Decision-making Capacity matters to whether a patient’s decision should determine her treatment. But why it matters in this way isn’t clear. The standard story is that dmc matters because autonomy matters. And this is thought to justify dmc as a gatekeeper for autonomy – whereby autonomy concerns arise if but only if a patient has dmc. But appeals to autonomy invoke two distinct concerns: concern for authenticity – concern that a choice is consistent with an individual’s commitments; and concern for (...) sovereignty – concern that an individual exercises control over that which is hers to control. Here, I argue, neither concern can alone explain why dmc matters. Instead, dmc matters because it indicates a harmony between the two concerns – the demands of each concern are more likely to agree if a patient has dmc. This vindicates the standard story, but also makes clear that dmc is an inappropriate gatekeeper for autonomy. (shrink)

In a recent Response published in the Journal of Medical Ethics,1 Buturovic provides two criticisms of my argument in ‘Is the exclusion of psychiatric patients from access to physician-assisted suicide discriminatory?’2 First, Buturovic argues that my argument effectively ‘erases the distinction between healthy adults and patients (whether somatic or psychiatric) essentially implying that PAS [physician-assisted suicide] should be available to all, for all reasons or, ultimately no reason’ (Buturovic,1 pg. 1). Second, Buturovic argues that opening the doors to medical assistance (...) in dying (MAID) for psychiatric patients could have a number of undesirable implications. In particular, Buturovic highlights the potential negative implications for relations of trust in medicine—psychiatry in particular—along with potential effects on the rate of organ donation. I would here like to respond to these two criticisms. In short, my response to Buturovic’s first argument is that the slope is not nearly as slippery as Buturovic suggests. The reason for this is that the plausibility of Buturovic’s argument rests on a significant misinterpretation of my argument, along with an important equivocation in her own. Buturovic argues that, under the three criteria that I propose for the provision of MAID—sufficient decision-making capacity, demonstrated treatment resistance, and a lack of substantially negative implications for existing standards of psychiatric treatment and research—the provision of MAID for trivial reasons, even no reason at all, is justifiable. The main problem with this argument is that I propose no such positive criteria. My argument is that none of the three arguments addressed in my previous paper are sufficient to justify the exclusion of any and all psychiatric patients from access to MAID. I do not claim, in other words, that any individual …. (shrink)

Background Medical assistance in dying (MAiD) sparks debate in several countries, some of which allow or plan to allow MAiD where a mental disorder is the sole underlying medical condition (MAiD-MD). Since MAiD-MD is becoming permissible in a growing number of jurisdictions, there is a need to better understand the moral concerns related to this option. Gaining a better understanding of the moral concerns at stake is a first step towards identifying ways of addressing them so that MAiD-MD can be (...) successfully introduced and implemented, where legislations allow it. Methods Thus, this article aims (1) to better understand the moral concerns regarding MAiD-MD, and (2) to identify potential solutions to promote stakeholders’ well-being. A qualitative thematic review was undertaken, which used systematic keyword-driven search and thematic analysis of content. Seventy-four publications met the inclusion criteria. Results Various moral concerns and proposed solutions were identified and are related to how MAiD-MD is introduced in 5 contexts: (1) Societal context, (2) Healthcare system, (3) Continuum of care, (4) Discussions on the option of MAiD-MD, (5) MAiD-MD practices. We propose this classification of the identified moral concerns because it helps to better understand the various facets of discomfort experienced with MAiD-MD. In so doing, it also directs the various actions to be taken to alleviate these discomforts and promote the well-being of stakeholders. Conclusion The assessment of MAiD-MD applications, which is part of the context of MAiD-MD practices, emerges as the most widespread source of concern. Addressing the moral concerns arising in the five contexts identified could help ease concerns regarding the assessment of MAiD-MD. (shrink)

If you slide far enough down the slippery slope envisioned by opponents of medical assistance-in-dying (MAiD), you eventually land in a ghastly society with industrialized euthanasia, rampant suicide, and devalued life. But what if the slippery slope leads us somewhere better? This paper explores the benefits of eliminating nearly all MAiD prohibitions and regulations. We anticipate three positive effects for public health: 1. Expanded access to those currently not qualified from MAiD by removing ineffective access criteria; 2. Harm reduction by (...) making MAiD safer and by rerouting suicidal patients into alternate care; and 3. Improvements to the health system through lowered healthcare costs and increased patient activation in end-of-life care. Safeguards and prohibitions deny those who wish to die the ability to do so to prevent the _potential_ danger of a few being subjected to an undesired early death. (shrink)

In a recent article Joshua James Hatherley argues that, if physician-assisted suicide (PAS) is morally permissible for patients suffering from somatic illnesses, it should be permissible for psychiatric patients as well. He argues that psychiatric disorders do not necessarily impair decision-making ability, that they are not necessarily treatable and that legalising PAS for psychiatric patients would not diminish research and therapeutic interest in psychiatric treatments or impair their recovery through loss of hope. However, by erasing distinction between somatic and psychiatric (...) disorders on those grounds, he also erases distinction between healthy adults and patients (whether somatic or psychiatric) essentially implying that PAS should be available to all, for all reasons or, ultimately no reason. Furthermore, as psychiatric patients are much more likely to be a source of usable organs for transplantation, their broad inclusion would strengthen the link between PAS/euthanasia and organ donation, potentially undermining both as well as diminishing already declining general trust in medical authorities and professionals and public health authorities and activists. (shrink)

BackgroundIn June 2019, the Australian state of Victoria joined the growing number of jurisdictions around the world to have legalised some form of voluntary assisted dying. A discourse of safety was prominent during the implementation of the Victorian legislation.Main textIn this paper, we analyse the ethical relationship between legislative “safeguards” and equal access. Drawing primarily on Ruger’s model of equal access to health care services, we analyse the Victorian approach to voluntary assisted dying in terms of four dimensions: horizontal equity, (...) patient agency, high quality care, and supportive social norms. We argue that some provisions framed as safeguards in the legislation create significant barriers to equal access for eligible patients.ConclusionsWhile safety is undoubtedly ethically important, we caution against an overemphasis on safeguarding in voluntary assisted dying legislation given the implications for equal access. (shrink)