This paper compares the analysis of the antinomies of modern culture in the work of Agnes Heller and György Markus. It is particularly concerned with Heller’s innovative introduction of a third optative concept of culture as cultural conversation. The rationale, contours and diagnosis linked to this normative concept are explored and contrasted to the historicising alternative presented in Markus. It is argued that some weaknesses in Heller’s account are intimately linked to the utopian aspiration of her understanding of philosophy.

The conceptual and methodological contributions of Marxist aesthetics from Eastern European countries like Hungary, Yugoslavia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, and East Germany were productive and significant despite various hurdles faced concerning institutionalization, legitimization and differing theoretical abuses. In its mode of inquiry and discursive practices, Eastern European Marxist aesthetics is both similar and dissimilar to its Western, Soviet, Russian and Chinese counterparts. The specificity here is the function of a unique geographical and socio-historical context, as well as interaction with other (...) contemporary paradigms of thought. The innovative impulses of Eastern European Marxist aesthetics affected six scholarly domains: aesthetics of praxis, theory of realism, critique of modernity, semiotics, theory of genre and cultural theory. This paper provides a general survey of the intellectual achievements of Eastern European Marxist aesthetics across these six domains and will show how this theoretical tradition has influenced the modern history of ideas. (shrink)

This paper situates the critical attitude undergirding Ágnes Heller’s theory of modernity by elucidating her conceptualization of its ‘undialectical dialectics’ relative to the dialectical philosophies of Kant and Hegel. For Heller, the methodological commitments orienting a philosopher’s decision on how to conceptualize the dynamics of modernity are not merely theoretical but also ethico-practical, for they attempt to overcome the duality of life and spirit in the singular personality. For the denizens of contemporary modernity – who recognize contingency inhering in their (...) institutions – and for philosophers – who recognize the fallibility of their theoretical claims – a form of skepticism is warranted. By engaging with the work of György Márkus, Heller attempts to evince a notion of ‘normative skepticism’ that may exhibit both a critical attitude appropriate to conceiving modernity as ‘undialectical dialectics’ and to attenuate for the threat of ‘existential failure’ in the choice of oneself as a philosopher. (shrink)

This paper approaches the issue of cosmopolitanism from the vantage point of hospitality. The notion of hospitality throws into relief some issues that are at the heart of political cosmopolitanism, but cannot be addressed by it. This is because these issues do not necessarily revolve around the category of the citizen, but around the categories of stranger and outsider. The paper critiques the tendency to conflate the categories of the stranger and the outsider and goes on to argue that the (...) standard cosmopolitan extension of democracy to international contexts risks reproducing the exclusion of “outsiders” by nation-states, even democratic ones. (shrink)

This paper deals with Ágnes Heller’s suggestion, in A Theory of Modernity (1999), to ascribe to science a central role in the ongoing development of modernity. As we shall argue, this is not merely a historical issue but, rather, a historical-philosophical one that entails the problem of defining modernity, science and technology and their mutual interconnections. As for modernity, according to Heller, it is a free developmental project without any foundations other than freedom itself. In particular, the evolution of science (...) and technology is one of its main developmental tendencies. Science, she argues, has become the dominant world explanation while technological thought is the corresponding dominant (but not unique) imaginary institution. Her attempt to isolate the essential cultural features of science-technology owes much to Habermas’s analyses of the 1960s on the technocratic developments of contemporary societies legitimized through an ideological employment of science. Like Habermas, Heller embraces an instrumental and problem-solving conception of technology and ‘normal’ science which appears questionable, however, in the light of conclusions on the intrinsic creativity of the science-technology interface deriving from historical epistemology and an externalist history of science. Considerations and examples derived from the recent agenda of historical epistemology could integrate Heller’s philosophical and cultural analysis of the role of science in modernity while challenging some of her assumptions. (shrink)

From the point of view of reflected postmodernity, Ágnes Heller constructs her own discourse of aesthetics on the basis of György Lukács’s contribution. She locates aesthetics in her social philosophy, philosophy of history, and ethics, transforming aesthetics from a ‘Marxist Renaissance’ to a ‘post-Marxist’ position, and points out that the paradoxes of modern culture can be avoided by a personality that is autonomous and moral in action. The notion of the beautiful character in everyday life is a symbol of the (...) ideal type of society and of the good life in contrast to the God-forsaken world of modern dilemmas and the domination of the sublime in postmodernism. It is the expression of freedom and democracy in the contemporary age. Heller’s neo-humanist aesthetics is in essence the presentation of her cultural politics as a Great Republic. (shrink)

This article examines the idioms of ‘modernity’ with specific focus on indigenous peoples and their engagement with larger society in respect of culture, development and jurisprudence. This engagement in the past 50 years has largely been within the terms of the nation-state system, and related international fora. It is argued that these indigeneous communities, in all their great diversity across the world, have nevertheless been largely successful in carving out adequate political spaces to stake their claims as distinct ‘peoples’ rather (...) than simply being recognized as one among the several ethnic groups or minorities of a nation-state polity. This distinction is crucial and this paper shows why and how. This is not to say that the indigenous communities the world over have similar terms of engagement as their own heterogeneity defies any neat typological schema. At the same time, the multiple idioms of the current indigenous discourse, however, should not be treated as cacophonic but as embodying consciously crafted tools for boundary negotiations and voicing indigenous identities. This article reflects on this achievement by providing a survey of these developments even as it critically explores the terms of the discourses themselves. (shrink)

This article deploys a double conceptual framework. One frame is positioned through the ideas of absolute strangers and outsiders. The other frame develops out of, though is distinct from, the first, and refers to the disaggregated forms of modern citizenship. The citizen-as-absolute-stranger in addition to accruing political rights may also accrue social, economic or identity rights, or traverse wider relations between him or herself and other absolute strangers in either national or international settings. It is in this context that outsiders (...) are configured - aliens who have no national-juridical status. (shrink)

Agnes Heller was one of the first critical theorists to turn her attention to a contemporary theory of modernity. Yet her many writings on this topic remained fragments until the publication of her A Theory of Modernity (1999). This article focuses on the structural elements of this account. It traces the evolution of Heller's ideas in regard to logics, dynamic and social arrangement of modernity. It explains how these fit into her own development towards the standpoint she describes as postmodern (...) resignation and her notions of the `double bind' and `pendulum of modernity'. It argues that while Heller has modified her conception of the multiple logics of modernity to keep faith with a critical brief and an open-ended vision, some theoretical tensions remain. In particular, it explores the idea of modernity as a `steamroller' in conjunction with the question of its survival. It also questions whether Heller's emphatic normative vision of cultural modernity can easily be reconciled with the empirical trends of globalization that promise an increasing diversity of modernities. (shrink)

According to Ágnes Heller’s plans in 1989 and 1990, the last volume of her moral trilogy should have been entitled A Theory of Proper Conduct. In 1996 the third volume finally appeared with the title An Ethics of Personality. Its content: a series of philosophical dialogues between many dramatis personæ. The change in style and methodology of the third volume led to many criticisms, amongst them Mihály Vajda’s questioning of the whole project’s consistency. The present paper aims to engage these (...) criticisms by retracing the presence in An Ethics of Personality of the themes that, according to Heller’s previous intentions, should have informed the last part of her moral theory. The contribution analyses Heller’s definitions of modern paideia and moral wisdom, the issue of the possibility of happiness for modern people, and the philosophically problematic concept of moral aesthetics. In conclusion, the ‘literary’ methodology of the book is put in relationship with the non-prescriptive aspect of ethics. (shrink)

This article develops three interconnected arguments concerning the image of modernity as a revolutionary epoch and the way in which this image has been understood and theorized. These three lines of conceptualization, which can only be sketched in less rather than greater detail here, concern the constellation or figuration of modernity, its democratic dimension, and in reference to each, the work of Max Weber, especially The City. More specifically, the article argues that modern democracy is revolutionary when viewed as an (...) open and self-instituting articulation of political power. Its modern revolutionary impulse begins in the Italian Renaissance city-states, the German `free' cities, and the Swiss federation where urban autonomy was matched by the creation of elected forms of rulership and the development of federated circulations of power. (shrink)

The rhetorical function of the future in Christian Zionists' commemoration of Israel is a core component of their collective memory. As a discursive act, commemoration typically involves a remembering of the past. Based on an analysis of a corpus of US Christian Zionist texts from 1934 to 2010, I argue that a sort of commemorating and remembering of the future takes place, which silences alternative future worlds and possibilities that discord with Christian Zionist ideologies. These texts exhibit a concern with (...) the future that is rooted in a particularized narrative in order to validate Christian Zionist understandings of the role of Israel in human history. Thus, for Christian Zionists, remembering the future is a strategic resource for constructing specific expectations about Israel. Moreover, I argue that these expectations inform how discourse participants assign meaning to the present by forming biased mental models of Israel and manipulating social cognition. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to present Bioethics, particularly its educational aspect, as a way to promote moral and democratic competencies, thus improving a personal capacity to face not only bioethical issues but also broader ethical, moral and even political problems. We believe that we should invest educative efforts on the affective and cognitive aspects of moral behavior if we want to promote the capacity to make moral judgments and act according to them. In pluralistic democratic societies, it is (...) necessary to also promote the capacity to speak up and listen to arguments as a means to deal with moral problems. Any Bioethics which does not also include an educational action is prone to lose most of its significance. We propose that Bioethics should be led to an educational turn, focusing on the construction of an educative toolbox composed of interventional and evaluative instruments. (shrink)

This article reports the findings from a study of discursive representations of the future role of technology in the work of the US National Intelligence Council. Specifically, it investigates the interplay of ‘techno-optimism’ and propositional certainty in the NIC’s ‘Future Global Trends Reports’. In doing so, it answers the following questions: To what extent was techno-optimism present in the discourse? What level of propositional certainty was expressed in the discourse? How did the discourse deal with the inherent uncertainty of the (...) future? Overall, the discourse was pronouncedly techno-optimist in its stance towards the future role of technology: high-technological solutions were portrayed as solving a host of problems, despite the readily available presence of low-technology or no-technology solutions. In all, 75.1% of the representations were presented as future categorical certainties, meaning the future was predominantly presented as a known and closed inevitability. The discourse dealt with the inherent uncertainty of the subject matter, that is, the future, by projecting the past and present into the future. This was particularly the case in relation to the idea of technological military dominance as a guarantee of global peace, and the role of technology as an inevitable force free from societal censorship. (shrink)

This paper discusses Eastern European Marxists’ consideration of science and technology concerning aesthetic dimensions. Different from most of Western Marxists who take negative or dystopian attitudes towards modern science and technology from the aesthetic utopian perspective, those Marxists who come from countries such as Hungary, Yugoslav, Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Bulgaria or Romania, which once belonged to the socialist camp, under the influence of Soviet and Western culture, pay attention to the complicated tension between science-technology and aesthetics. In this paper, (...) I probe into these notions by reading György Lukács, Budapest School, Romanian theorists and the Yugoslav Praxis Group, which are divided into four key points: basic nature of science in contrast with arts; modern tension of culture between science and arts; the possibility of scientific aesthetics; and development of arts in the world of technology. There is a dialectical understanding of science and technology here which contributes to contemporary recognition of science and technology from the point of view of neo-humanism, not only in aesthetics but also human existence. This is relevant to theoretical reflection on the present and future Chinese socialist aesthetics. (shrink)

This paper uses Castoriadis’s idea of the imaginary and Agnes Heller’s conceptualization of modernity as an interplay of the historical and technological imaginations, to examine how modernity engages with the idea of development to foster a particular vision of the future as always in progression. It uses the examples of Tasmania and Kerala, in Australia and India, respectively, as case studies which challenge the dominant perception of development as a linear and progressive ideology of growth that translates into ‘the development (...) of productive forces and the rational mastery of nature’. The case studies also show how, despite the radically different paths through modernity, it is the same logics of modernity that are at work in both locations. (shrink)

The author describes Heller’s concept of ethics as a “quasi-sphere” intersecting with various fields relating to human relationships. Special attention is paid to the axiological aspects of her concept of ethics and the relationship between virtues and responsibility. The author also seeks to show how Heller integrated a traditional philosophical question—the relationship between “is” and “ought to be”—into her concept of “radical philosophy” at an earlier stage in the development of her philosophy. She initially considered the relationship between “is” and (...) “ought to be” to be contrasting. Later, when she had come to accept the political model of liberal capitalist society, the ideal of all-compassing equality became the ideal of “equality of opportunities”. The author interprets this shift as one in which the relationship becomes continual. He is also critical of Heller’s underestimation of the effect the “social a priori” has on the possibilities of human life. (shrink)