This paper draws attention to the crucial importance of a new kind of precisely defined law of nature in the Scientific Revolution. All explanations in the mechanical philosophy depend upon the interactions of moving material particles; the laws of nature stipulate precisely how these interact; therefore, such explanations rely on the laws of nature. While this is obvious, the radically innovatory nature of these laws is not fully acknowledged in the historical literature. Indeed, a number of scholars have tried to (...) locate the origins of such laws in the medieval period. In the first part of this paper these claims are critically examined, and found at best to reveal important aspects of the background to the later idea, which could be drawn upon for legitimating purposes by the mechanical philosophers. The second part of the paper argues that the modern concept of laws of nature originates in René Descartes's work. It is shown that Descartes took his concept of laws of nature from the mathematical tradition, but recognized that he could not export it to the domain of physico-mathematics, to play a causal role, unless he could show that these laws were underwritten by God. It is argued that this is why, at an early stage of his philosophical development, Descartes had to turn to metaphysics. (shrink)

In this article I dispute the claim, made by several contemporary scholars, that Spinoza was a naturalist. ‘Naturalism’ here refers to two distinct but related positions in contemporary philosophy. The first, ontological naturalism, is the view that everything that exists possesses a certain character permitting it to be defined as natural and prohibiting it from being defined as supernatural. I argue that the only definition of ontological naturalism that could be legitimately applied to Spinoza's philosophy is so unrestrictive as to (...) tell us nothing about the content of his ideas. The second, methodological naturalism, is the view that the natural sciences are the best means of finding out substantial truths about the concrete world. I present some historical research showing that Spinoza's way of positioning himself with respect to other philosophers in the Dutch Republic casts very serious doubt on the claim that he was a methodological naturalist. This adds further weight to arguments that have already been made against the naturalist reading of Spinoza. (shrink)

A recepção de Os meteoros, publicado em 1637 como um dos ensaios do Discurso do método, foi marcada por uma forte reação contra o mecanicismo cartesiano. Alguns de seus contemporâneos, adeptos da filosofia tradicional escolástica, elaboraram uma série de críticas quanto à maneira como Descartes concebia a natureza dos corpos e explicava os fenômenos naturais. Libert Froidmont, um de seus primeiros críticos, elaborou um conjunto de objeções contra A dióptrica e, principalmente, contra Os meteoros. Este artigo visa analisar alguns aspectos (...) sobre o debate entre Descartes e Froidmont concernente às hipóteses mecanicistas sustentadas pelo primeiro. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine the manner in which Descartes defends his Vortex Hypothesis in Part III of the Principles of Philosophy, and expand on Ernan McMullin’s characterization of the methodology that Descartes uses to support his planetary system. McMullin illuminates the connection between the deductive method of Part III and the method Descartes uses in earlier portions of the Principles, and he brings needed light to the role that imaginative constructions play in Descartes’s explanations of the phenomena. I develop (...) McMullin’s reading by bringing further attention to the constraints that Descartes places on the imagination in Part III. I focus in particular on the way in which Descartes uses metaphysical truths concerning God’s nature to support his general description of the planetary system, and on the way he relies on a mathematical standard of intelligibility to defend his proposals about the configuration of matter. Attending to the role of metaphysics and mathematics in Part III shows that Descartes’s arguments for the explanatory power of the Vortex Hypothesis are more effective than McMullin suggests. The reading I forward also offers important perspective on how Descartes’s hypotheses in Part III can be seen as both metaphysically and mathematically well-grounded. (shrink)