Blaise Pascal is highly regarded as a religious moralist, but he has rarely been given his due as an ethical theorist. The goal of this article is to assemble Pascal's scattered thoughts on moral judgment and moral wrongdoing into an explicit, coherent account that can serve as the basis for further scholarly reflection on his ethics. On my reading, Pascal affirms an axiological, social-intuitionist account of moral judgment and moral wrongdoing. He argues that a moral judgment is an immediate, intuitive (...) perception of moral value that we willfully disregard in favor of the attractive, though self-deceptive, deliverances of our socially constructed imaginations. We can deceive ourselves so easily because our capacity to evaluate goods is broken, a dark legacy of the fall. In the article's concluding section, I briefly compare Pascal to contemporary ethicists and suggest directions for future research. (shrink)

This article investigates the similarities between the ethics and theology of Blaise Pascal and Stanley Hauerwas regarding natural law, original sin and witness, in order to support Pascal as an important thinker for Christian ethics. It argues that Pascal’s theological anthropology is an important contribution to Hauerwas’ ethics by elucidating less clear dimensions of his thought, such as how it is that witness ought to proceed and might be effective despite human sinfulness, and the relation between human corruption and a (...) rejection of natural law. This also serves to support the argument that Pascal is an important figure for Christian ethics, despite being largely neglected. (shrink)