This paper argues that Paul Ricoeur’s hermeneutical philosophy attempts to reopen the question of human transcendence in contemporary terms. While his conception of language as self-transcending is deeply Husserlian, Ricoeur also responds to the analytical challenge when he deploys a basic distinction in Fregean logic in order to clarify Heidegger’s phenomenology of world. Ricoeur’s commitment to a transcendental view is evident in his conception of narrative, which enables him to emphasize the role of the performative in literary reading. The meaning (...) of the self in time provides Ricoeur with a discursive basis for distinguishing his own position from that of Kant and other philosophers in the transcendental tradition. (shrink)

What is a problem? What is problematic about any problem whatsoever, philosophical or otherwise? As the origin of assertion and apodeiction, the problematic suspends the categories of necessity and contingency, possibility and impossibility. And it is this suspension that is the essence of the problem, which is why it is so suspenseful. But then, how is the problem problematic? Only if what is suspended neither comes to presence, nor simply goes out into absence, that is, if the suspension continues, which (...) continues the problem. But what is problematic about suspension? As a consideration of language shows, the problem of suspension is the problem of implication. If being, for example, is merely implied, neither present nor absent, then it is the suspension of both, at least insofar as it is problematic. And this not only says something about language; rather, it has ontological implications as well — it speaks of being, and the being of anything whatsoever. For if being is implied, if that is the problem of being, it is because being is an implication. Then the being of things like problems is implied as well; or being is in things by implication. But what does it mean for being to be neither presence nor absence, but an implication? It means that being is implied in a way that is problematic — before it is necessary, or even possible. For being’s way of being is characterized by suspension — which has implications for thinking and speaking about being, and about things like problems, even about anything whatsoever. And this has implications for what being implies, namely, unity and time and aspect. (shrink)

The article displays the reciprocal influence between Heidegger and Marcuse concerning the idea of practical philosophy. It first proceeds by evaluating the possibility of an ethical interpretation of Being and Time and following Marcuse’s reception of it, and then by delineating the basic elements of Heidegger’s interpretations of Marx, his answer to Hegelian Marxism, and his understanding of the concept of Praxis.

The hermeneutical tradition represented by Yorck, Heidegger, and Gadamer has distrusted Dilthey as suffering from the two sins of modernism: scientific “positivism” and individualistic and aesthetic “romanticism.” On the one hand, Dilthey’s epistemology is deemed scientistic in accepting the priority of the empirical, the ontic, and consequently scientific inquiry into the physical, biological, and human worlds; on the other hand, his personalist ethos and Goethean humanism, and his pluralistic life- and worldview philosophy are considered excessively aesthetic, culturally liberal, relativistic, and (...) subjective. This essay involves two tasks in response to this negative evaluation of Dilthey that has shaped our current understanding of his philosophical project; first, an interpretation of the issues at stake in Heidegger’s reception of and struggles with Dilthey. These issues touch upon language, historicity, and the nature of hermeneutics. Second, by pursuing this task in light of Guignon’s interpretation of Dilthey and Heidegger, I hope to question and challenge the “overcoming” of Dilthey’s epistemic and life-philosophical hermeneutics in the “ontological” or “philosophical” hermeneutics of Heidegger. (shrink)

This study explores the views of death in the ideas of Kierkegaard and Heidegger to discuss the educational meaning of death and the direction of death education. What both thinkers have in common...

En diversas concepciones antropológicas, la definición del hombre aparece como una modificación o una especificación del ser animal. Martin Heidegger es uno de los pocos filósofos que, por el contrario, no define al hombre como ser humano, sino como Dasein, escapando así de una conceptualización antropomórfica. Contrario a la tradición, el animal para Heidegger no es cosa, pero tampoco existente. En este sentido, la noción Heideggeriana del Dasein permite investigar los límites entre el ser animal y el ser humano de (...) forma no sólo novedosa, sino también del todo productiva. Pues, pese a que en Ser y tiempo Heidegger es enfático en afirmar que sólo el ser humano en cuanto Dasein tiene como forma de ser la existencia, precisamente a propósito de su ambigüedad en torno al particular modo de ser del animal se explica que importantes filósofos contemporáneos e influidos por Heidegger – por ej., Jacques Derrida y Giorgio Agamben – se hayan dedicado a tratar esta problemática seriamente. En este sentido, la presente contribución indaga en aquella ambigüedad y tiene por objeto, en primera instancia, explorar y localizar la pregunta por lo animal en Ser y tiempo para así, en un segundo paso, reflexionar críticamente sobre las consecuencias de dicha localización tanto desde un punto de vista inmanente, así como también desde una perspectiva más general interesada en explorar la relación entre humanos y animales. (shrink)

RESUMEN Este artículo apunta a someter a consideración si existe o no un fundamento histórico-filosófico para la hipótesis de una homonimia no azarosa entre "escala de tiempo" y "escala musical". Un examen minucioso de ciertos pasajes del diálogo Timeo muestra que Platón fue el primero en sentar las bases para el concepto de tiempo, definido como número, al incorporar el concepto de 'analogía' o proporción, el cual fue desarrollado por los pitagóricos en el marco místico y teórico de los principios (...) emergentes de la armonía tonal. La teoría pitagórico-platónica de proporciones subyace -como intentaré probar- en el concepto aristotélico de tiempo y, en cuanto tal, en la representación tradicional del tiempo como parámetro y escala del movimiento. ABSTRACT This article aims to unpack the query of whether or not there is a historical- philosophical basis for the hypothesis of a non-random homonymy between 'time scale' and 'musical scale.' A deeper look into certain passages of Plato's dialog Timaios, shows that he first laid the foundation for the concept of time, defined as number, by incorporating the concept of 'proportion' or 'analogy', which was developed by the Pythagoreans in the mystical and theoretical frame of the rising principles of tonal harmony. The pythagorean-platonic theory of proportion underlies -as I will try to prove- the aristotelian concept of time, and thus the traditional representation of time as a parameter and scale of movements. (shrink)

This paper argues for a fundamental re-reading of Heideggerian philosophy, especially regarding the logical structures presented by Heidegger in the thirties and onward. The field, which this logic organizes, shows an explorative formal element of language in and of itself, and is therefore different from an analytic concept of logic. An analytic conceptualization of logic is understood here as a reflection on the inner structures of already existing notions. An explorative logic, on the other hand, explores the relations between already (...) existing notions and the possible, but yet unknown, development of new notions. The logic of Heidegger is explorative, as it describes the relational, formal structures between the already established semantic field and its virtual excess. This virtual excess, while formal, must be nonetheless considered the primary access to whatever we call external to language in the transcendental sense in Heidegger's philosophy. Therefore, the central question of this logical re-reading of Heidegger is the formal relation to the unknown real. (shrink)

This paper has a twofold objective. First, it engages with the interrelation of time, space, and matter in Kant, Heidegger, and Derrida and questions whether and how this interrelation effects the possibility of self-relation. In Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics Heidegger suggests that the very structure of subjectivity is constituted by what he calls the ‘pure self-affection’ of time and thus the possibility of self-relation is intimately bound up with the temporalizing of time. In his 1964–65 seminar, Heidegger: the (...) Question of Being and History, Derrida translates this pure affection of time into the more generic term ‘auto-affection,’ which will remain a pivotal reference point for his deconstruction of the metaphysical privileging of time as presence. Derrida shows how the (im)possibility of auto-affection is bound up not only with time but also with space, or rather with the ‘spacing of time’ that he also refers to as ‘the trace.’ Second, the paper moves across the frontiers of philosophy and physics posing anew the question concerning the interrelations of temporality, spatiality, and materiality. With reference to what in general relativity is called ‘the curvature of spacetime,’ the efficacy of materiality in the movement of auto-affection is called into question. (shrink)

Este artigo pretende realizar uma breve exposição acerca da crítica de Levinas à tradição filosófica até então vigente, cujos espectros, desdobramentos e necessidades giram ao redor e se sustém no alicerce da Razão ou do ser. Tal postura pode ser observada mesmo no início da filosofia ocidental, aponta Levinas, com Sócrates e a maiêutica, ou mais ainda, com os filósofos da physis e sua busca por um arché, o princípio regulador de todas as coisas. Haveria uma espécie de relação com (...) o conhecimento e o intuito “controlar” e ocultar nossas próprias fraquezas perante o desconhecido. Levinas rompe com a tradição, buscando colocar o humano no cerne da questão, bem como a investigação acerca da pulsão anterior à toda tematização, oriunda da alteridade radical. (shrink)

Na preleção de verão de 1923, intitulada “Ontologia: hermenêutica da facticidade”, Martin Heidegger estabelece seu programa filosófico em termos de uma investigação fundamental, nomeada por ele como hermenêutica fenomenológica da facticidade. De acordo com esta, a interpretação da vida fática não se realiza sem que se tome o ser e o falar como fenômenos privilegiados, ou seja, sem que se recupere o vínculo essencial em que nós, seres humanos existentes, já nos descobrimos sendo no mundo como seres capazes de fala. (...) Tendo em vista que é a partir do constructo ser-no-mundo que o filósofo alemão consegue dar um passo atrás no esquema sujeito-objeto, não é por acaso então que ele busca encontrar, desde muito cedo, modos de dizer o ser que não mais o entifiquem, com o intuito de pensá-lo para além do registro da referência e, portanto, da objetivação. É com base nessa situação que se torna premente que sua análise tenha início a partir do horizonte do ente privilegiado, uma vez que é para este que o sentido do ser se torna um problema. Assim, este artigo parte da hipótese de que a hermenêutica da facticidade se constitui por conta da tentativa de Heidegger de ater-se ao problema do ser que compreende ser, tendo como premissa uma ampla problematização em torno da significação da palavra vida. Palavras-chave: Heidegger; hermenêutica; facticidade.: In the summer lecture of 1923, entitled Ontology: The Hermeneutics of Facticity, Martin Heidegger established his philosophical program in terms of a fundamental research, named by him as phenomenological hermeneutics of facticity. According to this, the interpretation of the factical life is not achieved without taking the being and the speaking as privileged phenomena, i.e., without recovering the essential bond in which we, existent human beings, have already discovered ourselves being in the world as being capable of speaking. Given the fact that it is from the construct being-in-the-world that the German philosopher is able to step back on subject-object scheme, it is not by accident that he tries to find, since the beginning, ways of expressing being that no longer turn it into an entity, with the intention of thinking it beyond the scheme and, therefore, any objectualization registry. It is based on this situation that it is pressing that his analysis starts from the horizon of a privileged entity, since it is for this the sense of being becomes a problem. In fact, this paper starts from the hypothesis that hermeneutics of facticity is constituted due to Heidegger’s attempt on holding to the problem of being that understands being, with the premise of a wide problematization regarding the significance of the word life. Keywords: Heidegger; hermeneutics; facticity. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIf we take Heidegger's ontology to be a philosophy of history, then, for Husserl, the problem of history is only one among the three major directions of his thoughts. After Husserl met Dilthey in 1905, he more and more attended to the problem of history and reflected upon the longitudinal intentionality of time-genesis-history. His basic idea is to grasp the condition of possibility of history by means of an eidetic intuition upon the longitudinal intentionality. However, because Husserl never explicates his (...) thoughts on history in his published works, he is often regarded as a “non-historical” philosopher. In fact, like Dilthey, Husserl purports to combine historical enlightenment with critique of knowledge. It is hence Dilthey-Yorck, Husserl, Heidegger and Gadamer who established together the most important tradition of history of philosophy in the twentieth century, namely, phenomenological-ontological philosophy of history. (shrink)