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The Composition of Thoughts

Noûs 45 (1):126-166 (2011)

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  1. The Function is Unsaturated.Richard Heck & Robert May - 2013 - In Michael Beaney (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the History of Analytic Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
    An investigation of what Frege means by his doctrine that functions (and so concepts) are 'unsaturated'. We argue that this doctrine is far less peculiar than it is usually taken to be. What makes it hard to understand, oddly enough, is the fact that it is so deeply embedded in our contemporary understanding of logic and language. To see this, we look at how it emerges out of Frege's confrontation with the Booleans and how it expresses a fundamental difference between (...)
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  • Frege on Sense Identity, Basic Law V, and Analysis.Philip A. Ebert - 2016 - Philosophia Mathematica 24 (1):9-29.
    The paper challenges a widely held interpretation of Frege's conception of logic on which the constituent clauses of basic law V have the same sense. I argue against this interpretation by first carefully looking at the development of Frege's thoughts in Grundlagen with respect to the status of abstraction principles. In doing so, I put forth a new interpretation of Grundlagen §64 and Frege's idea of ‘recarving of content’. I then argue that there is strong evidence in Grundgesetze that Frege (...)
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  • Formality of Logic and Frege’s Begriffsschrift.Daniele Mezzadri - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (2):182-207.
    This paper challenges a standard interpretation according to which Frege’s conception of logic (early and late) is at odds with the contemporary one, because on the latter’s view logic is formal, while on Frege’s view it is not, given that logic’s subject matter is reality’s most general features. I argue that Frege – in Begriffsschrift – retained the idea that logic is formal; Frege sees logic as providing the ‘logical cement’ that ties up together the contentful concepts of specific sciences, (...)
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  • Frege’s Recognition Criterion for Thoughts and its Problems.Mark Textor - 2018 - Synthese 195 (6):2677-2696.
    According to Frege, we need a criterion for recognising when different sentences express the same thought to make progress in logic. He himself hedged his own equipollence criterion with a number of provisos. In the literature on Frege, little attention has been paid to the problems these provisos raise. In this paper, I will argue that Fregeans have ignored these provisos at their peril. For without these provisos, Frege’s criterion yields wrong results; but with the provisos in place, it is (...)
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  • Predication as Ascription.David Liebesman - 2015 - Mind 124 (494):517-569.
    I articulate and defend a necessary and sufficient condition for predication. The condition is that a term or term-occurrence stands in the relation of ascription to its designatum, ascription being a fundamental semantic relation that differs from reference. This view has dramatically different semantic consequences from its alternatives. After outlining the alternatives, I draw out these consequences and show how they favour the ascription view. I then develop the view and elicit a number of its virtues.
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  • Concept Designation.Arvid Båve - 2019 - American Philosophical Quarterly 56 (4):331-344.
    The paper proposes a way for adherents of Fregean, structured propositions to designate propositions and other complex senses/concepts using a special kind of functor. I consider some formulations from Peacocke's works and highlight certain problems that arise as we try to quantify over propositional constituents while referring to propositions using "that"-clauses. With the functor notation, by contrast, we can quantify over senses/concepts with objectual, first-order quantifiers and speak without further ado about their involvement in propositions. The functor notation also turns (...)
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  • II-The Last Dogma of Type Confusions.Ofra Magidor - 2009 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109 (1pt1):1-29.
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  • Quantifying In From a Fregean Perspective.Seth Yalcin - 2015 - Philosophical Review 124 (2):207-253.
    As Quine observed, the following sentence has a reading which, if true, would be of special interest to the authorities: Ralph believes that someone is a spy. This is the reading where the quantifier is naturally understood as taking wide scope relative to the attitude verb and as binding a variable within the scope of the attitude verb. This essay is interested in addressing the question what the semantic analysis of this kind of reading should look like from a Fregean (...)
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  • Desert in Liberal Justice: Beyond Institutional Guarantees.J. P. Messina - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (2):248-267.
    I argue that a theory of distributive justice is sensitive to desert if and only if it does not require an institutional scheme that prevents individuals from treating one another as they deserve, and requires a desert ethos. A desert ethos is a set of principles that, though not embodied in a society’s basic coercive structure, nevertheless governs interpersonal relations between citizens. These two necessary conditions are jointly sufficient for ‘giving desert its due’ in a theory of justice. I therefore (...)
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  • A Theory-Based Epistemology of Modality.Bob Fischer - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (2):228-247.
    We have some justified beliefs about modal matters. A modal epistemology should explain what’s involved in our having that justification. Given that we’re realists about modality, how should we expect that explanation to go? In the first part of this essay, I suggest an answer to this question based on an analogy with games. Then, I outline a modal epistemology that fits with that answer. According to a theory-based epistemology of modality, you justifiably believe that p if you justifiably believe (...)
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  • Why We Should Not Identify Sentence Structure with Propositional Structure.Thomas Hodgson - 2013 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (5-6):612-633.
    It is a common view among philosophers of language that both propositions and sentences are structured objects. One obvious question to ask about such a view is whether there is any interesting connection between these two sorts of structure. The author identifies two theses about this relationship. Identity (ID) – the structure of a sentence and the proposition it expresses are identical. Determinism (DET) – the structure of a sentence determines the structure of the proposition it expresses. After noting that (...)
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  • Individuating Fregean Sense.Jeff Speaks - 2013 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (5):634-654.
    (2013). Individuating Fregean sense. Canadian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 43, Essays on the Nature of Propositions, pp. 634-654.
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  • Recent Work on Structured Meaning and Propositional Unity.Bjørn Jespersen - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (9):620-630.
    Logical semantics includes once again structured meanings in its repertoire. The leading idea is that semantic and syntactic structure are more or less isomorphic. A key motive for reintroducing sensitivity to semantic structure is to obtain fine‐grained meanings, which are individuated more finely than in possible‐world semantics, namely up to necessary equivalence. Just getting the truth‐conditions right is deemed insufficient for a full semantic analysis of sentences. This paper surveys some of the most recent contributions to the program of structured (...)
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  • Function and Argument in Begriffsschrift.Calixto Badesa Cortes & Joan Bertran-San Millán - 2017 - History and Philosophy of Logic 38 (4):316-341.
    It is well known that the formal system developed by Frege in Begriffsschrift is based upon the distinction between function and argument—as opposed to the traditional distinction between subject and predicate. Almost all of the modern commentaries on Frege's work suggest a semantic interpretation of this distinction, and identify it with the ontological structure of function and object, upon which Grundgesetze is based. Those commentaries agree that the system proposed by Frege in Begriffsschrift has some gaps, but it is taken (...)
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  • Unarticulated Constituents and Propositional Structure.Adam Sennet - 2011 - Mind and Language 26 (4):412-435.
    Attempts to characterize unarticulated constituents (henceforth: UCs) by means of quantification over the parts of a sentence and the constituents of the proposition it expresses come to grief in more complicated cases than are commonly considered. In particular, UC definitions are inadequate when we consider cases in which the same constituent appears more than once in a proposition that only has one word with the constituent as its semantic value. This article explores some consequences of trying to repair the formal (...)
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