Most proposals on the problem of mental causation or the exclusion problem come from two metaphysical camps: physicalism and dualism. However, a recent theory called “Russellian panpsychism” (PRM) offers a distinct perspective on the relationship between consciousness and the physical world. PRM posits that phenomenal consciousness is ubiquitous and fundamental. It suggests that consciousness and physical properties are not entirely separate but rather intertwined. Phenomenal consciousness serves as a categorical/intrinsic ground for the extrinsic/dispositional nature of physical properties. By doing so, (...) PRM proposes a novel solution to the exclusion problem, combining elements from both physicalism and dualism while addressing their inherent difficulties. Nonetheless, the success of PRM faces challenges, as argued by Howell (2015). In this paper, I argue that if PRM is formulated as a version of dual-aspect monism, it can offer a distinctive approach to tackling the exclusion problem. (shrink)