Is there more to how well a life goes overall (its lifetime well-being) than simply the aggregate goodness and badness of its moments (its momentary well-being)? Atomists about lifetime well-being say ‘no’. Holists hold that there is more to lifetime well-being than aggregate momentary well-being (with different holists offering different candidates for what this extra element might be). -/- This paper presents and defends a novel form of holism about lifetime well-being, which I call ‘End of Life’. This is the (...) view that the momentary goodness or badness of the end of lives has a disproportionate effect upon lifetime well-being. More precisely: a welfare subject’s level of momentary well-being at the end of their life contributes more to their lifetime well-being than their level of momentary well-being at each other point. (shrink)

Many believe that an upward-sloping life is better than a downward-sloping life because of its shape. This is a common way of formulating the shape of a life hypothesis. We argue that the hypothesis is mistaken. We need not assume that there is something intrinsically valuable in the shape of one’s life to justify the tendency to judge an upward-sloping life as better than a downward sloping one. Instead, we can appeal to more fundamental and less controversial claims to justify (...) such a judgment. What one might justifiably judge to be better are features of lives which are often (though not necessarily) correlated with, rather than constituted by, an upward slope. (shrink)

It is an open question whether well-being ought to primarily be understood as a temporal concept or whether it only makes sense to talk about a person’s well-being over their whole lifetime. In this article, I argue that how this principled philosophical disagreement is settled does not have substantive practical implications for well-being science and well-being policy. Trying to measure lifetime well-being directly is extremely challenging as well as unhelpful for guiding well-being public policy, while temporal well-being is both an (...) adequate indirect measure of lifetime well-being, and an adequate focus for the purposes of improving well-being through public policy. Consequently, even if what we ought to care about is lifetime well-being, we should use temporal measures of well-being and focus on temporal well-being policies. (shrink)

A social insurance scheme against a short life seems impossible: ex ante (before lengths of life are known), it is hard to identify the persons who will be short-lived, and ex post (once lengths of life are known), it is often too late to compensate the short-lived. However, it is possible to insure persons against a short life by means of age-based statistical discrimination that favours the young in line with the Herod strategy: allocating the good things of life to (...) all young adults improves the situation of the unidentified persons who will die prematurely and reduces the deprivation due to an early death. This article examines three challenges questioning the capacity of the Herod strategy to reduce wellbeing deprivation due to a premature death. First, the limited substitutability between the quantity and the quality of life years makes an efficient insurance scheme against a short life incomplete. Second, the state cannot know ex ante the conception of the good life of the short-lived and must offer baskets of universal means that would improve all kinds of short lives. Such baskets will, under endowment effects, affect the adopted views about the good life, against the ideal of a neutral state. Third, the bias towards the future makes persons spontaneously reallocate the good things of life to later ages, which would defeat insurance against a short life. (shrink)