Moreover, while we acknowledge the problematic nature of the discussed fallacies and biases, important aspects of research would be lost through a broad application of descriptivism.
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  • Naturalizing the normative and the bridges between 'is' and 'ought".Katinka J. P. Quintelier & Daniel M. T. Fessler - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (5):266.
    Elqayam & Evans suggest descriptivism as a way to avoid fallacies and research biases. We argue, first, that descriptive and prescriptive theories might be better off with a closer interaction between and Moreover, while we acknowledge the problematic nature of the discussed fallacies and biases, important aspects of research would be lost through a broad application of descriptivism.
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  • Can moral obligations be empirically discovered?Jesse J. Prinz - 2007 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):271-291.
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  • The way things go: moral relativism and suspension of judgment.Eduardo Pérez-Navarro - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (1):49-64.
    A popular accusation against moral relativism is that it goes too far in its vindication of tolerance. The idea behind accusations like this can be summarized in the slogan, frequently attributed to relativism, that “anything goes”. The aim of this paper is to defend moral relativism from the accusation that it is an “anything goes” view; from the accusation that it forces us to suspend our judgment in cases in which we do not think we should even be allowed to. (...)
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  • Indeterminacy and Normativity.Giulia Pravato - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (5):2119-2141.
    This paper develops and defends the view that substantively normative uses of words like “good”, “right” and “ought” are irresolvably indeterminate: any single case of application is like a borderline case for a vague or indeterminate term, in that the meaning-fixing facts, together with the non-linguistic facts, fail to determine a truth-value for the target sentence in context. Normative claims, like vague or indeterminate borderline claims, are not meaningless, though. By making them, the speaker communicates information about the precisifications that (...)
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  • The FPL model and practical inference.B. C. Postow - 1989 - Philosophy of Science 56 (1):165-170.
    The efficacy criterion of the FPL model wrongly takes the goals of practical inference to be uncontroversial. The robustness criterion is arbitrary; the accommodation criterion is too weak to differentiate between arch rival theories. All three criteria of FPL fail to address the relation between background philosophical theories and other elements of an inferential system.
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  • Recent Work on the Ethics of Self-Defense.Tyler Doggett - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (4):220-233.
    Over the past 20 years, there has been a huge amount of work on which things you can kill in self‐defense and why. This paper surveys that work.
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  • Tolerance of incoherence in law, graded speech acts and illocutionary pluralism.Oren Perez - 2020 - Legal Theory 26 (3):214-249.
    One of the most difficult challenges of mature legal systems is the need to balance the conflicting demands of stability and flexibility. The demand for flexibility is at odds with the principle of impartiality, which is considered a cornerstone of the rule of law. In the present article, I explore the way in which the law copes with this dilemma by developing the idea of tolerance of incoherence. I argue that tolerance of incoherence emerges from the interplay between the inferential (...)
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  • Moral realism, moral relativism and moral rules (a compatibility argument).Graham Oddie - 1998 - Synthese 117 (2):251-274.
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  • Relativism - by Maria Baghramian. [REVIEW]Max Kölbel - 2007 - Philosophical Books 48 (4):368-371.
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  • Replies to Kirk Ludwig and Paul Hurley.Robert H. Myers - 2020 - Dialogue 59 (2):255-269.
    RÉSUMÉEn réponse à Paul Hurley, je soutiens que l'argument de la triangulation de Donald Davidson ne peut s'appliquer aux croyances normatives que si ces croyances correspondent à des propriétés à la fois normatives et causales. L'argument engage donc Davidson à une forme de naturalisme non-réductif et étonnamment non-révisionniste. En réponse à Kirk Ludwig, je soutiens que Davidson avait de bonnes raisons d'abandonner les théories humiennes des pro-attitudes, parce qu'il avait de bonnes raisons d'accepter la forme de naturalisme non-réductive et non-révisionniste (...)
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  • Metaethical Relativism: Against the Single Analysis Assumption.Ragnar Francén - 2007 - Dissertation, University of Gothenburg
    This dissertation investigates the plausibility of metaethical relativism, or more specifically, what I call “moral truth-value relativism”: the idea that the truth of a moral statement or belief depends on who utters or has it, or who assesses it. According to the most prevalent variants of this view in philosophical literature – “standard relativism” – the truth-values are relative to people’s moralities, often understood as some subset of their affective or desirelike attitudes. Standard relativism has two main contenders: absolutism – (...)
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  • Inner judgments and blame.Mario Morelli & Eric Stiffler - 1982 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 20 (3):393-400.
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  • A Hobbesian Welfare State?Christopher W. Morris - 1988 - Dialogue 27 (4):653-.
    Suppose that we have negative, natural rights to our lives, liberty, and possessions and that these rights are absolute or indefeasible. Then at best onlyminimal stateswill be legitimate, where such are states that restrict their activities to the enforcement of the basic rights of individuals and the like. Such appears to be the consequence of absolute natural rights. When made aware of these implications of absolute natural rights, many philosophers deny their existence. In the absence of a convincing defense of (...)
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  • The untruth in relativism.Christopher A. Dustin - 1995 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 3 (1):17 – 53.
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  • The definition of morality.Bernard Gert - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  • Précis of Moral Reason.Julia Markovits - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2):518-530.
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  • Executive Compensation and Employee Remuneration: The Flexible Principles of Justice in Pay.Michel Magnan & Dominic Martin - 2018 - Journal of Business Ethics 160:89–105.
    This paper investigates a series of normative principles that are used to justify different aspects of executive compensation within business firms, as well as the remuneration of lower-ranking employees. We look at how businesses perform pay benchmarking; employees’ engagement, fidelity and loyalty ; and the acceptability of what we call both-ends-dipping, that is, receiving both ex ante and ex post benefits for the same work. We make two observations. First, either different or incoherent principles are used to justify the pay (...)
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  • Executive Compensation and Employee Remuneration: The Flexible Principles of Justice in Pay.Michel Magnan & Dominic Martin - 2019 - Journal of Business Ethics 160 (1):89-105.
    This paper investigates a series of normative principles that are used to justify different aspects of executive compensation within business firms, as well as the remuneration of lower-ranking employees. We look at how businesses perform pay benchmarking; employees’ engagement, fidelity and loyalty ; and the acceptability of what we call both-ends-dipping, that is, receiving both ex ante and ex post benefits for the same work. We make two observations. First, either different or incoherent principles are used to justify the pay (...)
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  • Axiological Realism.Joel J. Kupperman - 1996 - Philosophy 71 (276):185-203.
    Many would consider the lengthening debate between moral realists and anti-realists to be draw-ish. Plainly new approaches are needed. Or might the issue, which most broadly concerns realism in relation to normative judgments, be broken down into parts or sectors? Physicists have been saying, in relation to a similarly longstanding debate, that light in some respects behaves like waves and in some respects like particles. Might realism be more plausible in relation to some kinds of normative judgments than others?
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  • How to spell out genuine relativism and how to defend indexical relativism.Max Kölbel - 2007 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 15 (2):281 - 288.
    It was the explicit aim of my paper ‘Indexical Relativism versus Genuine Relativism’ to ‘characterize and compare’ (p. 297) two different forms of relativism. One form, exemplified by Harman’s and Dreier’s moral relativism (Harman, 1975 and Dreier, 1990), involves the claim that certain sentences express different propositions in different contexts of utterance, much like indexical sentences – hence the name ‘indexical relativism’. The other form involves the claim that the truth-value of certain contents or propositions depends on certain non-standard parameters, (...)
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  • East Meets West: Toward a Universal Ethic of Virtue for Global Business. [REVIEW]Daryl Koehn - 2013 - Journal of Business Ethics 116 (4):703-715.
    Rudyard Kipling famously penned, “East is East, West is West, and never the twain shall meet.” His poetic line suggests that Eastern and Western cultures are irreconcilably different and that their members engage in fundamentally incommensurable ethical practices. This paper argues that differing cultures do not necessarily operate by incommensurable moral principles. On the contrary, if we adopt a virtue ethics perspective, we discover that East and West are always meeting because their virtues share a natural basis and structure. This (...)
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  • Moral Rationalism and Moral Motivation.Justin Klocksiem - 2020 - Acta Analytica 36 (1):123-136.
    Several prominent philosophers believe that moral facts are facts about what reasons we have, and that this entails that moral judgments are necessarily and inherently motivating. According to this argument, if morality cannot move us, then it is hard to understand how it could be sensibly regarded as action-guiding or normative. That is, they endorse a traditional argument for motivational judgment internalism based on moral rationalism. This paper criticizes this argument, and argues instead that there is no necessary or conceptual (...)
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  • Perspectival representation and fallacies in metaethics.Max Kölbel - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (3-4):379-404.
    The prevailing theoretical framework for theorising about representation construes all representation as involving objective representational contents. This classic framework has tended to drive philosophers either to claim that evaluative judgements are representations and therefore objective, or else to claim that evaluative judgements are not really representations, because they are not objective. However, a more general, already well-explored framework is available, which will allow theorists to treat evaluative judgements as full-fledged representations while leaving open whether they are objective. Such a more (...)
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  • Teaching Ethics to Undergraduate Business Students in Australia: Comparison of Integrated and Stand-alone Approaches.Elizabeth Prior Jonson, Linda Mary McGuire & Deirdre O’Neill - 2015 - Journal of Business Ethics 132 (2):477-491.
    There are questions about how ethics is best taught to undergraduate business students. There has been a proliferation in the number of stand-alone ethics courses for undergraduate students but research on the effectiveness of integrated versus stand-alone mode of delivery is inconclusive. Christensen et al. :347–368, 2007), in a comprehensive review of ethics, corporate social responsibility and sustainability education, investigated how ethics education has changed over the last 20 years, including the issue of integration of these topics into the core (...)
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  • Axiological Realism.Joel J. Kupperman - 1996 - Philosophy 71 (276):185 - 203.
    Many would consider the lengthening debate between moral realists and anti-realists to be draw-ish. Plainly new approaches are needed. Or might the issue, which most broadly concerns realism in relation to normative judgments, be broken down into parts or sectors? Physicists have been saying, in relation to a similarly longstanding debate, that light in some respects behaves like waves and in some respects like particles. Might realism be more plausible in relation to some kinds of normative judgments than others?
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  • Up and down with aggregation.Brad Hooker - 2009 - Social Philosophy and Policy 26 (1):126-147.
    This paper starts by addressing some objections to the very idea of aggregate social good. The paper goes on to review the case for letting aggregate social good be not only morally relevant but also sometimes morally decisive. Then the paper surveys objections to letting aggregate social good determine personal or political decisions. The paper goes on to argue against the idea that aggregate good is sensitive to desert and the idea that aggregate good should be construed as incorporating agent-relativity.
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  • Van Gogh and His Doctors: Projections and Counter-Projections.Milly Heyd - 2011 - The European Legacy 16 (3):355-362.
    This article analyzes the relationship between Van Gogh and two of his doctors, Dr. Rey and Dr. Gachet, whose portraits he painted, by comparing their rapport with the sick painter and vice versa. Van Gogh the patient/artist—presented here as a case study—enables us to examine not only his projections but the counter-projections of his doctors, whether in writing (Dr. Rey) or in painting (Dr. Gachet), and to explore the psychological and ethical tensions these projections give rise to. Van Gogh's portraits (...)
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  • Untergräbt der Relativismus die Autorität der Moral und die regulative Funktion ihrer Wahrheit?Manfred Harth - 2016 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 93 (2):291-322.
    In this article, various objections will be discussed that have been put forward against ethical relativism, but which haven’t been considered seriously enough on the part of relativists and have been overrated on the part of their opponents. The objections will be concentrated into three arguments: the action-theoretic, the epistemological and the truth-theoretic argument. The article will discuss whether they can be rebutted by proponents of the two main types of relativism: indexical relativism and truth-relativism. The conclusion will be as (...)
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  • Rationality in Agreement.Gilbert Harman - 1988 - Social Philosophy and Policy 5 (2):1.
    Gauthier's title is potentially misleading. The phrase “morals by agreement” suggests a social contract theory of morality according to which basic moral principles arise out of an actual or hypothetical agreement. John Rawls defends a hypothetical agreement version, arguing that the basic principles of justice are those that would be agreed to in an initial position of fair equality. I myself defend an actual agreement version, arguing that the moral principles that apply to a person derive from implicit conventions the (...)
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  • Explaining Value.Gilbert Harman - 1994 - Social Philosophy and Policy 11 (1):229-248.
    I am concerned with values in the descriptive rather than in the normative sense. I am interested in theories that seek to explain one or another aspect of people's moral psychology. Why do people value what they value? Why do they have other moral reactions? What accounts for their feelings, their motivations to act morally, and their opinions about obligation, duty, rights, justice, and what people ought to do? A moral theory like utilitarianism may be put forward as offering the (...)
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  • Internalism and moral training.ron L. Haines - 1986 - Journal of Value Inquiry 20 (1):63-69.
    Internalism--The view that one can have a reason such as to justify an action only if one is moved to do that action--Cannot account for what a child must learn in order to be moved to keep a promise. Nor can it account for the relevance of the considerations that the child must come to understand in order to understand the wrongness of racism. Therefore there is good reason to think internalism false.
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  • The psychology of meta-ethics: Exploring objectivism.Geoffrey P. Goodwin & John M. Darley - 2008 - Cognition 106 (3):1339-1366.
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  • Relativism and the expressivist bifurcation.Javier González de Prado Salas - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (3-4):357-378.
    Traditional expressivists want to preserve a contrast between the representational use of declarative sentences in descriptive domains and the non-representational use of declarative sentences in other areas of discourse. However, expressivists have good reasons to endorse minimalism about representational notions, and minimalism seems to threaten the existence of such a bifurcation. Thus, there are pressures for expressivists to become global anti-representationalists. In this paper I discuss how to reconstruct in non-representationalist terms the sort of bifurcation traditional expressivists were after. My (...)
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  • Is Cultural Pluralism Relevant to Moral Knowledge?Alan Gewirth - 1994 - Social Philosophy and Policy 11 (1):22-43.
    Cultural pluralism is both a fact and a norm. It is a fact that our world, and indeed our society, are marked by a large diversity of cultures delineated in terms of race, class, gender, ethnicity, religion, ideology, and other partly interpenetrating variables. This fact raises the normative question of whether, or to what extent, such diversities should be recognized or even encouraged in policies concerning government, law, education, employment, the family, immigration, and other important areas of social concern.
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  • Unprincipled Ethics.Gerald Dworkin - 1995 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 20 (1):224-239.
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  • Dissolving the Moral Contract.Frank Snare - 1977 - Philosophy 52 (201):301 - 312.
    What response is to be given to the immoralist's question ‘Why should I be just?’? I say ‘response’ because it is not clear that the immoralist is looking for an answer. His question seems to be rhetorical, even contemptuous. It nevertheless presents a challenge to morality. The immoralist's position is that it is irrational to take justice and fairness seriously and that his own advantage or self-interest is the only rational consideration for him. This is not a moral position although (...)
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  • Knowledge and Relativism IV.F. C. White - 1983 - Educational Philosophy and Theory 15 (2):1-14.
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  • Moral knowledge and mass crime: A critical reading of moral relativism.Nenad Dimitrijevic - 2010 - Philosophy and Social Criticism 36 (2):131-156.
    In this article I ask how moral relativism applies to the analysis of responsibility for mass crime. The focus is on the critical reading of two influential relativist attempts to offer a theoretically consistent response to the challenges imposed by extreme criminal practices. First, I explore Gilbert Harman’s analytical effort to conceptualize the reach of moral discourse. According to Harman, mass crime creates a contextually specific relationship to which moral judgments do not apply any more. Second, I analyze the inability (...)
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  • Akrasia and the Desire to Become Someone Else: Venturinha on Moral Matters.Javier González de Prado - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (5):1705-1711.
    This paper discusses practical akrasia from the perspective of the sophisticated form of moral subjectivism that can be derived from Nuno Venturinha’s remarks on moral matters.
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  • Beyond objectivism: new methods for studying metaethical intuitions.Taylor Davis - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology 34 (1):125-153.
    Moral realists often assume that folk intuitions are predominantly realist, and they argue that this places the burden of proof on antirealists. More broadly, appeals to intuition in metaethics typically assume that folk judgments are generally consistent across individuals, such that they are at least predominantly something, if not realist. A substantial body of empirical work on moral objectivism has investigated these assumptions, but findings remain inconclusive due to methodological limitations. Objectivist judgments classify individuals into broad categories of realism and (...)
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  • Leading and Following (Un)ethically in Limen.Miguel Pina E. Cunha, Nuno Guimarães-Costa, Arménio Rego & Stewart R. Clegg - 2010 - Journal of Business Ethics 97 (2):189-206.
    We propose a liminality-based analysis of the process of ethical leadership/followership in organizations. A liminal view presents ethical leadership as a process taking place in organizational contexts that are often characterized by high levels of ambiguity, which render the usual rules and preferences dubious or inadequate. In these relational spaces, involving leaders, followers, and their context, old frames may be questioned and new ones introduced in an emergent way, through subtle processes whose evolution and implications may not be easy to (...)
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