In this paper I show that one of the most fruitful ways of employing paradoxes has been as a philosophical method that forces us to reconsider basic assumptions. After a brief discussion of recent understandings of the notion of paradoxes, I show that Zeno of Elea was the inventor of paradoxes in this sense, against the background of Heraclitus’ and Parmenides’ way of argumentation: in contrast to Heraclitus, Zeno’s paradoxes do not ask us to embrace a paradoxical reality; and in (...) contrast to Parmenides, Zeno shows common assumptions to be internally problematic, not just in light of Eleatic positions. (shrink)

There are elements in Heraclitus that are enticing to modern readers in that they point toward a certain intimacy of consciousness. Having read the fragments of this philosopher, we propose a reading that harmonizes his assertions about universality with his assertions about self-knowledge, in which we believe we can glimpse the discovery of self-awareness. In Heraclitus’ view, humans possess a soul with an unlimited horizon and a capacity to access the logos. A person must pursue introspection, listen to the logos, (...) and find the unity of all things and himself. This will enable us to gain a deeper understanding of the interiority of self-awareness without sacrificing its connection to the universal. Furthermore, individuals must speak the logos to themselves to act according to it. By acting otherwise, one would be acting against his own inner self. (shrink)

In Metaphysics Γ, Aristotle argues against those who seem to accept contradictions. He distinguishes between the Sophists, who deny the principle of non-contradiction through arguments, and the Natural Philosophers, whose physical investigations lead to the acceptance of objective contradictions. Heraclitus’ name appears throughout the discussion. Usually, he is associated with the discussion against the Sophists. In this paper, I explore how the discussion with the Natural Philosophers may illuminate both the interpretation of Heraclitus by Aristotle and Heraclitus’ own worldview. To (...) refute the Natural Philosophers, Aristotle proposes a general reconstruction of their reasoning. Roughly, relying on sensory evidence (A1), they see that the same thing changes from one opposite to another (A2). Such a change appears to characterize a generation out of non-being, which a Natural Philosopher does not accept (A3). To solve the problem, despite their different worldviews, Natural Philosophers hint at a state in which opposites co-occur, characterizing an objective contradiction (C). Looking at the discussion in Metaphysics Γ and Heraclitus fragments, sections 1–3 show how assumptions A1, A2, and A3 easily apply to Heraclitus. The case of the conclusion is more challenging. In the case of the Pluralists, the co-existence of opposites characterizes a state in which there is no generation. Such a view does not fit Heraclitus’ mobilism. To argue that Aristotle’s argument is general enough to encompass dynamic views, I examine his problematization of accepting the change of change in Metaphysics K and Physics V. There, after re-stating several points that appear in Metaphysics Γ, Aristotle argues that accepting the becoming of another becoming leads to a state of contradiction in which the becoming is perishing. Heraclitus’ B8, cited in Nicomachean Ethics, gives evidence that, for Aristotle, Heraclitus puts a process at the origin of an opposite process. Moreover, after examining the expression ‘living the death/dying the life’ in B62, I argue that Heraclitus was aware that his worldview implied a dynamic objective contradiction. Finally, an analysis of elemental changes in B36 proves that accepting objective contradictions does not make Heraclitus’ worldview less attractive. (shrink)

The aim of this critical note is to discuss Heraclitus' use of analogy as a pattern of thought not only with argumentative value but also ontological and epistemological status. Heraclitus' analogy is of two kinds and is expressed in the use of the adverbs ὥσπερ ("as") and ὅκωσπερ ("just as"). The first is used as an explanatory device, while the second denotes the ontological homogeneity of logos. Analogy reveals not only the inherent opposition of logos in each single thing, but (...) also the interdependent common interrelation between things. (shrink)

In here, philosophical-literate thinking on the way is mainly tried. On one side, making a philosophical analysis of Heraclitus’ fragment 60 is aimed. The different views on what Heraclitus might have meant in this article which is generally translated as the way up and the way down are one and the same are examined. On the other side, with a reading of Robert Frost’s famous poem of Road Not Taken, it has been tried whether a phenomenological interpretation of the way (...) based on passenger is possible or not. It has been researched if there is a common ground or not where this fragment and poem -which exhibit two different views on the way- have met each other. This fragment and poem has been linked together on the context of essentiality of the passenger for the way. (shrink)

Buddhism has always produced epistemological systems, and those of the Mahāyāna, in particular, always showed knowledge and perception to be inherently delusive. “Higher” forms of Buddhism have a degenerative philosophy of history according to which a sort of Golden Age was disrupted by the rise and gradual development of knowledge and the delusion inherent in it, which have reached their apex in our time – the final phase of the “Era of Darkness.” From this standpoint, this paper intends to show (...) science, in which Marcuse saw an inherent instrumental/technological interest, to have been developed by delusion and to have simultaneously furthered the development of delusion, to the point at which they begot the deadly ecological crisis proper to this concluding phase of the Era of Darkness – which reveals as such the delusion at its root, achieving the latter’s empirical reductio ad absurdum and offering us the possibility of eradicating it and thus healing our minds and, hopefully, our world. (shrink)

Heraclitus is generally recognised as the first of the Greek thinkers to develop a psychology, but the understanding of his psychology is held back by the assumptions that his soul is a life-principle and is ‘comprehensive’ of the various faculties we regard as psychological. The fragment that best displays the revolutionary character of Heraclitus’ soul doctrine, from a properly psychological viewpoint, is B 85. I offer an extended analysis of this fragment in order to bear out the claims, firstly, that (...) psyche or ‘soul’ for Heraclitus is the intelligence alone, divine in origin, and secondly that thumos (primarily as the seat of desire) is a better candidate for his biological life-principle, whose exigencies are at odds with those of soul. I also offer some reflections on why, despite Heraclitus’ multifaceted influence on fifth-century thought, and despite the coherence of his psychology, this ‘revolution’ never quite took hold. (shrink)

The aim of this brief article is to demonstrate and analyze the influence of Heraclitus’s thought on some of the poems written by Miguel de Unamuno, in particular ‘La elegía eterna’ and ‘La flor tronchada’. At times –as in ‘La elegía eterna’– Heraclitus merely serves as a sort of a walking stick, an aid to his efforts to poetically reveal his anxieties. On other occasions –as in ‘La flor tronchada’– he genuinely needs Heraclitus’s philosophy to illustrate his view of human (...) life and its relation to God as unending warfare. (shrink)

This paper is devoted to the analysis of Plotinus’ citation of the Heraclitean saying B113 DK in the second treatise On the Presence of Being (VI 5 [23]). I shall argue that the use which the author of the Enneads makes of this fragment has been hitherto misunderstood by scholars and that, for this reason, the significance of the passage and its role within Plotinus’ argument have been missed. Close attention will be paid to the tool through which Plotinus conveys (...) his own reading of Heraclitus’ tenet, i.e. etymology, and to the passages in which he both lays down and puts into practice the programmatic guidelines for his interpretation of the Presocratic. In addition, I shall interpret Plotinus’ recourse to a wordplay which is, in character, quite Heraclitean as a proof of the importance of his philosophical engagement with the Obscure. (shrink)