Proof-theoretic semantics is an alternative to model-theoretic semantics. It aims at explaining the meaning of the logical constants in terms of the inference rules that govern their behaviour in proofs. We argue that this must be construed as the task of explaining these meanings relative to a logic, i.e., to a consequence relation. Alas, there is no agreed set of properties that a relation must have in order to qualify as a consequence relation. Moreover, the association of a consequence relation (...) to a logical calculus is not as straightforward as it may seem. We show that these facts are problematic for the proof-theoretic project but the problems can be solved. Our thesis is that the consequence relation relevant for proof-theoretic semantics is the one given by the sequent-to-sequent derivability relation in Gentzen systems. (shrink)

Proof-theoretic semantics is an alternative to model-theoretic semantics. It aims at explaining the meaning of the logical constants in terms of the inference rules that govern their behaviour in proofs. We argue that this must be construed as the task of explaining these meanings relative to a logic, i.e., to a consequence relation. Alas, there is no agreed set of properties that a relation must have in order to qualify as a consequence relation. Moreover, the association of a consequence relation (...) to a logical calculus is not as straightforward as it may seem. We show that these facts are problematic for the proof-theoretic project but the problems can be solved. Our thesis is that the consequence relation relevant for proof-theoretic semantics is the one given by the sequent-to-sequent derivability relation in Gentzen systems. (shrink)

Paraconsistent quantum logic, a hybrid of minimal quantum logic and paraconsistent four-valued logic, is introduced as Gentzen-type sequent calculi, and the cut-elimination theorems for these calculi are proved. This logic is shown to be decidable through the use of these calculi. A first-order extension of this logic is also shown to be decidable. The relationship between minimal quantum logic and paraconsistent four-valued logic is clarified, and a survey of existing Gentzen-type sequent calculi for these logics and their close relatives is (...) addressed. (shrink)

In the recent literature on proof-theoretic semantics, there is mention of a generality condition on defining rules. According to this condition, the schematic formulation of the defining rules must be maximally general, in the sense that no restrictions should be placed on the contexts of these rules. In particular, context variables must always be present in the schematic rules and they should range over arbitrary collections of formulae. I argue against imposing such a condition, by showing that it has undesirable (...) results and that it is ill-supported by the arguments brought in its favour. (shrink)

By weakening an inference rule satisfied by logic daC, we define a new paraconsistent logic, which is weaker than logic \ and G′ 3, enjoys properties presented in daC like the substitution theorem, and possesses a strong negation which makes it suitable to express intutionism. Besides, daC ' helps to understand the relationships among other logics, in particular daC, \ and PH1.