(1998). The Hermeneutics of Heidegger's Speech: A Rhetorical Phenomenology. Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology: Vol. 29, No. 2, pp. 162-173.

El presente volumen está dedicado a la reflexión filosófica inter-cultural y, por ello, con nombre propio, a Raúl Fornet-Betancourt, figura prominente en este ámbito del pensar contemporáneo en Latinoamérica, El Caribe y Europa. Es en gran parte gracias al Prof. Fornet-Betancourt que la voz de los pueblos hispanohablantes de América es escuchada actualmente como expresión de un modo de pensar propio que, sin abandonar el profundo y amplio conocimiento de la tradición, asume nuevas problemáticas y objetos de reflexión, como también (...) permanentes y antiguos dilemas de la existencia hu-mana, desde una perspectiva de diálogo entre culturas. Esta perspec-tiva, abierta a la sensibilidad creativa de la rica mixtura afrodescen-diente, indígena y europea que configura el amplio ethos espiritual de Centroamérica, el Caribe y América Latina, habla al mundo desde lo propio que no se encierra en sus límites, sino que, por el contrario, se atreve en igualdad de condiciones a entrar en diálogo con otras culturas en torno a lo sido del mundo, del hoy que nos compete y de lo que adviene desde ya en el presente. Este es el legado que ya desde hace algunos años construye el Prof. Fornet-Betancourt, y que sirve de marco de referencia a la mayoría de artículos que conforman este número especial de nuestra revista en su honor. (shrink)

The nature and value of autonomy has long been debated in diverse philosophical traditions, including moral and political philosophy. Although the notion dates back to ancient Greek philosophy, it was during the Age of Enlightenment that autonomy drew much attention. Thus, as may be known, moral philosophers tended to emphasize self-regulation, particularly one’s own will to abide by universal moral laws, as the term “autonomy” originates from the Greek words “self” (auto) and “rule” (nomos). In parallel, modern epistemologists supposedly espoused (...) the idea of intellectual autonomy as self-reliance. In this classical view, an intellectually autonomous explorer of knowledge must not depend on a belief that is obtained from another’s testimony, until one can justify it to oneself. However, accompanying the growing focus on the importance of social dimensions of acquiring knowledge and understanding, recent epistemologists have doubted the classical view and have since reconsidered intellectual autonomy from distinct approaches such as social and virtue epistemology. This paper propounds an interpersonal-epistemic approach to intellectual autonomy. First, it is argued that thinking through questioning both individually and with other epistemic peers is an interpersonal-epistemic practice. Second, it is demonstrated that with particular cognitive features inherent within us, an intellectually autonomous person must think through questioning in necessary situations. This interpersonal account of intellectual autonomy can conceptually enrich intellectual autonomy by considering its relationship with not only responsibility but also with vulnerability. Specifically, regarding responsibility, an intellectually autonomous person must be responsible for his or her own actions throughout questioning processes. Regarding vulnerability, our intellectual autonomy lies in retaining autonomy with vulnerability in the plastic control of the questioning processes. (shrink)

In the early work of Martin Heidegger, I argue, we can confect a particular and particularly useful conception of rhetoric as a capacity to articulate situatedness by means, in part, of a more precise vocabulary for what I call the phenomena of everydayness. One aspect of this claim is that rhetoric is a diagnostic of established positions. Practicing what I preach, my first task here is to articulate as synoptically as possible the established positions on the topic at hand. In (...) the most general terms, that topic is “Heidegger and rhetoric.” We can identify eight stances in the literature. I articulate them in order of determinateness, as a series of specifications. First, before the publication in recent... (shrink)

El presente artículo se centra en el análisis de la lectura de la filosofía política platónica que Hans-Georg Gadamer realiza en su conferencia Plato und die Dichter (1934). Se planteará como hipótesis propia que, en los diálogos platónicos, tanto el filosofar como el poetizar habilitan el acceso a la comprensión del carácter sagrado de la justicia, la dimensión política de la legalidad de la musa poética y la percepción de lo sagrado como necesidad humana que permanece encubierta al modo de (...) lo innecesario. Por otro lado, sobre el final se prestará atención al concepto de phrónēsis en relación a la facultad humana del juicio y como instrumento necesario para la realización práctica del devenir del ser político del hombre en el Estado. (shrink)

Reseña del libro: Martin Heidegger y Karl Löwith, Briefwechsel. 1919–1973 -/- .

Heidegger’s doubts concerning the concept of “empathy” are unequivocally proven not only by his general tendency to avoid it, but also by his sharp critique of this term, as presented in both Being and Time and the lectures from the Summer Semester 1925, History of the Concept of Time. However, the concept of empathy is used by Heidegger in a positive, albeit rather allusive fashion, in three consecutive lectures of his early Freiburg period: Basic Problems of Phenomenology, Phenomenology of Intuition (...) and Expression and The Phenomenology of Religious Life. The present paper analyzes these three passages of Heidegger’s early lectures in close detail, revealing their connection to the conceptions of empathy found in the works of both Dilthey and Scheler. Thus it aims to connect Heidegger’s rather idiosyncratic conception of intersubjectivity with some of the discussions on that topic in the phenomenological millieu of the early 1920s. (shrink)

Este trabajo examina el diálogo entre neokantismo, fenomenología y hermenéutica en el conocido como Kriegsnotsemester impartido por Martin Heidegger en 1919, y lo hace a la luz de las posibilidades allí abiertas para una reformulación contemporánea de la filosofía trascendental. A tal fin se abordará el análisis de las aporías que entraña la filosofía del valor en Windelband y Rickert y cómo la respuesta del joven Heidegger descubre un nuevo «espacio de sentido» en el que se mueve gran parte de (...) la filosofía actual. Desde esa dimensión preteórica del sentido será posible dar con el modo de acceso adecuado a la filosofía como «ciencia originaria». (shrink)

This article presents Gadamer’s interest in temporality as his strategy for advancing hermeneutics as philosophy of experience, a strategy becoming significantly more salient with the appearance of his 1992 essay, ‘Wort und Bild’. I demonstrate how temporal categories readily demarcate the problem of ontological imbalance so central in Gadamer’s philosophical project, a demarcation that removes any illusion of compatibility between Gadamer and the hermeneutics of Paul Ricoeur. The article also considers some common misunderstandings of Gadamer resulting from a failure to (...) take full account of his interest in temporality, misunderstandings that prohibit recognizing the radical potential of Gadamer’s hermeneutical philosophy for our understanding of human finitude. A full account of this orientation must begin with a grasp of the exemplariness of art in his philosophy, and in this connection, the article raises the question of Gadamer’s late interest in the distinct exemplariness, not of lyric poetry, but of narrative art. (shrink)

lntentional ontology. Heidegger and the transformation of Husserlian phenomenology. The article will look inside in what Heidegger said in his first course in Marburgo about the issue of intentionality as the basis for a “fundamental ontological investigation.” Through the first Heidegger’s lessons, especially Freiburg, aspects of the Husserl’s idea of intentionality who suffered a hermeneutic appropriation by Heidegger, will be deployed. The text will focus on the relationship between Husserl’s intentionality and categorial intuition in order to interpret them through the (...) light of hermeneutic and understanding intuition that Heidegger speaks in his 1919’s Kriegsnotsemester. (shrink)

It has often been noted that Leo Strauss developed his understanding of political philosophy through a critical engagement with Heidegger. Yet most analyses focus on Strauss’s American works while neglecting his earlier response during the crisis years of the Weimar Republic. The article seeks to overcome this limitation by ‘deconstructing’ Strauss’s American definitions of political philosophy in light of both his Weimar understanding of politische Wissenschaft and his 1922 discovery of Heidegger’s Aristotle. I argue that Strauss’s conception of political philosophy (...) originated in Heidegger’s subversion of the traditional distinction between theory and praxis. I thus propose a way to read Strauss from the start following his own changing views of that distinction. (shrink)