Results for 'Colin Howson'

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  1. Mechanika życia społecznego. Metodologiczne podstawy Davida Hume’a teorii pieniądza.Kawalec Pawel - 2011 - Przeglad Filozoficzny - Nowa Seria 80 (4):437-448.
    C. Howson’s probabilistic logic as a comprehensive methodological account of scientific inference, which avoids Hume’s inductive skepticism, is discussed against the background of the latter’s quantitative theory of money. Hume’s theory leads to two causal accounts that may appear to be contradictory. As the more general one suggests neutrality of money, while the more descriptive attributes causal influence to specie-flow mechanism of money. The former is grounded by a counterfactual reasoning. The discussion of recent examples of bayesian counterfactual models (...)
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  2. Conditionalization and Belief De Se.Darren Bradley - 2010 - Dialectica 64 (2):247-250.
    Colin Howson (1995 ) offers a counter-example to the rule of conditionalization. I will argue that the counter-example doesn't hit its target. The problem is that Howson mis-describes the total evidence the agent has. In particular, Howson overlooks how the restriction that the agent learn 'E and nothing else' interacts with the de se evidence 'I have learnt E'.
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  3.  75
    O Argumento do Milagre comete a Falácia da Taxa-base? Apresentação, Estado da Arte e Questões de Formalização.Pedro Bravo De Souza - 2018 - Intuitio 11 (1):46-64.
    Objetivamos discutir a crítica, avançada por Colin Howson em Hume's problem, segundo a qual o argumento do milagre (doravante, AM) comete a falácia da taxa-base. Por falácia da taxa-base, entende-se a negligência do valor da probabilidade prévia de determinada hipótese ou teoria T, P(T). Por sua vez, em uma de suas versões, AM assere que apenas assumindo que uma teoria científica madura T é aproximadamente verdadeira não faz de seu sucesso preditivo um milagre. Formalizado probabilisticamente, Howson argumenta (...)
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  4.  99
    Critical Notice of Colin Klein's What The Body Commands: The Imperative Theory of Pain (MIT 2015) [Book Review]. [REVIEW]Aydede Murat - manuscript
    This is a slightly more polished version of a presentation I wrote for the Author-Meets-Critics session on Colin's book at the Eastern APA session on Jan 4, 2017, in Baltimore. I’ve decided to post this commentary online pretty much as is -- I am afraid I don't have time to prepare a version suitable for publication. I hope the reader will find it helpful. At any rate, please treat this piece as a rough draft originally intended to be delivered (...)
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  5. A Critique of Colin McGinn's Human Cognition Theory.John Altmann - manuscript
    This is a brief essay discussing Colin McGinn's theory of human cognition. Mcginn believes that the more profound Metaphysical problems such as the mind-body problem, are unsolvable due to the limitations of our cognitive abilities. I argue that the solutions to these problems lies not in the strength of our cognitive abilities but rather in how we apply these abilities.
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  6. The Phenomenology of Ritual Resistance: Colin Kaepernick as Confucian Sage.Philip J. Walsh - forthcoming - Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy.
    In 2016, Colin Kaepernick, a quarterback for the San Francisco 49ers, remained seated during the national anthem in order to protest racial injustice and police brutality against African-Americans. After consulting with National Football League (NFL) and military veteran Nate Boyer, Kaepernick switched to taking a knee during the anthem for the remainder of the season. Several NFL players and other professional athletes subsequently adopted this gesture. This paper brings together complementary Confucian and phenomenological analyses to elucidate the significance of (...)
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  7. Minds Sans Miracles: Colin McGinn's Naturalized Mysterianism.Robert K. Garcia - 2000 - Philosophia Christi 2 (2):227-242.
    In this paper, I discuss Colin McGinn’s claim that the mind is not miraculous but merely mysterious, and that this mystery is due to the limits of our cognitive faculties. To adequately present the flow and unity of McGinn’s overall argument, I offer an extended and uninterrupted précis of his case, followed by a critique. I will argue that McGinn’s argument is unsuccessful if it is intended to persuade non-naturalists, but nevertheless may be a plausible position for a naturalist, (...)
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  8. A Review Of Colin Mcginn's Mindsight. [REVIEW]Casey Woodling - 2005 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 11.
    Anyone who has been around analytic philosophy the past 20 years knows that consciousness is in. These days much effort is spent playing whack-a-dualist. It seems that anyone who is anyone has written a book on the metaphysics of mind. Colin McGinn's new book marks a refreshing departure from this trend. Mindsight: Image, Dream, Meaning discusses the role imagination plays in the way we represent the world; the role it plays in dreams and some mental illnesses; and the fundamental (...)
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  9.  79
    What the Body Commands, by Colin Klein. [REVIEW]David Bain - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy (1):1-4.
    In various papers, Colin Klein has argued that pain experiences are commands. This monograph goes well beyond the papers, re-shaping his ‘imperativist’ view, setting it within a general account of ‘homeostatic sensations’, presenting new arguments, and criticising alternatives. Original, empirically informed, clear, and often persuasive, it is a lovely book.
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  10.  28
    Compassionate Moral Realism, Written by Colin Marshall. [REVIEW]Joshua Blanchard - forthcoming - Journal of Moral Philosophy.
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  11. Colin Wilson As Hydra.Vaughan Rapatahana - 2011 - Philosophy Now 85:21-23.
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  12.  85
    Reply to Colin Marshall and Martin Lin.Yitzhak Melamed - 2013 - The Leibniz Review 23:207-222.
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  13.  85
    Review of Colin Lyas, Aesthetics (The Fundamentals of Philosophy), London; University College London Press, 1997. [REVIEW]Jennifer A. McMahon - 1998 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (4):647-649..
    The aim of this book is to promote understanding and enjoyment of the arts. With this aim in mind, Lyas introduces the key issues of philosophical aesthetics through examples drawn from high and popular culture, and from a variety of art forms, from music and painting to literature and poetry. The book is pitched as a springboard into undergraduate courses in aesthetics and as an introduction to philosophical aesthetics for the general reader. It is refreshing to read a book on (...)
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  14.  39
    Colin McGinn, The Character of Mind. [REVIEW]Karl Pfeifer - 1984 - Philosophy in Review 4 (6):278-280.
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  15. What Is a Cognitive System?Robert D. Rupert - forthcoming - Cognitive Semantics 5.
    A theory of cognitive systems individuation is presented and defended. The approach has some affinity with Leonard Talmy's Overlapping Systems Model of Cognitive Organization, and the paper's first section explores aspects of Talmy's view that are shared by the view developed herein. According to the view on offer -- the conditional probability of co-contribution account (CPC) -- a cognitive system is a collection of mechanisms that contribute, in overlapping subsets, to a wide variety of forms of intelligent behavior. Central to (...)
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  16. First-Order Logic and Some Existential Sentences.Stephen K. McLeod - 2011 - Disputatio 4 (31):255-270.
    ‘Quantified pure existentials’ are sentences (e.g., ‘Some things do not exist’) which meet these conditions: (i) the verb EXIST is contained in, and is, apart from quantificational BE, the only full (as against auxiliary) verb in the sentence; (ii) no (other) logical predicate features in the sentence; (iii) no name or other sub-sentential referring expression features in the sentence; (iv) the sentence contains a quantifier that is not an occurrence of EXIST. Colin McGinn and Rod Girle have alleged that (...)
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  17.  48
    Comment: Kolnai's Disgust.Carolyn Korsmeyer & Barry Smith - 2014 - Emotion Review 6 (3):219-220.
    In his The Meaning of Disgust, Colin McGinn employs elements of the phenomenological theory of disgust advanced by Aurel Kolnai in 1929. Kolnai’s treatment of what he calls “material” disgust and of its primary elicitors—putrefying organic matter, bodily wastes and secretions, sticky contaminants, vermin—anticipates more recent scientific treatments of this emotion as a mode of protective recoil. While Nina Strohminger charges McGinn with neglecting such scientific studies, we here attempt to show how Kolnai goes beyond experimental findings in his (...)
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  18.  26
    Interrogating Healthy Conflict.Ebrahim Moosa - 2020 - Journal of Religious Ethics 48 (2):289-298.
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  19. Is the Paradox of Fiction Soluble in Psychology?Florian Cova & Fabrice Teroni - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (6):930-942.
    If feeling a genuine emotion requires believing that its object actually exists, and if this is a belief we are unlikely to have about fictional entities, then how could we feel genuine emotions towards these entities? This question lies at the core of the paradox of fiction. Since its original formulation, this paradox has generated a substantial literature. Until recently, the dominant strategy had consisted in trying to solve it. Yet, it is more and more frequent for scholars to try (...)
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  20.  33
    Healthy Conflict in an Era of Intractability: Reply to Four Critical Responses.Jason A. Springs - 2020 - Journal of Religious Ethics 48 (2):316-341.
    This essay responds to four critical essays by Rosemary Kellison, Ebrahim Moosa, Joseph Winters, and Martin Kavka on the author’s recent book, Healthy Conflict in Contemporary American Society: From Enemy to Adversary (Cambridge, 2018). Parts I and II work in tandem to further develop my accounts of strategic empathy and agonistic political friendship. I defend against criticisms that my argument for moral imagination obligates oppressed people to empathize with their oppressors. I argue, further, that healthy conflict can be motivated by (...)
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  21. Against McGinn's Mysterianism.Erhan Demircioglu - 2016 - Cilicia Journal of Philosophy 3 (1):1-10.
    There are two claims that are central to McGinn’s mysterianism: (1) there is a naturalist and constructive solution of the mind-body problem, and (2) we human beings are incapable in principle of solving the mind-body problem. I believe (1) and (2) are compatible: the truth of one does not entail the falsity of the other. However, I will argue that the reasons McGinn presents for thinking that (2) is true are incompatible with the truth of (1), at least on a (...)
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  22. A Libertarian Response to Macleod 2012: “If You’Re a Libertarian, How Come You’Re So Rich?”.J. C. Lester - 2014 - In Explaining Libertarianism: Some Philosophical Arguments. Buckingham, England: The University of Buckingham Press. pp. 95-105.
    This is a response to Macleod 2012's argument that the history of unjust property acquisitions requires rich libertarians to give away everything in excess of equality. At first, problematic questions are raised. How much property is usually inherited or illegitimate? Why should legitimate inheritance be affected? What of the burden of proof and court cases? A counterfactual problem is addressed. Three important cases are considered: great earned wealth; American slavery; land usurpation. All are argued to be problematic for Macleod 2012's (...)
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  23. Kripke's Second Paragraph of Philosophical Investigations 201.Samuel Weir - 2007 - Philosophical Investigations 30 (2):172–178.
    The received view of Kripke's Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language is that it fails as an interpretation because, inter alia, it ignores or overlooks what Wittgenstein has to say in the second paragraph of Philosophical Investigations 201. In this paper, I demonstrate that the paragraph in question is in fact fully accommodated within Kripke's reading, and cannot therefore be reasonably utilised to object to it. -/- In part one I characterise the objection; in part two I explain why it (...)
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  24. Justified Believing:Avoiding the Paradox.Gregory W. Dawes - 2012 - In James Maclaurin (ed.), Rationis Defensor: Essays in Honour of Colin Cheyne. Springer.
    Colin Cheyne has argued that under certain circumstances an internalist or deontological theory of epistemic justification will give rise to a paradox. The paradox, he argues, arises when a principle of epistemic justification is both justifiably believed (in terms of the theory) and false. To avoid this paradox, Cheyne recommends abandoning the principle of justification-transference, which states that acts of believing made on the basis of a justifiably-believed principle are themselves justified. Since such a principle seems essential to any (...)
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  25.  78
    Explicaciones "racionalistas" de la autoridad de la primera persona.Martin Francisco Fricke - 2010 - In Jaime Labastida & Violeta Aréchiga (eds.), Identidad y diferencia. Vol. 3: La filosofía y la ciencia. México, D.F.: Siglo XXI and Asociación Filosófica de México. pp. 211-226.
    Conocemos la propia mente mejor que la mente de otras personas. Explicaciones racionalistas dicen que este fenómeno se debe a nuestra racionalidad: Somos capaces de ajustar nuestras creencias e intenciones racionalmente en vista de su coherencia o de nueva evidencia y tal ajuste requiere que conozcamos nuestras creencias e intenciones con la autoridad de la primera persona. Examino pasajes de McGinn, Shoemaker y Burge, criticando el argumento en tres puntos: (1) Es posible pensar racionalmente sin autoconocimiento. (2) Los requerimientos racionalistas (...)
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  26. Review of McGinn *Ethics, Evil, and Fiction*. [REVIEW]Adam Morton - 1998 - The Times Literary Supplement (4946):28-29.
    I try to distinguish McGinn's separation of evil from mere wrong from his aesthetic theory of morality. I argue that the combination is dangeroous.
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  27. Conspicuous Confusion? A Critique of Veblen's Theory of Conspicuous Consumption.Colin Campbell - 1995 - Sociological Theory 13 (1):37-47.
    Veblen's concept of conspicuous consumption, although widely known and commonly invoked, has rarely been examined critically; the associated "theory" has never been tested. It is suggested that the reason for this lies in the difficulty of determining the criterion that defines the phenomenon, a difficulty that derives from Veblen's failure to integrate two contrasting conceptual formulations. These are, first, an interpretive or subjective version that conceives of conspicuous consumption as action marked by the presence of certain intentions, purposes, or motives, (...)
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  28. Technologically scaffolded atypical cognition: The case of YouTube’s recommender system.Mark Alfano, Amir Ebrahimi Fard, J. Adam Carter, Peter Clutton & Colin Klein - 2020 - Synthese:1-24.
    YouTube has been implicated in the transformation of users into extremists and conspiracy theorists. The alleged mechanism for this radicalizing process is YouTube’s recommender system, which is optimized to amplify and promote clips that users are likely to watch through to the end. YouTube optimizes for watch-through for economic reasons: people who watch a video through to the end are likely to then watch the next recommended video as well, which means that more advertisements can be served to them. This (...)
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  29. Kant on Perceptual Content.Colin McLear - 2016 - Mind 125 (497):95-144.
    Call the idea that states of perceptual awareness have intentional content, and in virtue of that aim at or represent ways the world might be, the ‘Content View.’ I argue that though Kant is widely interpreted as endorsing the Content View there are significant problems for any such interpretation. I further argue that given the problems associated with attributing the Content View to Kant, interpreters should instead consider him as endorsing a form of acquaintance theory. Though perceptual acquaintance is controversial (...)
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  30. Two Kinds of Unity in the Critique of Pure Reason.Colin McLear - 2015 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 53 (1):79-110.
    I argue that Kant’s distinction between the cognitive roles of sensibility and understanding raises a question concerning the conditions necessary for objective representation. I distinguish two opposing interpretive positions—viz. Intellectualism and Sensibilism. According to Intellectualism all objective representation depends, at least in part, on the unifying synthetic activity of the mind. In contrast, Sensibilism argues that at least some forms of objective representation, specifically intuitions, do not require synthesis. I argue that there are deep reasons for thinking that Intellectualism is (...)
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  31.  43
    “I Am the Original of All Objects”: Apperception and the Substantial Subject.Colin McLear - 2020 - Philosophers' Imprint 20 (26):1-38.
    Kant’s conception of the centrality of intellectual self-consciousness, or “pure apperception”, for scientific knowledge of nature is well known, if still obscure. Here I argue that, for Kant, at least one central role for such self-consciousness lies in the acquisition of the content of concepts central to metaphysical theorizing. I focus on one important concept, that of <substance>. I argue that, for Kant, the representational content of the concept <substance> depends not just on the capacity for apperception, but on the (...)
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  32. Pains That Don't Hurt.David Bain - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (2):305-320.
    Pain asymbolia is a rare condition caused by brain damage, usually in adulthood. Asymbolics feel pain but appear indifferent to it, and indifferent also to visual and verbal threats. How should we make sense of this? Nikola Grahek thinks asymbolics’ pains are abnormal, lacking a component that make normal pains unpleasant and motivating. Colin Klein thinks that what is abnormal is not asymbolics’ pains, but asymbolics: they have a psychological deficit making them unresponsive to unpleasant pain. I argue that (...)
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  33. Population Engineering and the Fight Against Climate Change.Colin Hickey, Travis N. Rieder & Jake Earl - 2016 - Social Theory and Practice 42 (4):845-870.
    Contrary to political and philosophical consensus, we argue that the threats posed by climate change justify population engineering, the intentional manipulation of the size and structure of human populations. Specifically, we defend three types of policies aimed at reducing fertility rates: choice enhancement, preference adjustment, and incentivization. While few object to the first type of policy, the latter two are generally rejected because of their potential for coercion or morally objectionable manipulation. We argue that forms of each policy type are (...)
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  34. On the Transcendental Freedom of the Intellect.Colin McLear - 2020 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 7 (2):35-104.
    Kant holds that the applicability of the moral ‘ought’ depends on a kind of agent-causal freedom that is incompatible with the deterministic structure of phenomenal nature. I argue that Kant understands this determinism to threaten not just morality but the very possibility of our status as rational beings. Rational beings exemplify “cognitive control” in all of their actions, including not just rational willing and the formation of doxastic attitudes, but also more basic cognitive acts such as judging, conceptualizing, and synthesizing.
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  35. Schopenhauer on the Content of Compassion.Colin Marshall - forthcoming - Noûs.
    On the traditional reading, Schopenhauer claims that compassion is the recognition of deep metaphysical unity. In this paper, I defend and develop the traditional reading. I begin by addressing three recent criticisms of the reading from Sandra Shapshay: that it fails to accommodate Schopenhauer's restriction to sentient beings, that it cannot explain his moral ranking of egoism over malice, and that Schopenhauer requires some level of distinction to remain in compassion. Against Shapshay, I argue that Schopenhauer does not restrict compassion (...)
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  36. Trust in a Social and Digital World.Mark Alfano & Colin Klein - 2019 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 1 (8):1-8.
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  37. Kant and Spinoza.Colin Marshall - forthcoming - In Yitzhak Melamed (ed.), Blackwell Companion to Spinoza. New York: Blackwell.
    In this chapter, I explore the connections between Spinoza’s philosophy and Immanuel Kant's. I begin by considering whether Kant engaged with Spinoza's actual views, and conclude that he did not. Despite that, I argue that there some philosophically-striking points of near-convergence between them. In addition to both privileging substance monism over other traditional metaphysical views, both Spinoza and Kant advance arguments for (a) epistemic humility based on the passivity of our senses and for (a) the timelessness of the mind based (...)
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  38.  55
    The Most Dangerous Error: Malebranche on the Experience of Causation.Colin Chamberlain - forthcoming - Philosophers' Imprint.
    Do the senses represent causation? Many commentators read Malebranche as anticipating Hume’s negative answer to this question. I disagree with this assessment. When a yellow billiard ball strikes a red billiard ball, Malebranche holds that we see the yellow ball as causing the red ball to move. Given Malebranche’s occasionalism, he insists that the visual experience of causal interaction is illusory. Nevertheless, Malebranche holds that the senses (mis)represent finite things as causally efficacious. This experience of creaturely causality does important explanatory (...)
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  39. Rorty’s Linguistic Turn: Why (More Than) Language Matters to Philosophy.Colin Koopman - 2011 - Contemporary Pragmatism 8 (1):61-84.
    The linguistic turn is a central aspect of Richard Rorty’s philosophy, informing his early critiques of foundationalism in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature and subsequent critiques of authoritarianism in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. It is argued that we should interpret the linguistic turn as a methodological suggestion for how philosophy can take a non-foundational perspective on normativity. It is then argued that although Rorty did not succeed in explicating normativity without foundations (or authority without authoritarianism), we should take seriously (...)
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  40. The Kantian (Non)‐Conceptualism Debate.Colin McLear - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (11):769-790.
    One of the central debates in contemporary Kant scholarship concerns whether Kant endorses a “conceptualist” account of the nature of sensory experience. Understanding the debate is crucial for getting a full grasp of Kant's theory of mind, cognition, perception, and epistemology. This paper situates the debate in the context of Kant's broader theory of cognition and surveys some of the major arguments for conceptualist and non-conceptualist interpretations of his critical philosophy.
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  41. Putting Foucault to Work: Analytic and Concept in Foucaultian Inquiry.Colin Koopman & Tomas Matza - 2013 - Critical Inquiry 39 (4):817-840.
    The forceful impact of Michel Foucault’s work in the humanities and social sciences is apparent from the sheer abundance of its uses, appropriations, and refigurations. This article calls for greater self-conscious reflexivity about the relationship between our uses of Foucault and the opportunities afforded by his work. We argue for a clearer distinction between analytics and concepts in Foucault-inspired work. In so doing we draw on key moments of methodological self-reflection in Foucault’s Collège de France lectures and elsewhere. This distinction (...)
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  42. Negative Truths From Positive Facts.Colin Cheyne & Charles Pigden - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (2):249 – 265.
    According to the truthmaker theory that we favour, all contingent truths are made true by existing facts or states of affairs. But if that is so, then it appears that we must accept the existence of the negative facts that are required to make negative truths (such as 'There is no hippopotamus in the room.') true. We deny the existence of negative facts, show how negative truths are made true by positive facts, point out where the (reluctant) advocates of negative (...)
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  43. Does Kant Demand Explanations for All Synthetic A Priori Claims?Colin Marshall - 2014 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 52 (3):549-576.
    Kant's philosophy promises to explain various synthetic a priori claims. Yet, as several of his commentators have noted, it is hard to see how these explanations could work unless they themselves rested on unexplained synthetic a priori claims. Since Kant appears to demand explanations for all synthetic a priori claims, it would seem that his project fails on its own terms. I argue, however, that Kant holds that explanations are required only for synthetic a priori claims about (purportedly) experience-independent entities, (...)
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  44. Color in a Material World: Margaret Cavendish Against the Early Modern Mechanists.Colin Chamberlain - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (3):293-336.
    Consider the distinctive qualitative property grass visually appears to have when it visually appears to be green. This property is an example of what I call sensuous color. Whereas early modern mechanists typically argue that bodies are not sensuously colored, Margaret Cavendish disagrees. In cases of veridical perception, she holds that grass is green in precisely the way it visually appears to be. In defense of her realist approach to sensuous colors, Cavendish argues that it is impossible to conceive of (...)
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  45.  76
    Fellow Creatures, by Christine Korsgaard. Oxford University Press, 2018. ISBN 0198753853. 272 Pp. $24.95. [REVIEW]Colin McLear - 2020 - European Journal of Philosophy 28 (1):258-262.
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  46. The Imperative View of Pain.David Bain - 2011 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (9-10):164-85.
    Pain, crucially, is unpleasant and motivational. It can be awful; and it drives us to action, e.g. to take our weight off a sprained ankle. But what is the relationship between pain and those two features? And in virtue of what does pain have them? Addressing these questions, Colin Klein and Richard J. Hall have recently developed the idea that pains are, at least partly, experiential commands—to stop placing your weight on your ankle, for example. In this paper, I (...)
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  47. Kant's Appearances and Things in Themselves as Qua‐Objects.Colin Marshall - 2013 - Philosophical Quarterly 63 (252):520-545.
    The one-world interpretation of Kant's idealism holds that appearances and things in themselves are, in some sense, the same things. Yet this reading faces a number of problems, all arising from the different features Kant seems to assign to appearances and things in themselves. I propose a new way of understanding the appearance/thing in itself distinction via an Aristotelian notion that I call, following Kit Fine, a ‘qua-object.’ Understanding appearances and things in themselves as qua-objects provides a clear sense in (...)
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  48. Pain and Spatial Inclusion: Evidence From Mandarin.Michelle Liu & Colin Klein - 2020 - Analysis 80 (2):262-272.
    The surface grammar of reports such as ‘I have a pain in my leg’ suggests that pains are objects which are spatially located in parts of the body. We show that the parallel construction is not available in Mandarin. Further, four philosophically important grammatical features of such reports cannot be reproduced. This suggests that arguments and puzzles surrounding such reports may be tracking artefacts of English, rather than philosophically significant features of the world.
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  49. Pain Signals Are Predominantly Imperative.Manolo Martínez & Colin Klein - 2016 - Biology and Philosophy 31 (2):283-298.
    Recent work on signaling has mostly focused on communication between organisms. The Lewis–Skyrms framework should be equally applicable to intra-organismic signaling. We present a Lewis–Skyrms signaling-game model of painful signaling, and use it to argue that the content of pain is predominantly imperative. We address several objections to the account, concluding that our model gives a productive framework within which to consider internal signaling.
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  50. Cognitive Ontology in Flux: The Possibility of Protean Brains.Daniel D. Hutto, Anco Peeters & Miguel Segundo-Ortin - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (2):209-223.
    This paper motivates taking seriously the possibility that brains are basically protean: that they make use of neural structures in inventive, on-the-fly improvisations to suit circumstance and context. Accordingly, we should not always expect cognition to divide into functionally stable neural parts and pieces. We begin by reviewing recent work in cognitive ontology that highlights the inadequacy of traditional neuroscientific approaches when it comes to divining the function and structure of cognition. Cathy J. Price and Karl J. Friston, and (...) Klein identify the limitations of relying on forward and reverse inferences to cast light on the relation between cognitive functions and neural structures. There is reason to prefer Klein’s approach to that of Price and Friston’s. But Klein’s approach is neurocentric - it assumes that we ought to look solely at neural contexts to fix cognitive ontology. Using recent work on mindreading as a case study, we motivate adopting a radically different approach to cognitive ontology. Promoting the Protean Brain Hypothesis, we posit the possibility that we may need to look beyond the brain when deciding which functions are being performed in acts of cognition and in understanding how the brain contributes to such acts by adapting to circumstance. (shrink)
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