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Inference Claims

Informal Logic 31 (3):191-229 (2011)

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  1. Carroll’s Regress Times Three.Gilbert Plumer - 2023 - Acta Analytica 38 (4):551-571.
    I show that in our theoretical representations of argument, vicious infinite regresses of self-reference may arise with respect to each of the three usual, informal criteria of argument cogency: the premises are to be relevant, sufficient, and acceptable. They arise needlessly, by confusing a cogency criterion with argument content. The three types of regress all are structurally similar to Lewis Carroll’s famous regress, which involves quantitative extravagance with no explanatory power. Most attention is devoted to the sufficiency criterion, including its (...)
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  • Justifying Questions: What Kinds, How, and Why.David Hitchcock - 2021 - In Moritz Cordes (ed.), Asking and Answering: Rivalling Approaches to Interrogative Methods. Tübingen: Narr Francke Attempto. pp. 139–155.
    The authors of 200 arguments for questions posed 19 types of questions, justified them in 62 different ways, offered a justification of the question for 50 different types of purposes, and posed the question for 49 different types of purposes. Further consolidation of the categories used in the analysis is desirable and possible. Of the six most commonly posed types of questions, only three (yes-no questions, select questions, and either-or questions) are at first glance capable of formal representation in an (...)
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  • Handbook of Argumentation Theory.Frans H. van Eemeren, Bart Garssen, Erik C. W. Krabbe, A. Francisca Snoeck Henkemans, Bart Verheij & Jean H. M. Wagemans - 2014 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer.
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  • Informal Logic’s Infinite Regress: Inference Through a Looking-Glass.Gilbert Edward Plumer - 2018 - In Steve Oswald (ed.), Argumentation and Inference. Proceedings of the 2nd European Conference on Argumentation, Fribourg 2017. pp. 365-377.
    [Winner of the 2017 AILACT Essay Prize Prize.] I argue against the skeptical epistemological view exemplified by the Groarkes that “all theories of informal argument must face the regress problem.” It is true that in our theoretical representations of reasoning, infinite regresses of self-justification regularly and inadvertently arise with respect to each of the RSA criteria for argument cogency (the premises are to be relevant, sufficient, and acceptable). But they arise needlessly, by confusing an RSA criterion with argument content, usually (...)
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  • Informal Logic: A 'Canadian' Approach to Argument.Federico Puppo (ed.) - 2019 - Windsor, Canada: Windsor Studies in Argumentation.
    The informal logic movement began as an attempt to develop – and teach – an alternative logic which can account for the real life arguing that surrounds us in our daily lives – in newspapers and the popular media, political and social commentary, advertising, and interpersonal exchange. The movement was rooted in research and discussion in Canada and especially at the University of Windsor, and has become a branch of argumentation theory which intersects with related traditions and approaches (notably formal (...)
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  • The Irrelevance of Relevance.David Botting - 2013 - Informal Logic 33 (1):1-21.
    The lack of a theory of relevance in the current state of the art of informal logic has often been considered regrettable, a gap that must be filled before the Relevance-Sufficiency-Acceptability model can be considered complete. I wish to challenge this view. A theory of relevance is neither desirable nor possible. Informal logic can get by perfectly well, and has been doing so far, with relevance judgments that are by nature unanalysable and intuitive. Criticism of theories of relevance, for example (...)
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  • Response to my commentator.David Hitchcock - unknown
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  • Recognizing Argument Types and Adding Missing Reasons.Christoph Lumer - 2019 - In Bart J. Garssen, David Godden, Gordon Mitchell & Jean Wagemans (eds.), Proceedings of the Ninth Conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (ISSA). [Amsterdam, July 3-6, 2018.]. Sic Sat. pp. 769-777.
    The article develops and justifies, on the basis of the epistemological argumentation theory, two central pieces of the theory of evaluative argumentation interpretation: 1. criteria for recognizing argument types and 2. rules for adding reasons to create ideal arguments. Ad 1: The criteria for identifying argument types are a selection of essential elements from the definitions of the respective argument types. Ad 2: After presenting the general principles for adding reasons (benevolence, authenticity, immanence, optimization), heuristics are proposed for finding missing (...)
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  • In Defense of a Normative Concept of Argument.Matthew W. McKeon - 2024 - Argumentation 38 (2):247-264.
    Blair articulates a concept of argument that suggests, as he puts it, that argument is a normative concept (Blair, Informal Logic 24:137–151, 2004, p. 190). Put roughly, the idea is that a collection of propositions doesn’t constitute an argument unless some taken together constitute a reason for the remaining proposition and thereby support it enough to provide at least prima facie justification for it (Blair, in: Blair, Johnson, Hansen, Tindale (eds) Informal Logic at 25, Proceedings of the 25th anniversary conference, (...)
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  • Arguments and Reason-Giving.Matthew W. McKeon - 2022 - Argumentation 36 (2):229-247.
    Arguments figure prominently in our practices of reason-giving. For example, we use them to advance reasons for their conclusions in order to justify believing something, to explain why we believe something, and to persuade others to believe something. Intuitively, using arguments in these ways requires a certain degree of self-reflection. In this paper, I ask: what cognitive requirements are there for using an argument to advance reasons for its conclusion? Towards a partial response, the paper’s central thesis is that in (...)
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  • Groundwork in the Theory of Argumentation: Selected Papers of J. Anthony Blair.David Hitchcock - 2014 - Informal Logic 34 (1):94-123.
    Introduction by Christopher W. Tindale Argumentation Library, Volume 21. Dordrecht: Springer, 2012. Pp. xxi, 1-355. Hardcover US$149. Softcover US$24.95.
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  • Modeling Corroborative Evidence: Inference to the Best Explanation as Counter–Rebuttal.David Godden - 2014 - Argumentation 28 (2):187-220.
    Corroborative evidence has a dual function in argument. Primarily, it functions to provide direct evidence supporting the main conclusion. But it also has a secondary, bolstering function which increases the probative value of some other piece of evidence in the argument. This paper argues that the bolstering effect of corroborative evidence is legitimate, and can be explained as counter–rebuttal achieved through inference to the best explanation. A model (argument diagram) of corroborative evidence, representing its structure and operation as a schematic (...)
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  • Material consequences and counter-factuals.David Hitchcock - unknown
    A conclusion is a “material consequence” of reasons if it follows necessarily from them in accordance with a valid form of argument with content. The corresponding universal generalization of the argument’s associated conditional must be true, must be a covering generalization, and must be true of counter-factual instances. But it need not be law-like. Pearl’s structural model semantics is easier to apply to such counter-factual instances than Lewis’s closest-worlds semantics, and gives intuitively correct results.
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  • (1 other version)J. Anthony Blair (2012): Groundwork in the Theory of Argumentation. [REVIEW]James B. Freeman - 2012 - Argumentation 26 (4):505-527.
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