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The puzzle of the absentminded driver combines an unstable decision problem with a version of the Sleeping Beauty problem. Its analysis depends on the choice between “halfing” and “thirding” as well as that between “evidential” and “causal” decision theory. I show that all four combinations lead to interestingly different solutions, and draw some general lessons about the formulation of causal decision theory, the interpretation of mixed strategies and the connection between rational credence and objective chance. 



The Sleeping Beauty problem has attracted considerable attention in the literature as a paradigmatic example of how selflocating uncertainty creates problems for the Bayesian principles of Conditionalization and Reflection. Furthermore, it is also thought to raise serious issues for diachronic Dutch Book arguments. I show that, contrary to what is commonly accepted, it is possible to represent the Sleeping Beauty problem within a standard Bayesian framework. Once the problem is correctly represented, the ‘thirder’ solution satisfies standard rationality principles, vindicating why (...) 

A large number of essays address the Sleeping Beauty problem, which undermines the validity of Bayesian inference and Bas Van Fraassen's 'Reflection Principle'. In this study a straightforward analysis of the problem based on probability theory is presented. The key difference from previous works is that apart from the random experiment imposed by the problem's description, a different one is also considered, in order to negate the confusion on the involved conditional probabilities. The results of the analysis indicate that no (...) 

Parodic earlier draft of "Sleeping Beauty: why violations of probability laws are `Deal' breakers". 

Analyses of the Sleeping Beauty Problem are polarised between those advocating the “1/2 view” and those endorsing the “1/3 view”. The disagreement concerns the evidential relevance of selflocating information. Unlike halfers, thirders regard selflocating information as evidentially relevant in the Sleeping Beauty Problem. In the present study, we systematically manipulate the kind of information available in different formulations of the Sleeping Beauty Problem. Our findings indicate that patterns of judgment on different formulations of the Sleeping Beauty Problem do not fit (...) 

Terence Horgan defends the thirder position on the Sleeping Beauty problem, claiming that Beauty can, upon awakening during the experiment, engage in “synchronic Bayesian updating” on her knowledge that she is awake now in order to justify a 1/3 credence in heads. In a previous paper, I objected that epistemic probabilities are equivalent to rational degrees of belief given a possible epistemic situation and so the probability of Beauty’s indexical knowledge that she is awake now is necessarily 1, precluding such (...) 

Philosophical interest in the role of selflocating information in the confirmation of hypotheses has intensified in virtue of the Sleeping Beauty problem. If the correct solution to that problem is 1/3, various attractive views on confirmation and probabilistic reasoning appear to be undermined; and some writers have used the problem as a basis for rejecting some of those views. My interest here is in two such views. One of them is the thesis that selflocating information cannot be evidentially relevant to (...) 

The Sleeping Beauty Problem attracts so much attention because it connects to a wide variety of unresolved issues in formal epistemology, decision theory, and the philosophy of science. The problem raises unanswered questions concerning relative frequencies, objective chances, the relation between selflocating and nonselflocating information, the relation between selflocation and updating, Dutch Books, accuracy arguments, memory loss, indifference principles, the existence of multiple universes, and manyworlds interpretations of quantum mechanics. After stating the problem, this article surveys its connections to all (...) 

“Doublehalfers” think that throughout the Sleeping Beauty Problem, Beauty should keep her credence that a fair coin flip came up heads equal to 1/2. I introduce a new wrinkle to the problem that shows even doublehalfers can't keep Beauty's credences equal to the objective chances for all coinflip propositions. This leaves no way to deny that selflocating information generates an unexpected kind of inadmissible evidence. 