This paper concerns the credibility problem for commitments. Commitments play an important role in cooperative human interactions and can dramatically improve the performance of joint actions by stabilizing expectations, reducing the uncertainty of the interaction, providing reasons to cooperate or improving action coordination. However, commitments can only serve these functions if they are credible in the first place. What is it then that insures the credibility of commitments? To answer this question, we need to provide an account of what motivates (...) us to abide by our commitments. We first discuss two conceptions of the nature of the commitments present in joint action and of the norms that govern them. We contend that while normative considerations may have some motivational force, there are reasons to doubt that they, by themselves, could provide a sufficient motivational basis to fully explain why agents abide by their commitments and thus why their commitments are credible. In the next two sections, we discuss two proposals regarding further sources of motivation, reputation management and social emotions. We argue that while reputation management and social emotions certainly play a role in motivating us to act as committed, there are both theoretical and empirical reasons to think that neither captures the most basic motivational force at work in sustaining commitments. We propose instead that the need to belong, i.e., the need to affiliate with others and form long-lasting bonds with them, is what primarily motivates us to interact and engage with those around us and act so as to preserve and reinforce the bonds we have forged with them. We argue that the need to belong is a more basic proximate motivation for conforming to commitments, in the sense both that affiliative behaviors are evidenced much earlier in human development than either reputation management or social emotions and that the need to belong is at least part of an explanation of why we care for our reputation and why we care about others’ assessments of our behavior. (shrink)

Multinational corporations face a litany of challenges regarding ethical decision-making as they traverse new variables in each country they operate in. Presented here is a new approach to ethical decision-making research for multinational corporations with the inclusion of moral virtues, national culture, and a feedback mechanism. The new proposed model builds off of the existing work by Trevino’s Person-Situated Interactionist Model. Hofstede’s work on individual national culture characteristics is used to move the conversation forward by explaining the relationships between individual (...) moderators in Trevino’s model and the effect of national culture on them. The new proposed model recommends the inclusion of moral virtues, with honesty and integrity as examples, as individual moderators in the decision-making process based on previous work. It contributes to the literature by introducing moral virtues into traditional ethical decision-making process models and introduces a new variable with a feedback mechanism for future learning. The paper concludes with recommendations for the future direction of research for ethical decision-making models for multinational organizations. (shrink)

Science is a collaborative effort to produce knowledge. Scientists thus must assess what information is trustworthy and who is a competent and honest source and partner. Facing the problem of trust, we can expect scientists to be vigilant. In response to their peers’ vigilance scientists will provide reasons, not only to convince their colleagues to adopt their practices or beliefs, but also to demonstrate that their beliefs and practices are justified. By justifying their beliefs and practices, scientists also justify themselves. (...) Reasons in science thus do not only function as tools of persuasion but also to manage reputation. This analysis strongly suggests that science constitutes a moral system, which has implications for the study and philosophy of science. (shrink)

Can commitments be generated without promises, commissive speech acts or gestures that are conventionally interpreted as such? While we remain neutral with respect to the normative answer to this question, we propose a psychological answer. Specifically, we hypothesize that people at least believe that commitments are in place if one agent (the sender) has led a second agent (the recipient) to rely on her to do something, and if this is mutually known by the two agents. Crucially, this situation can (...) occur even if the sender has neither uttered a commissive speech act nor performed any action that would conventionally be interpreted as such. In a series of online experiments, we tested this hypothesis by presenting participants with vignettes describing everyday situations in which a recipient’s expectations were frustrated by the sender’s behavior, and then eliciting moral judgments about the sender’s actions and character. We manipulated whether the recipient’s reliance on the sender was mutually known, and if so, whether the sender verbally acknowledged this or not. The results show that moral judgments differed significantly according to whether the recipient’s reliance was mutually known, but not according to whether this was verbally acknowledged. (shrink)

On August Business Roundtable, the Business Roundtable redefined the purpose and social responsibility of the corporation. Yet, this statement must be followed by substantial changes in the business models of corporations for it to avoid becoming empty rhetoric. We believe that the figure of the independent director may be one of the catalysts needed for this change of paradigm for corporations. In spite of the positive correlation between Corporate Social Responsibility and board independence, the development of the independence of boards (...) during the last decade has not lead to the expected CSR results. Academics and regulators point to a weak definition and the non-standardized measurement of both independence and board independence as one possible explanation, and agree that a broader definition is needed. This paper aims to contribute to this debate. We develop a second-generation definition of independence based on a positive approximation to the concept by integrating an Aristotelian perspective of virtue ethics with the best practices of corporate governance. Thus, we define independence as a virtue guided by practical wisdom, that implies autonomy and autarky and which enables a person to act with integrity, fairness and truthfulness. In the context of corporate governance, independence is associated with an honest disposition to serve. Our proposal has political implications for supervisors that make decisions relating to the suitability of board members. (shrink)