Politics, Philosophy & Economics, Volume 21, Issue 2, Page 190-227, May 2022. There is a sense of fairness that is distinctive of markets. This is fairness among economic competitors, competitive fairness. We regularly make judgments of competitive fairness about market participants, public policies and institutions. However, it is not clear to what these judgments refer, or what moral significance they have. This paper offers a rational reconstruction of competitive fairness in terms of non-domination. It first identifies competitive fairness as a (...) distinctive claim, advanced within markets in turn characterized as antagonistic, instrumental and procedural. It distinguishes competitive fairness from a number of familiar ideals with which it might be confused: legitimate expectation, equality of opportunity, sporting fairness and economic efficiency. While many exponents likely assume competitive fairness can be explained in terms of one of these ideals, in each case there are significant objections to doing so. Instead, the paper argues that the most promising justification of competitive fairness is under the republican ideal of non-domination, which can reconstruct many of the intuitive judgments of competitive fairness that we make in particular cases. However, it concludes, this explanation makes it difficult for exponents to continue to emphasize competitive fairness, given diverse other risks of domination, and to other values, in markets. (shrink)

The main goal of this thesis is to provide a clear basis for the analysis of alternative currencies, such as Bitcoin, LETS, Local currencies, the WIR or Carbon currencies. It attempts to determine whether alternative currencies might constitute just and workable alternatives, either in the form of small-scale experiments or in the form of more radical reforms. The first chapter proposes a new way to classify currencies. The second examines the case in favour of monetary plurality. The third analyses the (...) claims in favour of restricting the use of money locally, within a community, or to certain goods. The fourth studies the link between money and the market. Finally, a post-scriptum focuses on Bitcoin and cryptocurrencies. This thesis highlights that these currencies are drivers of several potential conflicts. Their widespread use might conflict with the adequate management of monetary policy, with social justice, and with liberal values. These conflicts are potential, for they would come into existence only if alternative currencies increased in scope. However, there is no reason to disregard potential conflicts when the case in their favour relies mostly on their potential benefits. (shrink)

Drawing on empirical evidence in medicine, economics, law, and anthropology, I argue that a market is uniquely capable of meeting the demand for transplantable kidneys, and that it may be arranged so as to operate safely. The welfare gains, expected to accrue to both vendors and recipients, are sufficient to justify sales. Having spelled out the considerations recommending a kidney market, I address the most forceful objections facing the proposal. Despite its currency, the claim that incentives will crowd out altruistic (...) donors and result in a decrease in supply is empirically unsupported and predicated on an implausible view of donorsâ motives. A host of objections claim vendorsâ will not give informed consent. Many such objections identify easily remediable problems, or impose unreasonable standards â standards that would rule out morally permissible kidney donation. And all presuppose a model of morally transformative consent that, I argue, is deficient. Two further challenges point to harms inflicted on those who do not participate in the market. Some claim that those in poverty will be subject to harmful social and legal pressure to vend. This objection fails to distinguish between being pressured to perform a specific act, and being under general economic pressure and having the option to perform an act. It, moreover, presupposes vending more common than is possible. Others worry that the market will give rise to unfair pecuniary externalities. This objection also presupposes that kidney sales will occur more often than is possible. But more importantly, the normative consideration that is supposed to make such externalities especially objectionable, in fact, recommends allowing sales. I also make a political case for kidney sales. I offer an account of the stateâs proper role in the market. I begin with a conception of democratic equality according to which the state is responsible to secure for its citizens the preconditions for democratic participation. I then show that this end would be promoted were the state to end the current prohibition on sales. (shrink)

En este artículo critico una dicotomía con la que se zanjan muchos debates sobre la libertad de expresión y de estrategia político-cultural: reclamando la necesidad de “más expresión” porque su única alternativa es la censura. Propongo que tras este argumento se encuentra la intuición de que para contrarrestar la dominación hay que garantizar que se pueda “salir” de ella. Una razón del éxito de esta intuición en los ámbitos de la libertad de expresión y la cultura es que la mejora (...) tecnológica en las comunicaciones respalda un presupuesto de superabundancia que ignora la economía política de la esfera pública. Concluyo indicando por qué los proyectos contrahegemónicos o contraculturales deberían cuidarse de no reproducir acríticamente esta perspectiva. (shrink)

The question of church-state separation has haunted America since her founding. James Madison and select founding fathers suggest that religions and states are better off when they minimize (or altogether eliminate) their interactions. Many Muslims in Iran, for instance, believe the opposite – aligning state functions with religious motives results in the most effective state. In this paper, I propose a model of thinking about church-state separation in which states and religions must maintain epistemic vulnerability to allow legal, political, and (...) socio-religious change. Simply put, epistemic vulnerability is an attitude of susceptibility to new sources and instances of knowledge. I present institutions as sets of constraints which interact with shared mental models. In this way, I explain how cultural institutions limit and shape individuals’ susceptibility to new knowledge. The more accommodating a religion is to self-assessment when confronted with new knowledge aids in forming institutions that are reliable, efficient, and robust for groups to grow and adopt new ideas. This results in a model of state-religion that highlights the impact on epistemic vulnerability when either religious organizations or state governance expand their responsibilities outside of their proper functions. (shrink)

This essay examines three potential arguments against high-frequency trading and offers a qualified critique of the practice. In concrete terms, it examines a variant of high-frequency trading that is all about speed—low-latency trading—in light of moral issues surrounding arbitrage, information asymmetries, and systemic risk. The essay focuses on low-latency trading and the role of speed because it also aims to show that the commonly made assumption that speed in financial markets is morally neutral is wrong. For instance, speed is a (...) necessary condition for low-latency trading’s potential to cause harm in “flash crashes.” On the other hand, it also plays a crucial role in a Lockean defense against low-latency trading being wasteful developed in this essay. Finally, this essay discusses the implications of these findings for related high-frequency trading techniques like futures arbitrage or latency arbitrage—as well as for an argument as to why quote stuffing is wrong. Overall, the qualifications offered in this essay act as a counterbalance to overblown claims about trading at high speeds being wrong. (shrink)

If money is used in a market setting, and if it fulfils its three traditional functions well, this creates normative problems. Arguably, the two most pressing problems linked to markets – inequality and corruption – are partly caused by the prevailing monetary design. Given the history of suggested monetary reforms, one might reasonably hope that, by consciously re-designing the functions of a currency, one might overcome these issues. This essay argues that there are clear moral limits to this. Because of (...) the way inequality and corruption are intertwined via money’s functions, we cannot simultaneously overcome both problems. This also means that even though these problems have monetary causes, they do not have purely monetary solutions, but need to be addressed relying on fiscal or market reform as well. (shrink)

Die globale Wirtschaftsordnung hat einen maßgeblichen Einfl uss auf die Wirtschaft einzelner Staaten und dadurch auf das Leben der meisten Menschen. Daher muss diskutiert werden, wie mit ihrem jetzigen Aufbau umzugehen ist und wie sie zukünftig gestaltet werden soll. Um diese Diskussion sinnvoll führen zu können, muss zuerst geklärt werden, wie die globale Wirtschaftsordnung ausgestaltet ist und wer die Akteure sind, die die globale Wirtschaftsordnung beeinfl ussen oder beeinfl ussen können. Wie sich zeigt, sind dies bezogen auf die vergleichsweise nur (...) schwach regulierten globalen Märkte vor allem in Institutionen eingebundene Akteure, die in der Politik sowie in Unternehmen arbeiten, aber auch Konsumenten. Um diesen Akteuren Verantwortung für sowohl die bisherigen positiven wie negativen Folgen dieser Wirtschaftsordnung als auch ihre zukünftige Gestaltung zuzuweisen, greife ich auf eine funktionalistische Verantwortungstheorie zurück. Maßgebliches, wenn auch nicht alleiniges Kriterium dieser auch konsequentialistisch, pragmatisch, instrumentell oder revisionistisch genannten Verantwortungstheorie ist dabei die Effi zienz der Zuschreibung. Daher muss vor allem die Gestaltungsmacht der einzelnen Akteure in den Blick genommen werden. Die Stärke einer solchen Verantwortungstheorie ist einerseits, dass sie weitgehend mit metaphysisch anspruchslosen Grundannahmen auskommt, andererseits, dass sie sich für den Umgang mit den relevanten Akteuren als sinnvoll erweist. Aufgrund der Komplexität der Institutionen, mit denen man es bei der globalen Wirtschaftsordnung zu tun hat, und der unterschiedlichen Akteure, die sie beeinflussen können, stößt auch diese Theorie an Grenzen. Diese Grenzen betreffen jedoch auch andere Verantwortungskonzepte. Zudem sind die spezifischen Probleme der funktionalistischen Verantwortungszuschreibungen in Zusammenhang mit Institutionen weniger gravierend. Deshalb sollte eine funktionalistische Theorie bei Verantwortungszuschreibungen für Aspekte der globalen Wirtschaftsordnung zugrunde gelegt werden. (shrink)