In a landmark 1994 case, the Court of Justice of the European Union ruled that individuals had the right to ask for Internet links that contained certain information about them to be delisted by search engines. This came to be known as the “right to be forgotten.” This paper discusses the extent to which this right is consistent with the Islamic tradition. Following an overview of some aspects of the right to be forgotten and why it is endorsed in the (...) European Union with its emphasis on privacy but not in the USA with its exaltation of free speech, the paper discusses two related issues: (1) elements in the Islamic tradition potentially conducive to endorsing a particular understanding of the right to be forgotten and (2) some possible obstacles from that tradition that could challenge the recognition of this right from an Islamic perspective. The paper concludes that despite some challenges, including Qur’anic verses and certain views, activities, and institutions, the right to be forgotten is defendable from within the Islamic tradition by reference to the principle of _satr_, which breaches that one should not seek to publicize personal information that causes harm to other people or even to oneself. The paper seeks to contribute to discussions on this new right by showing what a religious tradition such as Islam can offer to them. (shrink)

This chapter addresses the morality of two types of national security electronic surveillance (SIGINT) programs: the analysis of communication “metadata” and dragnet searches for keywords in electronic communication. The chapter develops a standard for assessing coercive government action based on respect for the autonomy of inhabitants of liberal states and argues that both types of SIGINT can potentially meet this standard. That said, the collection of metadata creates opportunities for abuse of power, and so judgments about the trustworthiness and competence (...) of the government engaging in the collection must be made in order to decide whether metadata collection is justified in a particular state. Further, the moral standard proposed has a reflexive element justifying adversary states’ intelligence collection against one another. Therefore, high-tech forms of SIGINT can only be justified at the cost of justifying cruder versions of signals intelligence collection practiced by a state’s less-advanced adversaries. (shrink)

Over the past decade, police departments in many countries have experimented with and increasingly adopted the use of police body-worn cameras. This article aims to examine the moral issues raised by the use of PBWCs, and to provide an overall assessment of the conditions under which the use of PBWCs is morally permissible. It first reviews the current evidence for the effects of using PBWCs. On the basis of this review the article sets out a teleological argument for the use (...) of PBWCs. The final two sections of the article review two deontological objections to the use of PBWCs: the idea that use of PBWCs is based on or expresses disrespectful mistrust, and the idea that the use of PBWCs violates a right to privacy. The article argues that neither of these objections is persuasive, and concludes that we should conditionally accept and support the use of PBWCs. (shrink)

This article analyses proportionality as a potential element of a theory of morally justified surveillance, and sets out a teleological account. It draws on conceptions in criminal justice ethics and just war theory, defines teleological proportionality in the context of surveillance, and sketches some of the central values likely to go into the consideration. It then explores some of the ways in which deontologists might want to modify the account and illustrates the difficulties of doing so. Having set out the (...) account, however, it considers whether the proportionality condition is necessary to a theory of morally justified surveillance. The article concludes that we need and should apply only a necessity condition, but notes that proportionality considerations may retain some use in in practice, as a form of coarse‐grained filter applied before assessing necessity when deliberating the permissibility of potential forms of surveillance. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe main objective of this study is to discuss the ramifications of considering privacy as a public good for business organizations. Using an extensive literature review, an attempt to achieve this objective is made by trying to answer the following questions: What are the historical and philosophical roots of privacy? How is the concept of privacy defined and what are the controversies surrounding different definitions of privacy? Does an individual have a right to privacy? If the answer to question three (...) is in affirmative, what are the philosophical and legal foundations of that right? How can an individual's privacy be invaded? Is privacy right an individual right or does it have a societal value? What are the reasons for considering privacy as a public good? Finally, the article offers prescriptive insights for organizations to successfully obtain information from consumer while respecting their privacy. (shrink)

This paper discusses privacy and the monitoring of e-mail in the context of the international nature of the modern world. Its three main aims are: (1) to highlight the problems involved in discussing an essentially philosophical question within a legal framework, and thus to show that providing purely legal answers to an ethical question is an inadequate approach to the problem of privacy on the Internet; (2) to discuss and define what privacy in the medium of the Internet actually is; (...) and (3) to apply a globally acceptable ethical approach of international human rights to the problem of privacy on the Internet, and thus to answer the question of what is and is not morally permissible in this area, especially in light of recent heightened concerns about terrorist activities. It concludes that the monitoring of e-mail is, at least in the vast majority of cases, an unjustified infringement of the right to privacy, even if this monitoring is only aimed at preventing the commission of acts of terrorism. (shrink)

The paper examines the ethics of electronic monitoring for advertising purposes and the implications for Internet user privacy using as a backdrop DoubleClick Incs recent controversy over matching previously anonymous user profiles with personally identifiable information. It explores various ethical theories that are applicable to understand privacy issues in electronic monitoring. It is argued that, despite the fact that electronic monitoring always constitutes an invasion of privacy, it can still be ethically justified on both Utilitarian and Kantian grounds. From a (...) Utilitarian perspective the emphasis must be on minimizing potential harms. From a Kantian perspective the emphasis must be on giving users complete information so that they can make informed decisions as to whether they are willing to be monitored. Considering the Internet advertising industrys current actions, computer users and government regulators would be well advised, both practically and ethically, to move to a user control model in electronic monitoring. (shrink)

Traditional theism teaches that God engages in a relentless form of observation for every human being. If, as is widely supposed, humans have a right to privacy, then it seems that God constantly violates this right. In this paper we argue that there is both a defensible philosophical excuse and justification for this infringement. We also argue that this defense is extensible to human social and political contexts; it provides the vital elements of a theory of just privacy infringement. This (...) theory is broadly compatible both with major forms of political theory and with the main conceptions of privacy defended in recent philosophical and jurisprudential literature. (shrink)