In this response I first address the criticisms of omission by discussing some of the elements of the original project that were excluded in the final version (section 1). In section 2 I respond to Howard’s criticism that I assume too much transparency in conscience. In section 3 I discuss the problem of evil and the transition in the Phenomenology of Spirit from conscience to religion. I focus here especially on the distinction between Objective and Absolute Spirit, and on how (...) that distinction plays out differently in the Phenomenology and the Philosophy of Right. In section 4 I take up the specifically political issues of conscience, responding to Speight’s suggestion that conscience should have a transformative role and to De Nys’s query about the State’s relationship to dissenting moral and religious views. Finally, in section 5 I take up the issues of whether I and Hegel do justice to the range of uses of conscience and whether or not the Hegelian view is too optimistic about modernity. (shrink)

It is widely known that Hegel is a proponent and defender of the market economy. But why exactly does Hegel think that the market economy is superior to other economic systems? In this paper, I argue that Hegel's answer to this question has not been sufficiently understood. Commentators, or so I want to claim, have only identified one part of Hegel's argument—but have left out the most original and surprising dimension of his view: namely, Hegel's conviction that we should embrace (...) the market economy for its educational impact. Indeed, Hegel thinks that the market, by creating a sphere of life apart from traditional norms and expectations, teaches us something about ourselves, about others, and about the world we inhabit together—something that we could not learn anywhere else, but that we inevitably need to live well as individuals. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungDie gegenwärtige Debatte um die normativen Grundlagen kritischer Gesellschaftstheorie weist eine große Bandbreite ethischer Positionen auf: vom ethischen Negativismus, der gänzlich auf einen positiven Kritik-Maßstab verzichtet, über Entfremdungs- und Resonanztheorien, die zumindest eine grobe Vorstellung des guten Lebens vermitteln wollen, bis hin zu deontologischen Ansätzen, die Gesellschaftskritik in intelligibler Freiheit begründet sehen. Der folgende Beitrag zeigt, dass diese drei Grundpositionen sich mit Problemen konfrontiert sehen, die der hegelsche Freiheitsbegriff zu lösen vermag.