This paper has a twofold objective. First, it engages with the interrelation of time, space, and matter in Kant, Heidegger, and Derrida and questions whether and how this interrelation effects the possibility of self-relation. In Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics Heidegger suggests that the very structure of subjectivity is constituted by what he calls the ‘pure self-affection’ of time and thus the possibility of self-relation is intimately bound up with the temporalizing of time. In his 1964–65 seminar, Heidegger: the (...) Question of Being and History, Derrida translates this pure affection of time into the more generic term ‘auto-affection,’ which will remain a pivotal reference point for his deconstruction of the metaphysical privileging of time as presence. Derrida shows how the (im)possibility of auto-affection is bound up not only with time but also with space, or rather with the ‘spacing of time’ that he also refers to as ‘the trace.’ Second, the paper moves across the frontiers of philosophy and physics posing anew the question concerning the interrelations of temporality, spatiality, and materiality. With reference to what in general relativity is called ‘the curvature of spacetime,’ the efficacy of materiality in the movement of auto-affection is called into question. (shrink)

The History of Philosophy as a Problem: Four Fundamental Views in the German Debate and Heidegger’s Hermeneutical Dissolution Resumen: El artículo pretende introducir el problema que supone el estudio de la historia de la filosofía, especialmente hoy cuando esta práctica se ha establecido como elemento indisociable de la formación en la materia. Con el fin de plantear de manera más concreta dicho problema, el artículo trata la legitimidad del enfoque hermenéutico, pues este parece consistir en identificar el estudio histórico de (...) la filosofía con el propio filosofar. Para lograr una evaluación precisa de este enfoque, se lleva a cabo un recorrido por las cuatro posiciones cardinales del debate alemán en torno al sentido, el método y la función de la historia de la filosofía. Mediante la contraposición de la propuesta de Heidegger frente a estas cuatro posiciones cardinales, se espera aclarar cuáles son los fundamentos del pensamiento hermenéutico y sacar a la luz las razones por las que el estudio del pasado filosófico podría ser considerado esencial para la formación en filosofía.: The article aims to introduce the problem that represents the study of the history of philosophy, especially today when this practice has established as the model in the academic formation of the field. In order to raise this problem more specifically, the article focuses on the legitimacy of the hermeneutic approach, as it consists in the affirmation of the necessity of the study of the past for philosophy. The evaluation of this approach is carried out in the light of a description of the four cardinal positions of the German debate about the meaning, method and function of the history of philosophy. By contrasting Heidegger’s proposal with these four cardinal positions, it is hoped to clarify the foundations of hermeneutic thought and to bring to light the reasons because the study of philosophical past can be considered essential for philosophy. Palabras clave: hermenéutica, función de la historia, métodos historiográficos, comprensión, interpretación. Keywords: hermeneutics, function of history, historiographical methods, understanding, interpretation. (shrink)

En este texto buscamos hacer inteligible el lugar y los derroteros que sigue el concepto de auto-afección en el pensamiento de Jacques Derrida. Dicho concepto se desarrolla a partir de una interpretación de Kant y el problema de la metafísica, de Heidegger. En la elaboración del concepto en Derrida se enfatiza el momento de distancia en el que el sí-mismo no puede reducir al otro, sino que tiene que hacer patente la demora en su propia formación. Esto implicaría considerar que (...) la mismidad que se constituye en la auto-afección no puede ser separada de una hetero-afección, mediante la cual el otro no puede ser objetivado y no es otra cosa que el sí-mismo en su alteración. La forma de dicho espaciamiento que produce la alteración se pone a prueba en la voz y en la estructura del “oírse-hablar”, la que se revela como un espacio polifónico irreductible a una unidad, donde la auto-afección se desune de sí para retornar como aquello que no espera y como aquello que no puede replegarse en un lugar de reunión. In this paper we try to understand the status and the path followed by the concept of self-affection in the thought of Jacques Derrida. This concept is developed based on an interpretation of Martin Heidegger’s Kant and the problem of Metaphysics. In the elaboration of the concept, Derrida emphasizes the moment of distance in which the self cannot be reduced to the other, but the self makes clear the delay in its own formation. This means that the sameness that constitutes self-affection cannot be separated from hetero-affection, in which the other cannot be objectified and is nothing more than the self in its own alteration. The shape of the spacing that produces such alteration is tested in the voice and its own structure of “s’entendre-parler”, which is revealed as a polyphonic space irreducible to a unity, where self-affection is detached from itself in order to return as something that it does not expect and as something that cannot not retreat into a meeting place. (shrink)

Este artigo quer mostrar que Kant descobriu, segundo Eric Weil, o problema do sentido. Entretanto, Eric Weil observa que Kant não encontrou uma linguagem apropriada para falar do sentido. A linguagem de Kant era ainda uma linguagem ontológica. Malgrado isso, Kant conseguiu fechar, na terceira Crítica, o abismo que separava natureza e liberdade.

ABSTRACTSchelling’s first Russian disciple, D.M. Vellanskij, met his teacher at Würzburg in 1803. It was the heyday of Schelling’s philosophy of identity, the identity of spirit and nature, of mind and matter. Yet, teacher and student differ on the labels they applied to this philosophy. Vellanskij thought of it as the peak of human ‘Aufklärung’, whereas Schelling abhorred the term due to controversies going on within German philosophy at the time. The argument put forward here is that Vellanskij was right (...) in using the term ‘Enlightenment’ for Schelling’s philosophy of identity, which conceptualized – via nature – the ideas of free movement, tolerance and human solidarity. (shrink)

A análise de Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik [Kant e o Problema da Metafísica] de Heidegger constitui o propósito do nosso artigo. Publicado em 1929, o ano do “debate Heidegger-Cassirer” em Davos, Kant e o Problema da Metafísica fornece uma interpretação controversa e peculiar da Crítica da Razão Pura de Kant. Debruçando-se sobre a primeira edição da Crítica de Kant, Heidegger apresenta uma interpretação ontológica da subjetividade transcendental kantiana. Contra a atenção neo-kantiana dedicada à lógica e à espontaneidade subjetiva, (...) Heidegger procura lançar luz sobre as determinações finitas e recetivas da subjetividade kantiana, salientando a preponderância da imaginação enquanto faculdade fundamental e possibilidade da subjetividade humana. A elucidação cuidadosa de tais posições heideggerianas relativas à Crítica da Razão Pura constitui o objeto do nosso trabalho. (shrink)

The essay focuses on the dispute over the Kantian legacy that took place in Davos, in 1929, between Cassirer and Heidegger. The relationship between imagination, freedom and politics is at its core. Two different readings of Kant stand in a discrepancy that generates dismay. An opposition, not a hermeneutical leveling, stands between the two. It is a philosophical opposition that is intimately linked to the positivity of what is posed - and not necessarily opposed — next to the opposite position; (...) philosophical opposition as a productive figure of the negative, because it incorporates the potential for movement and transformation that the negative has, avoiding the exclusion of one interpretation from the other. One must therefore read the confrontation or dispute between Cassirer and Heidegger in Davos as a real opposition between opposing forces, both positive, because neither philosophy derives its meaning from the negation of the other, as Kant would have said. The opposites do not contradict each other, but rather face each other according to an ontological and symbolic plan which on the one hand makes them both necessary but on the other hand opposes them in a single space of knowledge. In the background stand the black shadows that stretch over Germany and Europe. Darkness that will soon throw the opposition into the darkness, imposing a night of the world in which one philosophy will save the symbolic through the exile, while the other philosophy will abandon itself to its destructive repetition leading to the annihilation of the being. (shrink)

El objetivo del presente artículo es ofrecer una interpretación de la doctrina del esquematismo de los conceptos empíricos y matemáticos presentada por Kant en su Crítica de la razón pura. Mostramos que los esquemas de los conceptos empíricos y matemáticos son procedimientos de síntesis gobernados por reglas conceptuales. Aunque no consideramos que esta doctrina kantiana carece de problemas, nuestro trabajo muestra que: 1) esos esquemas pueden distinguirse rigurosamente de sus correspondientes conceptos; 2) esos esquemas no son entidades superfluas. Estas conclusiones (...) se alcanzan mostrando que el contenido de un concepto determina la unidad de elementos sensibles que tiene que ser efectuada por un esquema en tanto procedimiento de síntesis. (shrink)