This paper offers a critical examination of efforts to use Heidegger's thought to illuminate deep ecology. It argues that deep ecology does not entail a non-anthropocentric or ecocentric environmental ethic; rather, it is best understood as offering an ontological critique of the current environmental crisis, from a perspective of deep anthropocentrism.

Many recent critical discussions of anthropocentrism have focused on Bryan Norton's ‘convergence hypothesis': the claim that both anthropocentric and nonanthropocentric ethics will recommend the same environmentally responsible behaviours and policies. I argue that even if we grant the truth of Norton's convergence hypothesis, there are still good reasons to worry about anthropocentric ethics. Ethics legitimately raises questions about how to feel, not just about which actions to take or which policies to adopt. From the point of view of norms for (...) feeling, anthropocentrism has very different practical implications from nonanthropocentrism; it undermines some of the common attitudes – love, respect, awe – that people think it appropriate to take toward the natural world. (shrink)

The author examines the problem of motivation about future generations. He argues that though many philosophers think that direct motivations are problematic for future generations only, they are not unproblematic for the current generations too, and that the motivation problem can be solved if we consider the idea of “leaving the earth no worse.” He also shows why such an idea should be promoted and can motivate us to work in the best interests of current and future generations. The author (...) also contends that prioritizing the idea of “leaving the earth no worse” is not exclusively anthropocentric. (shrink)

In this paper, I add to the recent flurry of research concerning the moral patiency of artificial beings. Focusing on David Gunkel's adaptation of Levinas, I identify and argue that the Relationist's extrinsic case-by-case approach of ascribing artificial moral status fails on two accounts. Firstly, despite Gunkel's effort to avoid anthropocentrism, I argue that Relationism is, itself, anthropocentric in virtue of how its case-by-case approach is, necessarily, assessed from a human perspective. Secondly I, in light of interpreting Gunkel's Relationism as (...) a case-by-case approach, reiterate that it cannot give sufficient action guidance. (shrink)

This book defends an account of justice to nonhuman beings – i.e., to animals, plants etc. – also known as ecological or interspecies justice, and which lies in the intersection of environmental political theory and environmental ethics. More specifically, against the background of the current extinction crisis this book defends a global non-ranking biocentric theory of distributive ecological/interspecies justice to wild nonhuman beings, because the extinction crisis does not only need practical solutions, but also an account of how it is (...) the outcome of large-scale injustice. This book not only provides a novel theoretical framework that supports such a claim, but it also develops the theoretical tools to find just compromises between the entitlements of intraspecies and intra-human global distributive justice to ecological space for the purpose of working towards a vision of just conservation. -/- Content: 1. Introducing Ecological Justice 2. Political Non-Ranking Biocentrism 3. The Community of Justice 4. The Currency of Distributive Justice 5. The Principles of Distributive Justice 6. Ecological Justice and the Capabilities Approach 7. Biodiversity Loss: An Injustice? 8. Who Owns the Earth? 9. Visions of Just Conservation 10. Outlook for Implementation . (shrink)

In the last 25 years writing in bioethics, particularly in medical ethics, has generally claimed that action is ethically acceptable only if it receives informed consent from those affected. However, informed consent provides only limited justification, and may provide even less as new information technologies are used to store and handle personal data, including personal genetic data. The central philosophical weakness of relying on informed consent procedures for ethical justification is that consent is a propositional attitude, so referentially opaque: consent (...) is given to specific propositions describing limited aspects of a situation, and does not transfer even to closely related propositions. Assembling genetic data in databases creates additional difficulties for ethical justification. This is not because genetic information is intrinsically exceptional, but because the merger of genetic and information technologies make it possible to assemble massive quantities of complex information that defeat individuals' best efforts to grasp what is at stake, or to give or withhold informed consent. The future agenda for bioethics will need to take account of both these limitations of appeals to informed consent. (shrink)

In 'Non-Anthropocentrism? A Killing Objection', Tony Lynch and David Wells argue that any attempt to develop a non-anthropocentric morality must invariably slide back to either anthropocentrism (either weak or strong) or a highly repugnant misanthropy in cases of direct conflict between the survival needs of humans and nonhuman species. This reply argues that their attempt to expose the flaws in non-anthropocentrism deflects attention away from the crux of the ecocentric critique, which can best be understood if we replace the confusing (...) terms anthropocentrism/non-anthropocentrism with 'human racism'/ecocentrism (understood as a more inclusive moral perspective which encompasses nonracist humanism). Human racism manifests when a reconciliation of human and nonhuman needs is possible but is nonetheless concealed and/or denied. That is, the best test for discerning prejudice against nonhuman nature is not when individual or social choice are severely circum-scribed but rather when such choices are relatively unconstrained. Moreover, their concluding argument that human concern for nonhuman nature should be understood in terms of aesthetic values rather than moral values does not provide reliable grounds for the systematic protection of nonhuman nature. (shrink)

The distinction between anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric theories, together with the more fine-grained distinction between anthropocentrism, biocentrism and ecocentrism, are probably two of the most frequently occurring distinctions in the environmental ethics literature. In this essay I draw attention to some problematic aspects of the terminology used to draw these distinctions: the ‘centrism-terminology’. I argue that this terminology is ambiguous and misleading, and therefore confusing. Furthermore, depending on which interpretation it is given, it is also either asymmetric and non-inclusive, or superfluous. (...) Although I find it unlikely that the centrism-terminology will be abandoned, I end the essay by providing a suggestion for an alternative way to categorise theories in environmental ethics. (shrink)

Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) evaluates actions in terms of negative consequences (costs) and positive consequences (benefits). Though much has been said on CBA, little attention has been paid to the types of values held by costs and benefits. This paper introduces a simple typology of values in CBA and applies it to three forms of CBA: the common, money-based CBA, CBA based in social welfare, and CBA based in intrinsic value. The latter extends CBA beyond its usual anthropocentric domain. Adequate handling (...) of value typology in CBA avoids analytical mistakes and connects CBA to its consequentialist roots. (shrink)

In the past thirty years environmental ethics has emerged as one of the most vibrant and exciting areas of applied philosophy. Several journals and hundreds of books testify to its growing importance inside and outside philosophical circles. But with all of this scholarly output, it is arguably the case that environmental ethics is not living up to its promise of providing a philosophical contribution to the resolution of environmental problems. This article surveys the current state of the field and offers (...) an alternative path for the future development of environmental ethics toward a more publicly engaged model of applied philosophy. (shrink)

: Animal ethics has presented convincing arguments for the individual value of animals. Animals are not only valuable instrumentally or indirectly, but in themselves. Less has been written about interest conflicts between humans and other animals, and the use of animals in practice. The motive of this paper is to analyze different approaches to interest conflicts. It concentrates on six models, which are the rights model, the interest model, the mental complexity model, the special relations model, the multi-criteria model, and (...) the contextual model. Of these, the contextual model is the strongest, and carries clear consequences for the practical use of animals. (shrink)

A Kantian approach can establish that non-human natural entities are morally considerable and that humans have duties to them. This is surprising, because most environmental ethicists have either rejected or overlooked Kant when it comes to this issue. Inspired by an argument of Christine Korsgaard, I claim that both humans and non-humans have a natural good, which is whatever allows an entity to function well according to the kind of entity it is. I argue that humans are required to confer (...) normative value on the natural good of all entities that have a natural good. This is so because, as a matter of fact, humans confer normative value on their own natural good simply because it is a natural good, which commits humans to the position that any natural good deserves to have normative value conferred on it. Since non-human natural entities have a natural good, their natural good deserves to have normative value conferred on it as well, and this is sufficient to make non-human natural entities morally considerable such that humans have duties to them. (shrink)

Cosmic Christology, including deep incarnation, provides an ethical-theological framework for confronting environmental crisis. It criticizes ‘history’ as arrogantly anthropocentric and proposes a paradigm shift from Christ the Saviour of history to the Christ of the cosmos. Whereas I recognize these strengths for protecting nature, I argue that in its universal pretension Christ too often becomes an abstract reality and loses material grounding for social justice. In its eagerness to supplant the Christ the Saviour of history, cosmic Christology risks stripping humanity (...) from those deemed ‘non-persons’ and inadvertently reinforces the status of the oppressed as subalterns. Likewise, by de-legitimizing history, and by putting exploited nature and the oppressed as equivalents, struggles by subalterns for recognition and justice are diminished. To avoid this, I argue that the salvation of nature passes through the salvation of history. Only the Christ the Saviour of history can be the cosmic Christ. (shrink)

Anthropocentrism has been claimed to be the root of the global environmental crisis. Based on a multidisciplinary (e.g. environmental philosophy, animal ethics, anthropology, law) and multilingual (English, Spanish, French, German, Japanese) literature review, this article proposes a conceptual analysis of ‘anthropocentrism’ and reconstructs the often implicit argument that links anthropocentrism to the environmental crisis. The variety of usages of the concept of ‘anthropocentrism’ described in this article reveals many underlying disagreements under the apparent unanimity of the calls to reject anthropocentrism, (...) both regarding what exactly is the root of the problem, and the nature of the possible solutions. It highlights the limitations of the argument of anthropocentrism as the scapegoat of the environmental crisis and identifies two main challenges faced by attempts to go beyond anthropocentrism: an epistemological challenge regarding knowledge and the place of sciences, and a metaethical challenge related to values and cultural pluralism. Beyond the issue of an anthropocentric point of view, the core of the problem might be an intertwinement of views and assumptions that work together to undermine attempts to protect the environment from the greed of some humans, such as the human-nature dichotomy, capitalism, consumerism, industrialism, etc. Finally, this article suggests that making the nuances and the presuppositions that underlie various versions of the anti-anthropocentric rhetoric explicit is necessary to foster constructive dialogue among different anti-anthropocentrism proponents, as well as with their detractors. (shrink)

Spinoza’s attitude toward nonhuman animals is uncharacteristically cruel. This essay elaborates upon this ostensible idiosyncrasy in reference to Hasana Sharp’s commendable desire to revitalize a basis for animal ethics from within the bounds of his system. Despite our favoring an ethics beginning from animal affect, this essay argues that an animal ethic adequate to the demands of our historical moment cannot be developed from within the confines of strict adherence to Spinoza’s system—and this is not yet to speak of a (...) more robust animal ethics which would advocate actual care and compassion for the animals themselves. We argue that on the assumption of Spinoza’s ontological biocentrism, in the presence of Spinozist determinism and the absence of an axiological biocentrism, an anthropocentric axiology necessarily follows. Any Spinozist animal ethic must fall back, therefore, upon appeals to the maximization of human pleasure and power; hence Spinoza’s ruthless injunction to “use (the animals) at our pleasure.” These are the very ontological and ethical assumptions which have incited human self-exaltation in the modern period, in pursuit of power and pleasure even despite the destructive long-term consequences for all the living. We suggest that an adequate animal ethic would require either an abandonment of Spinoza’s ontological biocentrism or the adoption of an axiological biocentrism. (shrink)

This article provides a comprehensive review of the rather intricate relationship between contemporary environmental ethics, understood as a philosophical branch, and ancient philosophy. While its primary focus is on Western philosophy, it also includes some brief yet crucial considerations about the influence of Eastern traditions of thought on environmental ethics. Aside from the introduction in the first section, the discussion is organised into three main sections. In the Reception: Ancient philosophy in environmental ethics section, I review the initial reception of (...) ancient philosophy in contemporary environmental ethics. Next, in the Reaction: Environmental ethics in ancient philosophy scholarship section, I examine how the scholarship in AP responded to this early reception. I conclude, in the final section, with some constructive suggestions for future research. (shrink)

A notable feature of recent philosophical work on climate ethics is that it makes practically no reference to ‘traditional’ environmental philosophy. There is some irony in this, since environmental ethics arose as part of a broader movement within philosophy, starting in the 1960s, aimed at developing different fields of applied philosophy, in order to show how everyday practice could be enriched through philosophical reflection and analysis. The major goal of this paper is to explain why this branch of practical ethics (...) has, for the most part, failed the test of practicability when it comes to formulating a response to global climate change. The central problem is that debates in environmental philosophy became absorbed by a set of metaphysical questions about the nature of value. The result has been a field dominated by views that provide unsuitable foundations for the development of public policy. (shrink)

At its inception, geoethics was envisioned as a type of professional ethics concerned with the moral implications of geoscientific research, applications, and practices. More recently, however, some scholars have proposed versions of geoethics as public and global ethics. To better understand these developments, this article considers the relationship between geoethics and environmental ethics by exploring different aspects of the human-nature relation (i.e., the moral status and role of humans in relation to the non-human world). We start by noting that the (...) main strains of geoethical thought elaborated so far represent examples of environmental virtue ethics and defend moral weak anthropocentric positions (e.g., “ethical”, “responsible” or “enlightened” anthropocentrism). Some scholars propose that such weak anthropocentric geoethics can synthesize the different positions in environmental ethics and move beyond them toward a novel and distinct approach. We compare the meaning and the use of the term “anthropocentrism” in both environmental ethics and geoethics, stressing that although geoethics is inevitably epistemically anthropocentric (i.e., anthropogenic), it does not need to be morally anthropocentric. We consider the compatibility of non-anthropocentric stances with current geoethical theory and argue for the integration of normative non-anthropocentric accounts (e.g., ecocentric) into geoethical debates and geoscience education. (shrink)

The term ‘speciesism’ was once coined to name discrimination against nonhuman animals as well as the bias that such discrimination expresses. It has sparked a debate on criteria for being morally considerable and the relative significance of human and nonhuman animals’ interests. Many defenses of the preferential consideration of humans have come with a denial of the normative meaning of the term ‘speciesism’ itself. In fact, defenders of the moral relevance of species membership and their critics alike have often used (...) ‘speciesism’ as a merely descriptive technical term for classifying positions in normative ethics. This paper argues that this terminological choice severely impoverishes our ethical vocabulary and moral conceptual scheme. It obscures the considerable common ground among theorists with differing views on the relevance of various properties for moral consideration. It is often overlooked that even most defenders of the preferential treatment of one’s fellow species members have good reason to hold on to the normative notion that ‘speciesism’ was originally meant to be. Two distinct types of concepts are involved when differential treatment along species lines is addressed in a normative and a descriptive way, respectively. The term ‘speciesism’ should be reserved for the normative concept and kept apart from the descriptive term ‘speciescentrism.’ Attempts to redefine speciesism as something that is not wrong by definition are shown to be epistemically and morally harmful for the same reasons attempts to redefine racism and sexism in this way are. (shrink)

Ever since nonhuman entity and the environment became a major ethical issue, anthropocentric worldviews have been blamed for all that is morally wrong about our dealings with nature. Those who regard themselves as non-anthropocentrists / holistic scholars typically assume that the West’s anthropocentric axiologies and ontologies stir all of the environmental degradations associated with human species. In contrast, a handful of environmental philosophers aver that anthropocentrism is entirely acceptable as a foundation for environmental ethics as human’s perspective cannot be entirely (...) removed from the decision-making process. They often argue that is it possible for the man to act responsibly towards the environment for human’s sake and its future generation. Thus there is an ever-present tension between anthropocentrism and holism, with each side trying to oust talk each other. In my opinion, those extreme views are lump sided, as such lack room for tolerance. The thrust of this paper is to bridge the gap within these ethical theories with the theory of “anthropoholism”. Anthropoholism is a theory in environmental ethics that acknowledges man central role; perspective, place in eco-system as well as ontology but argues that despite this position, Man is just a part of nature, such that he cannot exist independently of the environment, or cannot be understood without reference to the environment. With this, the theory of anthropoholism is able to bridge the gap between the two extreme views by stating the obvious and explaining the connection between the two extreme views. (shrink)

Anthropocentrism, in its original connotation in environmental ethics, is the belief that value is human-centred and that all other beings are means to human ends. Environmentally -concerned authors have argued that anthropocentrism is ethically wrong and at the root of ecological crises. Some environmental ethicists argue, however, that critics of anthropocentrism are misguided or even misanthropic. They contend: first that criticism of anthropocentrism can be counterproductive and misleading by failing to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate human interests. Second, that humans (...) differ greatly in their environmental impacts, and consequently, addressing human inequalities should be a precondition for environmental protection. Third, since ecosystems constitute the “life-support system” for humans, anthropocentrism can and should be a powerful motivation for environmental protection. Fourth, human self-love is not only natural but helpful as a starting point for loving others, including nonhumans. Herein we analyze such arguments, agreeing with parts of them while advancing four counter-arguments. First, redefining the term anthropocentrism seems to be an attempt to ignore behavior in which humans focus on themselves at the risk of the planet. Second, if addressing human inequalities is a precondition for environmental protection, biodiversity protection will remain out of the scope of ethical consideration for an indefinite period of time. Third, anthropocentric motivations can only make a positive contribution to the environment in situations where humans are conscious of a direct benefit to themselves. Fourth, ‘self-love’ alone is an inadequate basis for environmental concern and action. We also explore the question of agency, shared responsibility, and a fair attribution of blame for our environmental predicaments. (shrink)

Stakeholder theory has become an influential framework for addressing organizational challenges, including those related to sustainability. Yet, the inclusion of nonhuman stakeholders in stakeholder theory is complicated by ontological and epistemological obstacles. To overcome these, we turn to art and posthumanist practice theory and examine artist-led practices by focusing on the projects of two pioneering eco-artists, Helen Mayer Harrison and Newton Harrison. In this way we identify the ontological and epistemological challenges that impede the inclusion of nonhumans into stakeholder theory, (...) showing that artist-led practices allow for the inclusion of nonhuman stakeholders in two ways: (1) by specifying the temporal, spatial, and outcome distinctions that ontologically hinder their inclusion; and (2) by explicating the reframing of knowing and the emotional and imaginative dimensions of knowing that epistemologically enable their inclusion. We expand on the theorizing of nonhuman stakeholder inclusion by understanding the inclusion of nonhumans, first, not as a fixed state that is to be achieved but rather as one that materializes and gains meaning through specific practices of knowing; and, second, not as merely the absence of exclusion but rather as a dynamic interplay, where inclusion and exclusion mutually constitute one another. By advancing stakeholder theory’s theorizing and understandings of inclusion and exclusion, we also respond to urgent and contemporary environmental challenges. (shrink)

Захист природи і відновлення екологічного балансу людського довкілля неможливі без консолідації зусиль усього людства. Актуальною проблемою є формування етичної мотивації широкого загалу людей для зміни наявної неефективної політики і практики природокористування. У дослідженні розкрито застосування концепції покликання як філософсько-етичного феномена до вирішення екологічних проблем. Покликання визначено як смислове ціле, яке об’єднує особистісні бажання, здібності, діяльність для їх реалізації та оцінку досягнених результатів відповідно до розуміння людиною особистісного, суспільного або духовного блага, на яке вони спрямовані. Проаналізовано поклик як інтерналізовану соціальну спонуку (...) людини у сфері природоохоронної діяльності. Розкрито значення моральних почуттів і етичних принципів адвокації, солідарності, відповідальності, справедливості для виявлення і реалізації покликання до захисту природи. На основі аналізу філософських праць К.-О. Апеля, М. Гайдеґера, Т. В. Гардашук, А. М. Єрмоленка, Г. Йонаса, М. М. Кисельова, Х. Копніної, К. М. Маєр-Абіха та релігійної думки (папа Франциск, патріарх Варфоломій) проаналізовано проблему антропоцентризму в етиці і завдання консолідації антропології, етики і екології у пошуку шляхів вирішення кризи довкілля. Обґрунтовано принципи спільної відповідальності і надособистісного блага у покликанні людей на захист природи. (shrink)

The 3Rs framework in animal experimentation– “replace, reduce, refine” – has been alleged to be expressive of anthropocentrism, the view that only humans are directly morally relevant. After all, the 3Rs safeguard animal welfare only as far as given human research objectives permit, effectively prioritizing human use interests over animal interests. This article acknowledges this prioritization, but argues that the characterization as anthropocentric is inaccurate. In fact, the 3Rs prioritize research purposes even more strongly than an ethical anthropocentrist would. Drawing (...) on the writings of Universities Federation for Animal Welfare (UFAW) founder Charles W. Hume, who employed Russell and Burch, it is argued that the 3Rs originally arose from an animal-centered ethic which was however restricted by an organizational strategy aiming at the voluntary cooperation of animal researchers. Research purposes thus had to be accepted as given. While this explains why the 3Rs focus narrowly on humane method selection, not on encouraging animal-free question selection in the first place, it suggests that governments should (also) focus on the latter if they recognize animals as deserving protection for their own sake. (shrink)

Humans are living in damaged landscapes within a new geographical epoch known as the Anthropocene. The COVID-19 outbreak fuels uncertainty, instability, and ambiguity for humans. This viral disaster has been blamed for losing and further exacerbating ecological imbalance, and prompts a need to re-examine multispecies relations and, in particular, human exceptionalism. The authors, by applying a new theoretical assemblage that brings the new materialist turn entangled with Buddhist philosophies into our stories and diffractions of child-virus bodies, have been prompted to (...) raise two questions about how multispecies justice could disrupt environmental sustainability education. The questions we will engage with in the paper include: Can we explore these new theoretical assemblages (east-west) with child-virus relations as a means for raising multispecies justice that critiques the universalisation of human forces in the Anthropocene? What possibilities does the pandemic offer to rethink multispecies relations as an entangled ecological crisis by exploring what a ‘new normal’ in post-COVID-19 sustainability education could emerge? (shrink)

The societal roots of the environmental discussion are discussed. Attention focusses on the roles played by the nature conservation, environmental, consumer and anti-nuclear movements, popular and popularized science, the media and the development of environmental policy and regulation.The scientific approach and the societal background enable us to understand the concept of the “environmental crisis”, which itself provides the most important contextual background to environmental ethics. To illustrate contemporary thinking, an analysis of Agenda 21 shows how environmental problems are currently seen (...) as the result of poverty, consumption and production patterns and demographic and decision making issues.Using this environmental knowledge background as a reference, the main lines of thinking in environmental ethics are overviewed. The overview begins by looking at approaches which value the environment because it is or might be of value to man. It continues by considering approaches which are intermediate between the anthropocentric and deep ecological viewpoints. In particular, Leopold's”Land Ethic” and Singer's”Animal Liberation” ideas are discussed.Deep ecology is based on the idea that nature as a whole has moral value. Reference is made to the work of the Norwegian philosopher Naess and to the more scientifically-rooted “deep green theory” of Sylvan and Plumwood.In addition to these different lines of theorising within environmental ethics, the ethical aspects of such anchorpoints in the environmental discussion as sustainable development and the Gaia theory, are also discussed. (shrink)

Many philosophers consider favouritism toward humans in the context of moral choice to be a prejudice. Several terms are used for it – ' speciesism ', 'human chauvinism', 'human racism', and 'anthropocentrism' – with somewhat varying and often blurred meanings, which brings confusion to the issue. This essay suggests that only one term, ' speciesism ', be used, and it attempts a conceptual clarification. To this end it proposes a set of conditions of adequacy for a concept that would be (...) acceptable to the parties of the controversy. Through an examination of various forms of alleged speciesism it eventually proposes a rather precise concept. On this definition some positions believed not to be speciesist perhaps should be so called, and some positions believed to be speciesist perhaps should not be so called. The latter would better be referred to as 'humanistic ethics' or 'non-speciesist humanism'. (shrink)

This paper criticises contemporary posthumanist theories of anthropocentrism by reading an early essay by Bertrand Russell alongside work by Rosi Braidotti and Jane Bennett. It argues that, despite appearances, scientism and posthumanism share key commitments in common, such that clarifying the problems with which Russell struggles regarding nature and significance can illuminate symmetrical problems in posthumanism. Against these alternatives, the paper draws on insights from Bernard Williams, contemporary Hegelian philosophy, and J. J. Gibson’s work on animal agency to sketch a (...) picture of what it means to take a human perspective. It is the perspective of one species among others, with a particular evolutionary history; it is also the perspective of a species that, because of certain developments in that history, knows itself as such. That opens us to forms of answerability to the world that do not touch the lives of unselfconscious animals. Some critics of the theoretical discourse on anthropocentrism have argued that taking a human perspective is morally unobjectionable. This paper goes further: it is necessary for grasping our relation to the rest of nature and so our responsibilities for it. (shrink)