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  1. Infinite Lotteries, Spinners, Applicability of Hyperreals†.Emanuele Bottazzi & Mikhail G. Katz - 2021 - Philosophia Mathematica 29 (1):88-109.
    We analyze recent criticisms of the use of hyperreal probabilities as expressed by Pruss, Easwaran, Parker, and Williamson. We show that the alleged arbitrariness of hyperreal fields can be avoided by working in the Kanovei–Shelah model or in saturated models. We argue that some of the objections to hyperreal probabilities arise from hidden biases that favor Archimedean models. We discuss the advantage of the hyperreals over transferless fields with infinitesimals. In Paper II we analyze two underdetermination theorems by Pruss and (...)
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  • Fermat’s Dilemma: Why Did He Keep Mum on Infinitesimals? And the European Theological Context.Jacques Bair, Mikhail G. Katz & David Sherry - 2018 - Foundations of Science 23 (3):559-595.
    The first half of the 17th century was a time of intellectual ferment when wars of natural philosophy were echoes of religious wars, as we illustrate by a case study of an apparently innocuous mathematical technique called adequality pioneered by the honorable judge Pierre de Fermat, its relation to indivisibles, as well as to other hocus-pocus. André Weil noted that simple applications of adequality involving polynomials can be treated purely algebraically but more general problems like the cycloid curve cannot be (...)
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  • Timothy Williamson’s Coin-Flipping Argument: Refuted Prior to Publication?Colin Howson - 2019 - Erkenntnis 86 (3):575-583.
    In a well-known paper, Timothy Williamson claimed to prove with a coin-flipping example that infinitesimal-valued probabilities cannot save the principle of Regularity, because on pain of inconsistency the event ‘all tosses land heads’ must be assigned probability 0, whether the probability function is hyperreal-valued or not. A premise of Williamson’s argument is that two infinitary events in that example must be assigned the same probability because they are isomorphic. It was argued by Howson that the claim of isomorphism fails, but (...)
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