How to Understand Russellian Panpsychism

Erkenntnis:1-20 (forthcoming)
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Abstract

Russellian Panpsychism or Panpsychist Russellian Monism (PRM) presents a new perspective on the ontological status of phenomenal consciousness, acknowledging its reality at the fundamental level of existence. Diverging from physicalism, PRM upholds the existence of phenomenal consciousness without disrupting the uniformity of nature, a departure from dualism. PRM posits a symbiotic relationship between mental and physical entities, asserting that the former provides intrinsic foundations for the latter, which are structural. This raises a pivotal inquiry: how does PRM reconcile these distinct realms? Is it a form of property dualism, recognizing two fundamental entity categories, or does it propose the primacy of mental properties with physical reducibility? Examining prevalent interpretations of PRM as dualistic or idealistic, this paper contends that neither aligns with PRM’s criteria for ontological monism, where only one fundamental entity type exists. Instead, it advocates for a dual-aspect monism framework, portraying the mental and physical as two authentic facets of a singular entity or property. Through a thorough analysis, the paper demonstrates how this dual-aspect interpretation harmonizes with PRM’s foundational principles, providing a robust resolution to the mental-physical dichotomy while upholding ontological monism. The conclusion explores the implications and contributions of this framework to the metaphysical discourse on consciousness.

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Ataollah Hashemi
Saint Louis University

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