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Guy Fletcher
University of Edinburgh
  1. A Fresh Start for the Objective-List Theory of Well-Being.Guy Fletcher - 2013 - Utilitas 25 (2):206-220.
    So-called theories of well-being (prudential value, welfare) are under-represented in discussions of well-being. I do four things in this article to redress this. First, I develop a new taxonomy of theories of well-being, one that divides theories in a more subtle and illuminating way. Second, I use this taxonomy to undermine some misconceptions that have made people reluctant to hold objective-list theories. Third, I provide a new objective-list theory and show that it captures a powerful motivation for the main competitor (...)
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  2. Objective List Theories.Guy Fletcher - 2016 - In The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Well-Being. Routledge. pp. 148-160.
    This chapter is divided into three parts. First I outline what makes something an objective list theory of well-being. I then go on to look at the motivations for holding such a view before turning to objections to these theories of well-being.
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  3. The Locative Analysis of Good For Formulated and Defended.Guy Fletcher - 2012 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (JESP) 6 (1):1-27.
    THE STRUCTURE OF THIS PAPER IS AS FOLLOWS. I begin §1 by dealing with preliminary issues such as the different relations expressed by the “good for” locution. I then (§2) outline the Locative Analysis of good for and explain its main elements before moving on to (§3) outlining and discussing the positive features of the view. In the subsequent sections I show how the Locative Analysis can respond to objections from, or inspired by, Sumner (§4-5), Regan (§6), and Schroeder and (...)
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  4. Taking Prudence Seriously.Guy Fletcher - 2019 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: volume 14. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 70-94.
    Philosophers have long theorised about which things make people’s lives go well (and why) and the extent to which morality and self-interest can be reconciled. By contrast, we have spent little time on meta-prudential questions, questions about prudential discourse. This is surprising given that prudence is, prima facie, a normative form of discourse and, as such, cries out for further investigation of how exactly it functions and whether it has problematic commitments. It also marks a stark contrast from moral discourse, (...)
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  5. Variable Versus Fixed-Rate Rule-Utilitarianism.Brad Hooker & Guy Fletcher - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (231):344–352.
    Fixed-rate versions of rule-consequentialism and rule-utilitarianism evaluate rules in terms of the expected net value of one particular level of social acceptance, but one far enough below 100% social acceptance to make salient the complexities created by partial compliance. Variable-rate versions of rule-consequentialism and rule-utilitarianism instead evaluate rules in terms of their expected net value at all different levels of social acceptance. Brad Hooker has advocated a fixed-rate version. Michael Ridge has argued that the variable-rate version is better. The debate (...)
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  6. Sentimental Value.Guy Fletcher - 2009 - Journal of Value Inquiry 43 (1):55-65.
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  7. Hybrid Views in Meta‐Ethics: Pragmatic Views.Guy Fletcher - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (12):848-863.
    A common starting point for ‘going hybrid’ is the thought that moral discourse somehow combines belief and desire-like aspects, or is both descriptive and expressive. Hybrid meta-ethical theories aim to give an account of moral discourse that is sufficiently sensitive to both its cognitive and its affective, or descriptive and expressive, dimensions. They hold at least one of the following: moral thought: moral judgements have belief and desire-like aspects or elements; moral language: moral utterances both ascribe properties and express desire-like (...)
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  8. Resisting Buck-Passing Accounts of Prudential Value.Guy Fletcher - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (1):77-91.
    This paper aims to cast doubt upon a certain way of analysing prudential value (or good for ), namely in the manner of a ‘buck-passing’ analysis. It begins by explaining why we should be interested in analyses of good for and the nature of buck-passing analyses generally (§I). It moves on to considering and rejecting two sets of buck-passing analyses. The first are analyses that are likely to be suggested by those attracted to the idea of analysing good for in (...)
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  9. Mill, Moore, and Intrinsic Value.Guy Fletcher - 2008 - Social Theory and Practice 34 (4):517-32.
    In this paper, I examine how philosophers before and after G. E. Moore understood intrinsic value. The main idea I wish to bring out and defend is that Moore was insufficiently attentive to how distinctive his conception of intrinsic value was, as compared with those of the writers he discussed, and that such inattentiveness skewed his understanding of the positions of others that he discussed and dismissed. My way into this issue is by examining the charge of inconsistency that Moore (...)
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  10. Review of Richard Kraut’s What is Good And Why: The Ethics of Well-Being. [REVIEW]Guy Fletcher - 2009 - Analysis 69 (3):576-8.
    Anyone familiar with Richard Kraut's work in ancient philosophy will be excited to see him putting aside the dusty tomes of the ancients and delving into ethics first-hand. He does not disappoint. His book is a lucid and wide-ranging discussion that provides at least the core of an ethical theory and an appealing set of answers to a range of ethical questions.Kraut aims to provide an alternative to utilitarianism that preserves the good-centred nature of that theory. He claims that all (...)
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  11. Rejecting Well-Being Invariabilism.Guy Fletcher - 2009 - Philosophical Papers 38 (1):21-34.
    This paper is an attempt to undermine a basic assumption of theories of well-being, one that I call well-being invariabilism. I argue that much of what makes existing theories of well-being inadequate stems from the invariabilist assumption. After distinguishing and explaining well-being invariabilism and well-being variabilism, I show that the most widely-held theories of well-being—hedonism, desire-satisfaction, and pluralist objective-list theories—presuppose invariabilism and that a large class of the objections to them arise because of it. My aim is to show that (...)
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  12. The Consistency of Qualitative Hedonism and the Value of (at Least Some) Malicious Pleasures.Guy Fletcher - 2008 - Utilitas 20 (4):462-471.
    In this article, I examine two of the standard objections to forms of value hedonism. The first is the common claim, most famously made by Bradley and Moore, that Mill's qualitative hedonism is inconsistent. The second is the apparent problem for quantitative hedonism in dealing with malicious pleasures. I argue that qualitative hedonism is consistent, even if it is implausible on other grounds. I then go on to show how our intuitions about malicious pleasure might be misleading.
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  13. A Millian Objection to Reasons as Evidence.Guy Fletcher - 2013 - Utilitas 25 (3):417-420.
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  14. Needing and Necessity.Guy Fletcher - 2018 - In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics. Oxford University Press. pp. 170-192.
    Claims about needs are a ubiquitous feature of everyday practical discourse. It is therefore unsurprising that needs have long been a topic of interest in moral philosophy, applied ethics, and political philosophy. Philosophers have devoted much time and energy to developing theories of the nature of human needs and the like. -/- Philosophers working on needs are typically committed to the idea that there are different kinds of needs and that within the different kinds of needs is a privileged class (...)
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  15. Uneasy Companions.Guy Fletcher - 2009 - Ratio 22 (3):359-368.
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  16. Brown and Moore's Value Invariabilism Vs Dancy's Variabilism.Guy Fletcher - 2010 - Philosophical Quarterly 60 (238):162-168.
    Campbell Brown has recently argued that G.E. Moore's intrinsic value holism is superior to Jonathan Dancy's. I show that the advantage which Brown claims for Moore's view over Dancy's is illusory, and that Dancy's view may be superior.
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  17. Hume's Morality: Feeling and Fabrication – Rachel Cohon. [REVIEW]Guy Fletcher - 2010 - Philosophical Quarterly 60 (241):861-863.
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  18. Wrongness, Welfarism and Evolution: Crisp on Reasons and the Good.Guy Fletcher - 2007 - Ratio 20 (3):341–347.
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  19.  64
    Shafer-Landau, Russ, Ed. Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Vol. 8.Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. Pp. 352. $110.00 ; $45.00. [REVIEW]Guy Fletcher - 2014 - Ethics 125 (1):282-288.
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  20.  75
    On Hatzimoysis on Sentimental Value.Guy Fletcher - 2009 - Philosophia 37 (1):149-152.
    Despite its apparent ubiquity, philosophers have not talked much about sentimental value. One exception is Anthony Hatzimoysis (The Philosophical Quarterly 53:373–379, 2003). Those who wish to take sentimental value seriously are likely to make use of Christine Korsgaard’s ideas on two distinctions in value. In this paper I show that Hatzimoysis has misrendered Korsgaard’s insight in his discussion of sentimental value. I begin by briefly summarising Korsgaard’s idea before showing how Hatzimoysis’ treatment of it is mistaken.
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