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  1. Reasons, causes, and action explanation.Mark Risjord - 2005 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 35 (3):294-306.
    To explain an intentional action one must exhibit the agent’s reasons. Donald Davidson famously argued that the only clear way to understand action explanation is to hold that reasons are causes. Davidson’s discussion conflated two issues: whether reasons are causes and whether reasons causally explain intentional action. Contemporary work on explanation and normativity help disentangle these issues and ground an argument that intentional action explanations cannot be a species of causal explanation. Interestingly, this conclusion is consistent with Davidson’s conclusion that (...)
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  • Erotetic contextualism, data-generating procedures, and sociological explanations of social mobility.Kareem Khalifa - 2004 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 34 (1):38-54.
    Critics of the erotetic model of explanation question its ability to discriminate significant from spurious explanations. One response to these criticisms has been to impose contextual restrictions on a case-by-case basis. In this article, the author argues that these approaches have overestimated the role of interests at the expense of other contextual aspects characteristic of social-scientific explanation. For this reason, he shows how procedures of measuring occupational status and social mobility affected different aspects of one explanation that Peter Blau and (...)
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  • From Pluralistic Normative Principles to Autonomous-Agent Rules.Beverley Townsend, Colin Paterson, T. T. Arvind, Gabriel Nemirovsky, Radu Calinescu, Ana Cavalcanti, Ibrahim Habli & Alan Thomas - 2022 - Minds and Machines 32 (4):683-715.
    With recent advancements in systems engineering and artificial intelligence, autonomous agents are increasingly being called upon to execute tasks that have normative relevance. These are tasks that directly—and potentially adversely—affect human well-being and demand of the agent a degree of normative-sensitivity and -compliance. Such norms and normative principles are typically of a social, legal, ethical, empathetic, or cultural (‘SLEEC’) nature. Whereas norms of this type are often framed in the abstract, or as high-level principles, addressing normative concerns in concrete applications (...)
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  • From Pluralistic Normative Principles to Autonomous-Agent Rules.Beverley Townsend, Colin Paterson, T. T. Arvind, Gabriel Nemirovsky, Radu Calinescu, Ana Cavalcanti, Ibrahim Habli & Alan Thomas - 2022 - Minds and Machines 1:1-33.
    With recent advancements in systems engineering and artificial intelligence, autonomous agents are increasingly being called upon to execute tasks that have normative relevance. These are tasks that directly—and potentially adversely—affect human well-being and demand of the agent a degree of normative-sensitivity and -compliance. Such norms and normative principles are typically of a social, legal, ethical, empathetic, or cultural nature. Whereas norms of this type are often framed in the abstract, or as high-level principles, addressing normative concerns in concrete applications of (...)
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  • Explanation and rationality naturalized.David Henderson - 2010 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 40 (1):30-58.
    Familiar accounts have it that one explains thoughts or actions by showing them to be rational. It is common to find that the standards of rationality presupposed in these accounts are drawn from what would be thought to be aprioristic sources. I advance an argument to show this must be mistaken. But, recent work in epistemology and on rationality takes a less aprioristic approach to such standards. Does the new (psychological or cognitive scientific) realism in accounts of rationality itself significantly (...)
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  • Action explanations are not inherently normative.Till Grüne-Yanoff - 2008 - Theoria 74 (1):60-78.
    "Though this be madness, yet there is method in't." Hamlet , act II, scene ii Abstract: Inherent normativity is the claim that intentional action explanations necessarily have to comply with normatively understood rationality constraints on the ascribed propositional attitudes. This paper argues against inherent normativity in three steps. First, it presents three examples of actions successfully explained with propositional attitudes, where the ascribed attitudes violate relevant rationality constraints. Second, it argues that the inference rules that systematise propositional attitudes are qualitatively (...)
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  • Norms, invariance, and explanatory relevance.David Henderson - 2005 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 35 (3):324-338.
    Descriptions of social norms can be explanatory. The erotetic approach to explanation provides a useful framework. I describe one very broad kind of explanation-seeking why-question, a genus that is common to the special sciences, and argue that descriptions of norms can serve as an answer to such why-questions. I draw upon Woodward’s recent discussion of the explanatory role of generalizations with a significant degree of invariance. Descriptions of norms provide what is, in effect, a generalization regarding the kind of historically (...)
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