In ‘The Presuppositions of Religious Pluralism and the Need for Natural Theology’ I argue that there are four important presuppositions behind John Hick’s form of religious pluralism that successfully support it against what I call fideistic exclusivism. These are i) the ought/can principle, ii) the universality of religious experience, iii) the universality of redemptive change, and iv) a view of how God (the Eternal) would do things. I then argue that if these are more fully developed they support a different (...) kind of exclusivism, what I call rational exclusivism, and become defeaters for pluralism. In order to explain rational exclusivism and its dependence on these presuppositions I consider philosophers J.P. Moreland, William Lane Craig, and Alvin Plantinga, who offer arguments for their forms of exclusivism but I maintain that they continue to rely on fideism at important points. I then give an example of how knowledge of the Eternal can be achieved. (shrink)

The paper questions the scientific rather than ideological problem of an eventual biological successor of the mankind. The concept of superhumans is usually linked to Nietzsche or to Heidegger’s criticism or even to the ideology of Nazism. However, the superhuman can be also viewed as that biological species who will originate from humans eventually in the course of evolution.While the society is reached a natural limitation of globalism, technics depends on the amount of utilized energy, and the mind is restricted (...) by its carrier, i.e. by the brain, it is language which seems to be the frontier of any future development of humans or superhumans. Language is a symbolization of the world and thus doubling in an ideal or virtual world fruitful for creativity and the modeling of the former. Consequently, the gap between the material and the ideal world is both produced by and productive for language. (shrink)

The central thesis of the philosophy of Advaita Vedānta is the doctrine of the identity of brahman and ātman. Brahman is essentially sat, being as such in the sense of the dimension of existence in which all worldly goings-on take place. The ātman is conceived as the “seer,” i.e., as the pure subject qua the to-whom of any experiential givenness; and this subject, in turn, is understood not as some entity that performs the seeing but as nothing but the very (...) seeing itself, i.e., as consciousness in the sense of the abiding presence-realm in which permanently changing experiential contents come to givenness. The Advaitic thesis is that this presence-realm—the seeing that takes place “in us”—is ultimately nothing other than the universal being-dimension—brahman—itself, modified by the mental contents of an innerworldly individual. This paper attempts to vindicate this doctrine by a series of reflections on the nature of the I and of reality as such. It argues that Advaita Vedānta can be viewed as a version of cosmopsychism in its idealist version which does not view consciousness as one of the features of the cosmos as a whole, but as its exclusive intrinsic nature, i.e., as the very essence of being as such. (shrink)

For Advaita Vedānta, consciousness is to be distinguished from all contents of consciousness that might be introspectively detectable: It is precisely consciousness of whatever contents it is conscious of and not itself one of these contents. Its only nature is, Advaita holds, prakāśa ; in itself it is devoid of any content or structure and can never become an object. This paper elaborates on this kind of understanding of consciousness in order to next explain why it might be fruitful for (...) developing a clear understanding of the nature of the so-called problem of consciousness. Today’s philosophy of mind tends to conceive of consciousness in terms of qualia, thereby taking it as a special kind of object. This renders the antimaterialist claim of the distinctness of consciousness from all physical features vulnerable to the materialist reply that the difference in question might be a merely epistemological matter, i.e., a matter of different modes of givenness without difference in what is thus given. This move, however – this paper argues –, is impossible without resulting in circularity or infinite regress with regard to consciousness in the sense of givenness itself. (shrink)

Unknown to most Western psychologists, ancient Indian scriptures contain very rich, empirically derived psychological theories that are, however, intertwined with religious and philosophical content. This article represents our attempt to extract the psychological theory of cognition and consciousness from a prominent ancient Indian thought system: Samkhya-Yoga. We derive rather broad hypotheses from this approach that may complement and extend Western mainstream theorizing. These hypotheses address an ancient personality theory, the effects of practicing the applied part of Samkhya-Yoga on normal and (...) extraordinary cognition, as well as different ways of perceiving reality. We summarize empirical evidence collected in diverse fields of research that allows for making judgments about the hypotheses, and suggest more specific hypotheses to be examined in future research. We conclude that the existing evidence for the hypotheses is substantial but that there are still considerable gaps in theory and research to be filled. Theories of cognition contained in the ancient Indian systems have the potential to modify and complement existing Western mainstream accounts of cognition. In particular, they might serve as a basis for arriving at more comprehensive theories for several research areas that, so far, lack strong theoretical grounding, such as meditation research or research on aspects of consciousness. (shrink)

The three major schools of Vedanta— a kara's Advaita, R m nuja's Viśi dvaita, and Madhva's Dvaita—all claim to be based on the Upanishads, but they have evolved very different views of Brahman, or the Supreme Reality, and the soul's relation to that Reality once it is liberated from rebirth, when mok a or eternal life commences. Advaita teaches that liberated souls merge into the seamless blissful Brahman, the only Reality, and finally escape their earth dreams of sin and suffering, (...) even to the point of forfeiting individuality. Both Viśi dvaita and Dvaita are resolutely realist systems and see essential differences between Brahman and souls that are never transcended, even in the world of the liberated, visualized in these systems as a glorious paradise where God (Vishnu) reigns in splendor over blissful souls devoted to Him everlastingly. But whereas Madhva sees innate differences in souls, each with a greater or lesser capacity for bliss, R m nuja sees a universal sameness in the quality and degree of bliss, even to the point of equating it with the bliss of God Himself. The author points out these and other contrasts between the three views of mok a , critiques each, then develops a view of the liberated state more satisfactory (in his view) than any of the three in a marriage of East and West. (shrink)

svabhāva (own being) and yadṛchhā (chance, accident) are named as two different claimants among others as the first cause (jagatkāraṇa) in the ŚvUp. But in later works, such as Aśvaghoṣa’s poems, svabhāva is synonymous with yadṛchhā and entails a passive attitude to life. Later still, svabhāva is said to be inhering in the Lokāyata materialist system, although in which sense—cosmic order or accident—is not always clearly mentioned. Svabhāva is also a part of the Sāṃkhya doctrine and is mentioned in the (...) medical compilations. It is proposed that the idea of svabhāva as cosmic order became a part of Lokāyata between the sixth and the eighth century ce and got widely accepted by the tenth century, so much so that in the fourteenth century Sāyaṇa-Mādhava aka Vidyāraṇya could categorically declare that the Cārvāka/Lokāyata upheld causality, not chance. But the other meaning of svabhāva, identical with yadṛchhā, continued to circulate along with kāla, time, which was originally another claimant for the title of the first cause and similarly had acquired several significations in course of time. Both significations of svabhāva continued to be employed by later writers, and came to be used in another domain, that of daiva (fate) vis-à-vis puruṣakāra (manliness or human endeavour). (shrink)

Review of Adamson, P., & Ganeri, J.. Classical Indian Philosophy: a History of Philosophy Without any Gaps. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Volume 5.

The problem of synthesis and reconciliation of the Ramanuja and Sirhindi is of vital significance and importance, and no serious student of comparative philosophy can deliberately neglect it. Epistemologically speaking, these two philosophers have been forced to tackle the same problem(s), and in solving them, their methods and hypotheses have been noticeably similar. The emphasis of this paper is to recognize, highlight, and compare the aspects valued in Ramanuja’s epistemological views with those of the Sirhindi. I will also discuss the (...) basic postulates of Ramanuja and Sirhindi’s epistemology and underline certain epistemological approaches to knowledge and justification for formulating the arguments to find out new dimensions in outlining their fundamental epistemological positions. This paper explores certain elements in the identities of these two philosophers and attempts to demonstrate a thread of continuity, especially with regard to their methods and thoughts. This paper also brings out a brief critical account of their epistemological views. (shrink)

Gunas personality framework is an inclusive and comprehensive personality framework. Every human being is composed of three gunas or fundamental elements —sattva (intelligence-stuff), rajas (energy-stuff), and tamas (mass-stuff). Some of the prior measures of gunas do not fully capture the content of this variable, and some are not suitable for contemporary use. We conceptualize gunas in terms of an individual’s attitude towards social issues and have developed a new measure of gunas. We have demonstrated the concurrent and predictive validity of (...) the measure through a study of two samples of 60 executives and 356 MBA students. We show that sattva predicts performance, rajas predicts effort, and tamas is positively related to dispositional negativity. We show how the new gunas scale is a useful tool in contemporary times. (shrink)

There are various permutations of theism: henotheism, pantheism, panentheism, a/theism, and nontheistic divinity. There is debate whether the idea of OmniGod was ever achieved in India. R. C. Zaehner argued that an evolutionary transition from pratenaturalism of the Vedas to Upaniṣad’s monism, culminated in monotheism with Purāṇas and the _Bhagavad Gītā._ I argue differently, beginning with ancient ritualistic polytheism, followed by unifying One Brahman, toward monistic panentheism and later non-dualism of _advaita_ Vedānta. Under the influence of Asaṅga, Buddhism elevated the (...) Buddha as the Great Divine Replacement. As a response or reaction, Brāhmaṇism forged Īśvara as God with the World as his Body. By 13th century, theistic dualism separated Īśvara from his _creatio._ Even Nyāya rational philosophy was persuaded by monotheism as demonstrated in their teleo-cosmological argument for the existence of Īśvara. I attribute all this to sectarian and doctrinal shifts rather than to any evolutionary teleology and/or predestined historicist movement. (shrink)

Jīvanmukti or ‘living liberation’ has been identified as a distinguishing feature of Indian thought; or, upon drawing a narrower circle, of Hindu thought; and upon drawing an even narrower cocentric circle of Vedānta—of Advaita Vedānta. In some recent studies the cogency of its formulation within Advaita Vedānta has been questioned—but without reference to the testimony of its major modern exemplar, Rama a Mahar i. This paper examines the significance of the life and statements of Rama a Mahar i for the (...) current debate in the context of neo-Hinduism. (shrink)

It has become commonplace in introductions to Indian philosophy to construe Plato’s discussion of forms (εἶδος/ἰδέα) and the treatment in Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika of universals ( sāmānya/jāti ) as addressing the same philosophical issue, albeit in somewhat different ways. While such a comparison of the similarities and differences has interest and value as an initial reconnaissance of what each says about common properties, an examination of the roles that universals play in the rest of their philosophical enquiries vitiates this commonplace. (...) This paper draws upon the primary texts to identify the following metaphysical, epistemological, semantic and soteriological roles that universals play in the philosophy of Plato and of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika: Metaphysical: causal of the existence of x Metaphysical: constitutive of the identity/essence of x Epistemological: cognitively causal (i.e. of the cognition of one over many) Epistemological: epistemically causal (i.e. of knowledge of x) Semantic: necessary condition of speech and reason Epistemological: vindicatory of induction (Nyāya only) Metaphysical: explanatory of causation (Nyāya only) Soteriological: cathartic contemplation (Plato only) These roles provide us with motivations or reasons to believe that universals exist. As we examine these motivations, we find pressures mounting against our assimilating Platonic forms and the universals of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika in the discourse about common properties. It is especially when we appreciate the utterly different contribution that universals make in securing our highest welfare that we realize how Plato and the two sister schools are not so much talking somewhat differently about the same thing, but talking somewhat similarly about different things. This better understanding of this difference in these philosophies opens a route for our better understanding of their unique contributions in the ongoing dialogue of philosophy. (shrink)

Jivanmukti or 'living liberation' has been identified as a distinguishing feature of Indian thought; or, upon drawing a narrower circle, of Hindu thought; and upon drawing an even narrower cocentric circle of Ved nta—of Advaita Ved nta. In some recent studies the cogency of its formulation within Advaita Ved nta has been questioned—but without reference to the testimony of its major modem exemplar, Ramana Maharsi (1879-1950). This paper examines the significance of the life and statements of Ramana Maharsi for the (...) current debate in the context of neo-Hinduism. (shrink)

The Gita at first appears to be a series of explanations of various kinds of yoga strung together in no apparent order, and several of its claims and arguments seem to contradict one another. I argue that the apparent contradictions disappear if we see the arguments as related to one another dialectically rather than analytically. From an analytic perspective contradictions are either merely verbal and can be disambiguated by a conceptual distinction, or else they render the statement meaningless. A dialectical (...) resolution, in the sense I am using the term, requires a change of perspective rather than a simple terminological clarification. A dialectical reading can also show that the appearance of randomness in the order of presentation follows from an organizing principle that is hierarchical rather than linear. (shrink)

Jainism is among the ancient Indian religions and has a history of more than twenty five centuries and is considered to be among the Nastika or non-orthodox Indian religions. The matter of the soul, which is referred to as the Jiva in this school of thought, is one of the important concepts of this religion and is one of the two principal categories of ontology and is also one of the main and primary subject of Jainism philosophy. Jainism considers the (...) actual existence of the soul to be an intuitive matter; however, they have still presented arguments for its existence. In his school of thought, even though the soul is not believed to be material, it has dimensions and expands and contracts in accordance with the body. An infinite number of souls exist and all existents, even elements consist of a soul that has from one up to six perceptional senses in accordance to the body it lives in. In its pure state the soul possesses unlimited awareness and intuition, unlimited rapture and joy, and is absolute perfection and knowledge and awareness is not a characteristic but rather its essence; however, this illuminated essence is encompassed by karma – an extremely subtle matter, as a result of certain actions and feelings and this is the start of its imprisonment. The goal of a Jainism way – farer is to rid the soul of these layers of karma known as lesya and this is attained through asceticism and during the course of successive lives. The purpose of this article is to explain the soul in Jainism through utilizing a descriptive-analytical method and using authentic library resources and shows that teachings in regards to the soul in Jainism are decidedly different from that of other Indian religions. (shrink)

This paper is in two parts. The first presents an analysis of the epistemology underlying the practice of classical Indian mathematical astronomy, as presented in three works of Nīlakaṇṭha Somayāji (1444–1545 CE). It is argued that the underlying concepts put great value on careful observation and skill in development of algorithms and use of computation. This is reflected in the technical terminology used to describe scientific method. The keywords in this enterprise include parīkṣā, anumāna, gaṇita, yukti, nyāya, siddhānta, tarka and (...) anveṣaṇa. The concepts that underlie these terms are analysed and compared with such ideas as theory, model, computation, positivism, empiricism etc. In a short second part, it is proposed that the primacy awarded to number and computation in classical Indian science led to an artificial language that did include equations but emphasized displays that facilitated calculation, as in the Bakshali manuscript (800 CE?). It is further argued that echoes of these concepts can be recognized in current science, where computation is once again playing a greater role triggered by spectacular developments in computer technology. (shrink)

Some scholars, especially almost all Indian philosophers, defined man as an ethical animal. Why do they say that man is an ethical animal? The aim of this paper is to present the concept of suffering in Sānkhya-Yoga Philosophy. The usage methods are the descriptive and evaluative method. The research finding is that principle of reciprocity can be used as an ethical principle. The moral principle in Eightfold Mean of Sānkhya-Yoga Philosophy will be used in this research paper. This paper will (...) contribute an understanding of the ethical conduct is indispensable foundation in Sānkhya-Yoga Philosophy. (shrink)