Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. The Stag Hunt.Brian Skyrms - 2001 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 75 (2):31 - 41.
    If it was a matter of hunting a deer, everyone well realized that he must remain faithful to his post; but if a hare happened to pass within reach of one of them, we cannot doubt that he would have gone off in pursuit of it without scruple..." Rousseau's story of the hunt leaves many questions open. What are the values of a hare and of an individual's share of the deer given a successful hunt? What is the probability that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   25 citations  
  • Entre Cila e Caríbdis: o dilema darwiniano e o debunking da moralidade.Evandro Barbosa - 2019 - Filosofia Unisinos 20 (1).
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Stability and explanatory significance of some simple evolutionary models.Brian Skyrms - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (1):94-113.
    even if an equilibrium is asymptotically stable, that is no guarantee that the system will reach that equilibrium unless we know that the system's initial state is sufficiently close to the equilibrium. Global stability of an equilibrium, when we have it, gives the equilibrium a much more powerful explanatory role. An equilibrium is globally asymptotically stable if the dynamics carries every possible initial state in the interior of the state space to that equilibrium. If an equilibrium is globally stable, it (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  • Evolutionary game theory.Alexander J. McKenzie & Edward N. Zalta - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Evolutionary Explanations of Simple Communication: Signalling Games and Their Models.Travis LaCroix - 2020 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 51 (1):19-43.
    This paper applies the theoretical criteria laid out by D’Arms et al. to various aspects of evolutionary models of signalling. The question that D’Arms et al. seek to answer can be formulated as follows: Are the models that we use to explain the phenomena in question conceptually adequate? The conceptual adequacy question relates the formal aspects of the model to those aspects of the natural world that the model is supposed to capture. Moreover, this paper extends the analysis of D’Arms (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • (1 other version)Location, location, location: The importance of spatialization in modeling cooperation and communication.Patrick Grim, Stephanie Wardach & Vincent Beltrani - 2006 - Interaction Studiesinteraction Studies Social Behaviour and Communication in Biological and Artificial Systems 7 (1):43-78.
    Most current modeling for evolution of communication still underplays or ignores the role of local action in spatialized environments: the fact that it is immediate neighbors with which one tends to communicate, and from whom one learns strategies or conventions of communication. Only now are the lessons of spatialization being learned in a related field: game-theoretic models for cooperation. In work on altruism, on the other hand, the role of spatial organization has long been recognized under the term ‘viscosity’.Here we (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations