This essay attempts to offer some reflections on what it is that Jacques Derrida found uncomfortable in Martin Heidegger’s thought at the level of fundamental gestures. The region of disagreement is located in Derrida’s self-identification in a marrano register at an autographic level. This paper studies the notions of propriation and expropriation in Heidegger’s late texts and compares them to Derrida’s ‘uncanny propriation’ as a marrano notion. I offer four propositions regarding Derrida’s marranismo, which I align with Derrida’s proposal for (...) desecularization, tentatively described as a ‘messianic engagement with the khora’. I conclude with a proposal for the development of ontic models of marrano action that would antecede the theory/practice divide. (shrink)

For Heidegger, Hegel understands being, ‘the highest actuality’, as the categories which pervade and thereby form all objects and events. Since, Heidegger argues, the categories are, in Hegel, present-at-hand, Hegel conceives of being as presence-at-hand. This is a problem, for Heidegger, because it entails the full transparency and knowability of being, whereas, in his view, being is partially hidden and unknowable. I consider the objection to this Heideggerian critique of Hegel that Hegelian logic understands being not only as the list (...) of categories but also as their derivation and movement from pure being to the absolute idea, which (derivation and movement) establish being not only as presence but also as implication. Since being-as-implication is (a) not presence-at-hand and (b) necessary to being, it cannot be said that Hegel's account of being turns it into full transparency and knowability. Heidegger's critique should, therefore, be rejected. I argue that this objection is unsuccessful because there is strong evidence in the Logic that Hegel ‘subordinates’ being-as-implication to presence-at-hand. Implication's way of being is, in Hegel, only a collapse into presence-at-hand and hence ‘merely a modification of presence’. Consequently, Heidegger's critique of Hegel should not be rejected based on the objection. I conclude the article with a remark on the relation between language and being-as-implication. I argue that Hegel's account of being-as-implication in language disrespects the autonomy of being-as-implication therein and that Haas's argument for such an autonomy based on the phenomenon of the syntactic ellipsis of ‘is’ fails to undermine Hegel's account. (shrink)

About three decades ago, AI theory underwent a sharp turn as a consequence of criticism that pointed out the problem of externalism in the cognitivist position. Hubert Dreyfus, undoubtedly the main exponent of this criticism, opened the possibility of a Heideggerian reading using the frame problem to bring to light obscurities that otherwise would have been very difficult to detect. However, the question still remains of whether or not Heidegger’s philosophy can serve as the source of a positive contribution to (...) AI. In this paper, we argue that in the small measure in which such a task has been attempted, its orientation has been hampered by the omission of what, for Heidegger, was the central issue to be pondered: the question for being and the ontological difference. To propose a possible direction in which AI can be headed as a consequence of this novel perspective, we undertake a brief and schematic review of two published projects suggesting that they both manage to avoid the frame problem and also bear this Heideggerian outlook. (shrink)

Phenomenology, broadly construed, is the study of the meaningful structure of human experience. It is a philosophical tradition that begins with Edmund Husserl, develops with thinkers like Martin H...

This article argues that Hegel’s dialectic of wealth and power in the stage of social development called ‘culture’ (Bildung) reveals that even in moments of profound social alienation, Spirit (Geist)—the labor of constructing identity and freedom— remains. This stands in sharp contrast to Heidegger’s theory of alienation and Dasein’s ‘publicity’ (Offentlichkeit), which paints modern social existence as a profound threat to the very ‘Being’ and ‘possibilities’ of human life. The supposed threats of inauthenticity and mass existence are, from a Hegelian (...) perspective, failures of adequate social phenomenology. The desiring, affective subject is not absorbed in ‘they’ (das Man) but is, instead, the negativity that constantly transforms culture and the structure of social selfhood. (shrink)

Метою цієї статті є доведення можливості розгляду Гайдеґерового поняття Dasein як ре- концептуалізації та модифікації Гусерлевого поняття досвіду. Предметом ана- лізу є поняття Dasein, яке є одним із найбільш проблематичних з усього Гайдеґерового спадку з огляду на його багатозначність та відповідну множинність інтерпретацій. Особливу увагу приділено дослідженню прочитання Гайдеґерової філософії як онтологічної на противагу ек- зистенціалістському та антропологічному прочитанням; авторка текстуально підтвер- джує правомірність такого прочитання та доводить, що Dasein дійсно є модифікацією Гу- сер левого поняття досвіду. Так само, вона (...) стверджує, що не лише поняття Dasein, а й сама фундаментальна онтологія може до певної міри розглядатися як ориґінальна модифікація феноменології Гусерля. Зокрема, через те, що включається у Гайдеґерів проєкт фундамен- тальної онтології та модифікується не лише одне з основних феноменологічних понять, а й метод дослідження та деякі ключові теми. (shrink)

: John Haugeland's distinctive approach to Heidegger's ontology rests on taking scientific explanation to be a paradigmatic case of understanding the being of entities. I argue that this paradigm, and the more general account that Haugeland develops from it, misses a crucial component of Heidegger's picture: the dynamic character of being. While this dimension of being first comes to the fore after Being and Time, it should have been present all along. Its absence grounds Heidegger's persistent confusion about whether world (...) is an entity, as well as problems that both Haugeland's Heidegger and Heidegger's Plato run into with the ontological difference. Retrieving the dynamic character of being reveals the proper object of Heidegger's fundamental ontology as well as a distinctive feature of his metaphysics of normativity, which is all but impossible to see if we grasp Heidegger's account through the special case of scientific explanation—at least as usually understood. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Edmund Husserl strongly emphasized the importance of reduction to his phenomenology. For his followers, however, it has proved a formidable task to specify exactly how this intricate accomplishment that opens up the possibility for phenomenological research is to be performed. In this article, we study different approaches to gaining access to reduction and conclude by suggesting that we should read Husserliana itself as a set of accomplished reductions. In other words, our task is to pinpoint chapters where the movement (...) of reduction takes place. As an example of such a reading, I will point out events that come about in Husserl???s Idea of Phenomenology. R??SUM?? Husserl a fortement insist?? sur l???importance de la r??duction dans sa ph??nom??nologie. Pour ses disciples, cependant, s???est av??r????tre redoutable la t??che de pr??ciser comment doit??tre ex??cut??e cette r??alisation complexe qui ouvre la possibilit?? pour la recherche ph??nom??nologique. Dans cet article, nous??tudions les diff??rentes approches de la r??duction et nous concluons en sugg??rant que l???ouvrage Husserliana lui-m??me doit se lire comme un ensemble de r??ductions accomplies. Notre t??che consistera donc?? identifier les chapitres o?? a lieu ce mouvement de r??duction.?? titre d???exemple d???une telle lecture, j?????voquerai quelques-uns des??v??nements de L???id??e de la ph??nom??nologie de Husserl. (shrink)

This paper argues that Tugendhat's critique of Heidegger's existential conception of truth as disclosedness is usually misunderstood. The main claim of this paper is that Tugendhat insists against Heidegger on certain conventional features of truth such as conformity of the law of non-contradiction, not because he adheres to an ideal of truth as correctness; rather, he proposes an alternative existential conception of truth in terms of an active, critical or self-critical, engagement with untruth. Various recent objections to Tugendhat's critique of (...) Heidegger are discussed against the background of his alternative and are rejected. The paper concludes by outlining several challenges to Tugendhat's alternative existential conception of truth. (shrink)

In An Introduction to Metaphysics Heidegger asserted that “it wasnot German idealism that collapsed; rather, the age was no longer strong enough to sustain the greatness, breadth, and originality of that spiritual world, i.e., truly to realize it”. He was at this point launchinginto one of the major themes of his later work: the “darkening of the world” in the form of the materialism and “demonism” typified by the antitheses of the USSR and the USA, a polarity of seeming opposites (...) obscuring an underlying fundamental similarity. This was the modernist faith of both cultures in the power of science to solve all of the problems that have plagued humanity for untold centuries, a faith in the power of science to tell us the absolute truth about the nature of reality. In 1955 Heidegger also characterized science and technology in “The Question Concerning Technology” as an “enframing”, a particular dominant interpretation of reality dependent on the interest of control and which conceals far more than it reveals. For one thing, “the essence of technology isin a lofty sense ambiguous. Such ambiguity points to the mystery of all revealing, i.e., of truth”. Although enframing “lets man endure,” only art as the successor of philosophy transcends techne by allowing us to see that “the essence of technologyis nothing technological”. Much earlier, in Being and Time, he gave his first sustained account of science as the interpretationof reality driven by technological interests, and spoke of Being as the “transcendens” lying beyond “every possible character which an entity can possess” [p. 38]. It remains debatable whether this characterization of Being survived into Heidegger's later period, but despite his nostalgia for the spirituality of the early nineteenth century, the role of Beingin these earlier works might best be explained as some kind of realism. (shrink)

Although most aspects of world and self-consciousness are inherently subjective, neuroscience studies in humans and non-human animals provide correlational and causative indices of specific links between brain activity and representation of the self and the world. In this article we review neuroanatomic, neurophysiological and neuropsychological data supporting the hypothesis that different levels of self and world representation in vertebrates rely upon i) a 'basal' subcortical system that includes brainstem, hypothalamus and central thalamic nuclei and that may underpin the primary (or (...) anoetic) consciousness likely present in all vertebrates; and ii) a forebrain system that include the medial and lateral structures of the cerebral hemispheres and may sustain the most sophisticated forms of consciousness (e.g. noetic (knowledge based) and autonoetic, reflective knowledge). We posit a mutual, bidirectional functional influence between these two major brain circuits. We conclude that basic aspects of consciousness like primary self and core self (based on anoetic and noetic consciousness) are present in many species of vertebrates and that, even self-consciousness (autonoetic consciousness) does not seem to be a prerogative of humans and of some non-human primates but may, to a certain extent, be present in some other mammals and birds. (shrink)

In today's globalized world, we need to communicate values clearly and constructively across cultures and religions to avoid misunderstanding and conflict and to find shared solutions to the issues affecting human communities across the world. This communication is not easy to implement and requires a considerable amount of commitment and empathy. To be effective, intercultural and interreligious dialogues on ethics demand, first of all, an accommodation of different epistemologies coupled with a sincere respect for their richness and internal coherence. Furthermore, (...) our values are so closely rooted in our identity that expressing them becomes a cultural act—even an act of faith in the case of interreligious dialogue. In this paper, I argue that we need to reiterate or embrace this act of faith in the other's values if we are to properly understand them. How is this possible? The answer calls for a theoretical discussion of the hermeneutics of interreligious dialogue. When applied to intercultural and interreligious dialogues, I contend that the theory of hermeneutics needs a specific epistemological dimension—namely that of "appropriation"—that entails that we borrow the other's epistemological outlook, adopt the other's ad hoc modes of communication or transmission of values, and integrate the other's values into the constellation of our sources of meaning. (shrink)

This paper explores the philosophical perspectives of Nietzsche and Heidegger, tracing their analyses of the death of God and its aftermath. My aim is to clarify the diagnosis of this nihilism and its underlying causes, as well as evaluate the proposed remedies put forth by Nietzsche and Heidegger. Ultimately, I argue that the seemingly ambiguous consequences of the death of God are not only hopeful, but necessary, if human beings are to rise above and transmute a meaningless, resentment-laced existence, however, (...) not by jettisoning Judeo-Christianity and its values, but rather by reinterpreting them. (shrink)

In this article, we address the case of self-tracking as a practice in which two meaningful backgrounds (physical world and technological infrastructure) play an important role as the spatial dimension of human practices. Using a (post)phenomenological approach, we show how quantification multiplies backgrounds, while at the same time generating data about the user. As a result, we can no longer speak of a unified background of human activity, but of multiple dimensions of this background, which, additionally, is perceived as having (...) no pivotal role in the process, often being hidden, situated beyond human consciousness, or taken for granted. Consequently, the phenomenological experience of the background turns into a hermeneutic practice focused on the interpretation of representations and descriptions. By adopting a (post)phenomenological approach, we show the problems and limitations of quantification of human activities occurring in self-tracking and the theoretical problems associated with the scheme of human-technology relations. (shrink)

Although sexual difference is widely regarded as the concept that lies at the center of Luce Irigaray's thought, its meaning and significance is highly contested. This dissensus, however, attests to more than merely the existence of a recalcitrant conceptual ambiguity. That is, Irigaray's discussion of sexual difference remains fraught not because she leaves this concept undefined but because the centrality of sexual difference in fact marks a complex and unstable nexus of phenomena that shift throughout her work. Consequently, if Irigaray (...) is indeed the preeminent thinker of sexual difference, this is not in virtue of her recurrent appeal to a monolithic, readily digestible concept but rather somehow despite the absence of precisely this gesture. In this paper, I will attempt to elucidate the peculiar preeminence of sexual difference in Irigaray's work by identifying her persistent, though largely unexamined, commitment to transcendental phenomenology. Indeed, I attempt to show that the complex of phenomena of sexual difference emerges in L'oubli de l'air and The Way of Love as a modulation of Heidegger's own revision of transcendental phenomenology. In this sense, the peculiar preeminence of sexual difference does not mark the centrality of a concept but Irigaray's amplification of this Heideggerian gesture. (shrink)

This paper tries to read some structure into the perplexing diversity of the literature on Heidegger ’s concept of authenticity. It argues that many of the interpretations available rely on views that are false and cannot be Heidegger ’s. It also shows that the only correct interpretation of Heidegger ’s concept of authenticity emerges from a synthesis of Dreyfus ’ later interpretation and Haugeland’s interpretation of this concept. A synthesis of these interpretations yields an interpretation, according to which Dasein’s being (...) is authentic only if it is capable of using tools or language in radically new ways. (shrink)

In his lecture course on Hölderlin's hymn “The Ister,” Heidegger makes a striking claim about translation which implies that the paradigm of translation can never be encapsulated by a passive substitution of one linguistic signifier for another, for what is involved is no less than the stance the translator takes within his original language as unconcealment, and how he ex-sists toward the other language as the site of another revelation. If the human being and Being belong together by the happening (...) of Ereignis in the way beings presence through language, the hermeneutical event of translation as unfolding, not only within history but also toward that which opens up historical understanding, grounds his entire authentic comportment toward this unconcealment. This article will argue that translation provides a useful correlative through which we can understand Ereignis as appropriative event. (shrink)

After the fall of an oppressive regime, public interpretation of the past provides the normative backbone for the new society’s institutional framework. This narrative also molds temporality on a collective level, elevating some events and eras above the floating river of time, while omitting or suppressing others. In all societies, collective memory, and the temporality embedded within it, are mediated within the public domain. This paper argues that the hyper-accelerated time of transition leaves its mediating function vulnerable and prone to (...) slip into manipulation. By monopolizing the public interpretation of the past and manipulating public temporality, political regimes undermine the processes of healing and reconciliation, which require us to recognize different voices and interpretations. A manipulated temporality, that clashes with the personal temporality of lived experience, may violate personal identity and dignity and impede the democratic project. (shrink)

This essay takes up the line of critique of François Jullien in The Great Image Has No Form, that Chinese landscape painting ( shanshui) provides a counter-example to Western painting. The opposition, namely that the former undermines form and the latter focuses on form, provides two kinds of access to ‘truth’ and demonstrates two different philosophical temperaments between China and Europe. The article attempts to reflect on Jullien’s comparison and the varieties of experience of art that Jullien has opened up (...) for us. It also hopes to go a step further by exposing the different logic and sensibility that are present in shanshui painting through a reading of Wang Bi and Mou Zongsan. (shrink)

The essay develops a parallax between Lispector and Heidegger with regard to the question of being: being not as an idea or a concept, or as anything substantive, but being in the spatio-temporal sense of being in being, of the event which lets each instant of “in being” take place. Instantiating this proximity, the essay focuses on dis-humanization and the role that openness to nothingness plays in this context. Lispector’s writings, especially Passion, illustrate how what hinders the true humanity of (...) human beings is not barbarity or animality but what she calls “false humanization,” which sets humans apart from all other beings as if separate from life and nature. Heidegger’s critique of humanisms and their machinational approach to things and the world opens a similar perspective on being. Although presented in markedly different tonalities of writing, Lispector’s and Heidegger’s texts concern the “same” of the passion/pathos of being. (shrink)

Discussions about real knowledge contained in grand theories and models seem to remain an active quest in the academic sphere. The most fervent of these defendants is Rosemarie Parse with her Humanbecoming School of Thought (1981, 1998). This article first highlights the similarities between Parse's theory and Blumer's symbolic interactionism (1969). This comparison will act as a counterargument to Parse's assertions that her theory is original ‘nursing’ material. Standing on the contemporary philosophy of science, the very possibility for discovering specific (...) nursing knowledge will be questioned. Second, Parse's scientific assumptions will be thoroughly addressed and contrasted with Blumer's more moderate view of knowledge. It will lead to recognize that the valorization of the social nature of existence and reality does not necessarily induce requirements and methods such as those proposed by Parse. According to Blumer's point of view, her perspective may not even be desirable. Recommendations will be raised about the necessity for a distanced relationship to knowledge, being the key to the pursuit of its improvement, not its circular contemplation. (shrink)

A possible relation between Derrida's deconstruction of metaphysics and connectionism is explored by considering diffeacuterance in neural nets terms. First diffeacuterance, as the crossing of Saussurian difference and Freudian deferral, is modeled and then the fuller 'sheaf of diffeacuterance is taken up. The metaphysically conceived brain has two versions: in the traditional computational version the brain processes information like a computer and in the connectionist version the brain computes input vector to output vector transformations non-symbolically. The 'deconstructed brain' neither processes (...) information nor computes functions but is spontaneously economical. (shrink)

This article discusses the final volume of Heidegger’s Gesamtausgabe. It does so by contextualizing its main themes, that is, by relating it to other writings of Heidegger of roughly the same period. Three such themes can be discovered in Heidegger’s “final” writing: a discussion of the nature of phenomenology, the abandonment of the ontological difference and the relation between the thought of being and the discipline of theology. The essay concludes with a comparison of Heidegger’s thinking of Ereignis to how (...) theology configured the relation between God and the human being, so arguing that Heidegger seemed more indebted to the tradition of theology that he at times could acknowledge. (shrink)

This paper is an exploration of the Cartesian paradigms of clarity and univocity and how these inform contemporary educational theory and practice. Phenomenology is discussed as a way of disrupting Descartes' visions of clarity and distinctness as paradigms of knowledge and as a return of inquiry to life as it is actually lived. Analogical discourse is examined as a way of giving a voice to this sort of inquiry. Heidegger's notions of inquiry as obedience and thanksgiving are discussed.

_Purpose._ The basis of the presented research is a philosophical and methodological analysis of the human-centrism concept as a new intellectual strategy of comprehending and understanding the prospects of human existence in a situation of information-digital reality, which provides for the consistent solution of the following problems: 1) to make an explication of the conceptual content and semantic loading of human-centrism in the discourses of social philosophy and philosophical anthropology; 2) to analyse the theoretical significance and methodological role of human-centrism (...) in the information-digital reality; 3) to characterize the main parameters of the problematic field of human-centrism in overcoming the crisis of identity and preserving the system of universal human values. _Theoretical basis__._ The objective logic of unfolding of the modern information-digital world transforms philosophical anthropology into a new level of comprehending the human existence. Human-centrism interacts with philosophical anthropology and evaluates it from the point of its metaphilosophical, axiological-existential and methodological content. The assertion of human-centrism is caused by the identity crisis in the context of civilizational transformations, which as a result of the cumulative effect of information technology have a powerful influence on all aspects of human life and thinking. The philosophy of human-centrism as a life-affirming factor determines the development and adaptation of human self-consciousness to the modern socio-cultural environment, determined by information and technological processes. _Originality__._ It is substantiated that human-centrism as a new strategy of modern philosophical and anthropological discourses opens new cognition perspectives of the essence of human in the information-digital reality and contributes to the construction and implementation of new dimensions of identity in interaction with a qualitatively different level of world attitude. _Conclusions__._ The assertion of information-digital reality gives rise to a new type of philosophical and anthropological paradigm, a qualitative manifestation of which is the theory and methodology of human-centrism. It is characterized by a modern level of philosophical reflection, which allows preserving and at the same time renewing the system of universal human values. On this basis, human-centrism is a way of complementarity of all aspects of human life, who reconstructs themselves in a situation of new anthropological dimensions. (shrink)

Organization ethics praxis is theory and method of appropriate action for addressing ethics issues and developing ethical organizations. The perspective of praxis (theory and method of action) is important and different from the perspectives of theoria (theory of understanding), epistemology (ways of knowing), and ontology (ways of being/existing). Praxis is the least developed area within the field of organization ethics. Differences between theoria and praxis are considered within the context of Kohlberg—Gilligan developmental ethics where part of the controversy may be (...) unnecessary due to Kohlberg’s concentrating on epistemology and theoria, but not praxis; and, Gilligan’s considering aspects of praxis with epistemology and theoria. Differences between epistemology and praxis perspectives are considered in the contexts of two cases: Socratic “double-loop” action-learning conversations the night before the Challenger explosion; and, “triple-loop״ action-learning in a cross-cultural Boston—Indonesia child worker safety, acid-washed jeans case. (shrink)