In recent years, Nietzsche’s views on (natural) science attracted a considerable amount of scholarly attention. Overall, his attitude towards science tends to be one of suspicion, or ambivalence at least. My article addresses the “Nietzsche and science” theme from a slightly different perspective, raising a somewhat different type of question, more pragmatic if you like, namely: how to be a Nietzschean philosopher of science today? What would the methodological contours of a Nietzschean approach to present-day research areas (such as neuroscience, (...) astrophysics, synthetic biology or climate studies) amount to? In other words, my paper reflects a shift of focus from author studies to extrapolation. The design of my article is as follows. I will start with the question (already widely discussed in the expert literature) to what extent Friedrich Nietzsche (a classical philologist by training) managed to familiarise himself with the natural sciences of his epoch. Subsequently, I will outline some basic methodological and conceptual ingredients of Nietzsche’s philosophy of science, focussing on core issues such as “genealogy”, “interpretation”, “enhancement” and “truth”. Next, I will elucidate Nietzsche’s genealogical methodology with the help of three case studies (three representative samples if you will) taken from Nietzsche’s writings and dealing with physiology, astronomy and neuro-psychology respectively. Finally, I will present the methodological contours of a Nietzschean understanding of contemporary technoscience. (shrink)

An overview of the German philosophy of science community is given for the years 1992–2012, based on a survey in which 159 philosophers of science in Germany participated. To this end, the institutional background of the German philosophy of science community is examined in terms of journals, centers, and associations. Furthermore, a qualitative description and a quantitative analysis of our survey results are presented. Quantitative estimates are given for: (a) academic positions, (b) research foci, (c) philosophers’ of science most important (...) publications, and (d) externally funded projects, where for (c) all survey participants had indicated their five most important publications in philosophy of science. In addition, the survey results for (a)–(c) are also qualitatively described, as they are interesting in their own right. With respect to (a), we estimated the gender distribution among academic positions. Concerning (c), we quantified philosophers’ of science preference for (i) journals and publishers, (ii) publication format, (iii) language, and (iv) coauthorship for their most important publications. With regard to research projects, we determined their (i) prevalence, (ii) length, and (iii) trend (an increase in number?) as well as their most frequent (iv) research foci and (v) funding organizations. We also distinguished between German-based and non-German-based journals, publishers, and funding institutions, making it thereby possible to evaluate the involvement of the German philosophy of science community in the international research landscape. Finally, we discuss some implications of our findings. (shrink)

There is a widespread agreement that Nietzsche has developed a kind of position or doctrine called ‘perspectivism’. Scholars go on and develop metaphysical, semantic, epistemic, and psychobiological interpretations of the supposed Nietzschean perspectivism or even ‘perspectivisms’. They engage in debates about whether this perspectivism is relativistic, realistic, or anti-realistic and what the tenets of perspectivism are. In this paper, I suggest putting an end to this practice. I examine Nietzsche’s explicit mentions of the term ‘perspectivism’, the problems associated with the (...) misunderstanding of this term as a label, attempts to reconstruct perspectivism based on explicit mentions of ‘perspective’ and related vocabulary, and doctrinal assumptions scholars try to connect with this terminology. (shrink)

Käesoleva artikli eesmärgiks on välja töötada olenditeooria mõningad põhimõisted. Olendit määratletakse teatavate eristumisprotsesside lõimimisena ehk "läbivaatusena". Nendel protsessidel on kaks külge, "esi-" ja "isekülg". Esikülg on kõrvutuvuslik, st. paljusus, mille elemendid on üksteise kõrval; isekülg on läbistuvuslik, st. paljusus, mille elemendid läbistavad üksteist. Need kaks külge ei sarnane teineteisega ja nende vahel liikumine kätkeb taandamatut ajalisust, ontogeneesi. Artiklis laiendatakse olendi mõistet "vertikaalis" erinevatele keerukustasanditele (eluline, molekuliline, atomaarne jt) ja "horisontaalis" erinevatele individualiseeritusastmetele. Isekülge käsitletakse liigendatuna piki afekteerimis- ja afekteeritavusviise, mis tähistavad (...) seda, mida olend suudab tajuda ja teostada, ehk seda, milleks ta on võimeline. Lõpuks käsitletakse esi- ja isekülge olemise kui protsessi kahe aspektina, esinemise ja isenemisena. Esinemise ja isenemise ringluste arvukus ja tempo variatiivsus määravad olendi väehulga. A Theory of Beings The paper proposes to work out concepts for describing the individualization of beings on various levels of organization. A being with a certain degree of individuality comes into being when certain processes of differenciation are being integrated together. It is conceived of as having two aspects, self-relation (isekülg) and other-relation (esikülg). The former is a multiplicity where the elements interpenetrate each other and the latter is a multiplicity where the elements are exterior to each other (juxtaposition). The articulations of interpenetrating multiplicity determine how a being can affect its surroundings and be affected by it, and the modes of this articulation can be seen as attractors of the "phase-space" of a being. Ontogenesis is on the one hand the actualization of this virtual phase-space in an actual form with its characteristic ways of spatialization and temporalization. On the other hand, ontogenesis means the revirtualization of juxtaposing elements and processes. The number and intensity of these circuits determines the degree of power of a being. The paper proposes to extend all these notions also to pre-biotic systems.  . (shrink)

The question of truth is one of the oldest philosophical topics, but perhaps it concerns the world today more than ever. Der Beitrag geht auf einen Vortrag zurück, der 2018 in verschiedenen Fassungen beim Nietzsche-Forum München e.V., beim Nietzsche-Forum der Tongji-Universität Shanghai und beim Nietzsche-Kolloquium der Stiftung Nietzsche-Haus in Sils-Maria und 2019 in Machatschkala, Dagestan, gehalten wurde. Nietzsche was a realist about truth and he sought to criticize and reject the idealizations and moralizations that continue to dominate philosophical thinking: he (...) wanted to see how truth really stands. Following Nietzsche we can recognize more clearly that we need illusions in order to live, but that these illusions also endanger the very lives they support. We demand a final truth on which we can rely at all times, and which allows us to live together, such as the truth of God, the truth of reason, or the truth of being. But searching for such a final truth, we face “nothing,” or what Nietzsche described as “nihilism.” At the same time, however, we keep on speaking about truth and truths. How to speak—after Nietzsche—about truth without succumbing to illusion? Starting from Nietzsche’s critique of truth and Heidegger’s metaphysical account of Nietzsche’s position, this article examines how Nietzsche, in contrast to Heidegger’s ontological commitments, allows us to decide about truth on the grounds of perspectivism. While Nietzsche’s position thus seems compatible with that of Niklas Luhmann’s constructivism, Nietzsche still holds on to his truth as the truth of “an evangelist the like of which there has never been” (EH, Destiny 1). (shrink)