Scholarship on the philosophy of the Late Middle Ages has tended to overlook certain subject matters, especially some pertaining to ethics and political philosophy. My object of study in this paper is one of these overlooked notions, the idea of craft (ars) as an intellectual virtue. While recent publications have focused on sapientia and scientia, this paper aims to rehabilitate ars as a virtue, in particular John Buridan’s understanding of craft as an intellectual virtue in his Quaestiones super decem libros (...) Ethicorum Aristotelis ad Nicomachum. My goal is to examine Buridan’s analysis of craft as expounded in this commentary. Once the Picardian master’s theses have been presented, and the objections he raises have been reviewed along with the solutions proposed to those objections, I briefly suggest why craft might have been overlooked as a virtue. (shrink)

In this chapter we first discuss the main principles of justice and note the standard objections to them, which we believe necessitate a hybrid approach. The hybrid account we defend is primarily based on the distributive principle of sufficientarianism, which we interpret as the idea that each country should have the means to provide a minimally decent quality of life for each of its citizens. We argue that sufficientarian considerations give good reason to think that what we call the ‘ability (...) to pay objection’ should be taken much more seriously in this debate. Following this, our account emphasises what we believe are the two most important moral desiderata in any attempt to distribute responsibility for dealing with climate change: the ability to mitigate the problem and the making of culpable contributions to the problem. After noting that our proposal includes enough detail to be a useful start for policy makers, we defend our account against some potential objections. (shrink)

The concept of wisdom is largely ignored by contemporary philosophers. But given recent movements in the fields of ethics and epistemology, the time is ripe for a return to this concept. This article lays some groundwork for further philosophical work in ethics and epistemology on wisdom. Its focus is the distinction between practical wisdom and theoretical wisdom or between phronesis and sophia . Several accounts of this distinction are considered and rejected. A more plausible, but also considerably more complex, account (...) is offered. The discussion sheds light on the relation between practical wisdom and theoretical wisdom, and on the positive character of each. (shrink)

This book promotes the research of present-day women working in ancient and medieval philosophy, with more than 60 women having contributed in some way to the volume in a fruitful collaboration. It contains 22 papers organized into ten distinct parts spanning the sixth century BCE to the fifteenth century CE. Each part has the same structure: it features, first, a paper which sets up the discussion, and then, one or two responses that open new perspectives and engage in further reflections. (...) Our authors’ contributions address pivotal moments and players in the history of philosophy: women philosophers in antiquity, Cleobulina of Rhodes, Plato, Lucretius, Bardaisan of Edessa, Alexander of Aphrodisias, Plotinus, Porphyry, Peter Abelard, Robert Kilwardby, William Ockham, John Buridan, and Isotta Nogarola. The result is a thought-provoking collection of papers that will be of interest to historians of philosophy from all horizons. Far from being an isolated effort, this book is a contribution to the ever-growing number of initiatives which endeavour to showcase the work of women in philosophy. (shrink)

Christine de Pizan da vida a su gobernante ideal a partir de la tradición medieval del aristotelismo político y su noción de lo “arquitectónico”. Construido a modo de una arquitectura viviente de ciencias, el rey sabio aparece dominando la paleta de saberes, que va desde la episteme hasta los conocimientos más prácticos. Teoría y práctica se encuentran, así, en la base de su construcción de lo político. Pero ¿en qué medida la autora se consagra a brindar una explicación del pasaje (...) de las ciencias, sobre todo, aquel que va de las especulativas al registro práctico de la ciencia política? Si el rey se distingue por ser un sabio al tiempo que un experto en las diversas ciencias, cabe preguntarse si acaso la autora teoriza sobre dicho pasaje de lo teórico a lo práctico que constituye la esencia de su pensamiento. ¿Cuál es el canal para volcar la episteme al servicio del Estado? Al respecto, sostengo la hipótesis de que tanto la prudencia como el entendimiento o intelecto parecen ser los dos componentes de la sabiduría perfecta que la escritora aúna en una perfecta díada; operación, esta, que le permite explicar el pasaje de todas las ciencias al plano de lo contingente. ¿Acaso no es, gracias a esta operación, que el rey sabio de Christine de Pizan aparece como el intelecto supremo de la comunidad política, encarnada en el reino de Francia? ¿No son las ciencias, de este modo, redituables en servicio del Estado? (shrink)