My two principal aims in this essay are interconnected. One aim is to provide a new interpretation of the ‘infinite modes’ in Spinoza’s Ethics. I argue that for Spinoza, God, conceived as the one infinite and eternal substance, is not to be understood as causing two kinds of modes, some infinite and eternal and the rest finite and non-eternal. That there cannot be such a bifurcation of divine effects is what I take the ‘infinite mode’ propositions, E1p21–23, to establish; E1p21–23 (...) show that each and every one of the immanent effects of an infinite and eternal God is an infinite and eternal mode. The other aim is to show that these propositions can be understood as part of an extended critical response to Descartes’s infamous doctrine that God creates eternal truths and true and immutable natures. If we have the correct (Spinozan) conceptions of what God is and how God works, we see that an eternal and infinite God can only be understood to cause ‘eternal truths,’ and that these eternal truths are infinite and eternal modes of God. (shrink)

The mimetic theory forged by René Girard is completely closed by its own violence. Given that human violence was contained for centuries, by the victimary mechanism, its deconstruction by the Cross has unleashed a complete and total violence, leading us to the possibility of a real Apocalypse. We show here that this closure is based on a metaphysical view of desire, guiding us from the objet to the being of the model. Since Girard is always confined into metaphysics by his (...) constant use of the paradigm of the image, the presence and, consequently, the idol, we demonstrate that there is still a way out of violence, the same way that is today the way out of metaphysics. With Jean-Luc Marion and his phenomenology of givenness, we oppose the paradigm of the icon to the one of the idol, and therefore the model of the sign to the one of the image. We demonstrate then that global mimetic violence can be stopped if we no longer desire objects and start desiring saturated phenomena, which implies a complete shift in the way we think and receive phenomena. (shrink)

An icon is part of the visible world, moreover, of things that are visible in a second degree. It is not only a sensitive thing, but a sensitive image of a sensitive entity. As an eikon, it is located in a platonic sense among the lowest degree of the doxa, and within the lowest degree of the scale of being. However it is not a simple sensitive and illusory representation of God, such as one criticized from a Kantian point of (...) view. The profound sense of an icon lies in its opening towards the invisible. An icon tries to capture the invisible. How is this meeting point of the visible and the invisible entangled? Can an icon really allow us to “see” the invisible or is it only a profanation of the invisible? It is my aim to analyze those questions in the following article. (shrink)

Gratitude, the proper or fitting response to benevolence, has often been conceptualized as a virtue—a temporally stable disposition to perceive, think, feel, and act in certain characteristic ways in certain situations. Many accounts of gratitude as a virtue, however, have not analyzed this disposition accurately, and as a result, they have not revealed the rich variety of ways in which someone can fail to be a grateful person. In this paper, I articulate an account of the virtue of gratitude, and (...) I use this account to explore various vices that can manifest in its absence. (shrink)

A few years ago, it was common for philosophers to begin inquiry into hope by noting that the subject has received little attention in the philosophical literature. But our ability to make this claim is quickly coming to an end; hope has been earning increasing recognition in the discipline, with philosophers exploring important questions related to the nature of hope, what makes hope rational, and how hope is connected to human wellbeing and agency. Despite this recent interest, however, there remains (...) very little discussion of the social and political dimensions of hope. My aim in this paper is to demonstrate the importance of a feminist perspective in bringing these dimensions into fuller view. I argue that feminist insights into the relational nature of the self, which call attention to where selves are socially situated in relation to others, enable a richer understanding of the nature and value of hope. (shrink)

I discuss Young’s “asymmetrical reciprocity” and apply it to an ethics of mental health care. Due to its emphasis on engaging with others through respectful dialogue in an inclusive manner, asymmetrical reciprocity serves as an appropriate framework for guiding caregivers to interact with their patients and to understand them in a morally responsible and appropriate manner. In Section 1, I define empathy and explain its benefits in the context of mental health care. In Section 2, I discuss two potential problems (...) surrounding empathy: the difficulty of perspectivetaking and “compassion fatigue.” In Section 3, I argue that these issues can be resolved if examined through the lens of an ethics of care. Reciprocal relationships between patients and caregivers are an important element in the development of an ethics of care. In Section 4, I introduce two models of reciprocity that can be applied to a health care context: Benhabib’s symmetrical reciprocity and Young’s asymmetrical reciprocity. In Section 5, I demonstrate how asymmetrical reciprocity cultivates empathy and, in Section 6 and Section 7, I show how it overcomes the objections of empathy and improves therapeutic relationships. (shrink)

The author argues for the reductive interpretation of Descartes’ notion of the substantial union of soul and body, according to which the union is reduced to causal interactions. The opponents countered the reductive approach with the claims that Descartes (1) attributed sensations to the union rather than the soul; (2) held that the soul is the substantial form of the body; (3) identified some special conditions of the human body’s self-identity. In the article, the case is made that (a) these (...) claims lack clear textual evidence: if their context is properly considered, Descartes’ corresponding statements are consistent with the reductive interpretation; (b) they do not give proper weight to other Descartes’ statements (in particular, his numerous unambiguous statements that sensations are the soul’s states). The author argues that the reductive interpretation is consistent with other Descartes’ statements to which its opponents appeal - that sensations arise from the union of mind and body and that the causal interactions between the soul and the body are explained with the reference to their union. The consistency is achieved if we interpret these statements in the sense that the enduring union between a soul and a body is an ontological prerequisite and, hence, an explanation, of all interactions between the soul and the body and their effects (such as sensations): these interactions and effects would not take place without the union between this particular soul and this particular body. Such explanation is similar to the explanation of certain natural events by the laws of nature: just as the gist of a law of nature can be reduced to a set of causal dispositions, so the content of the notion of the union can be reduced to the emergence and maintenance of a set of causal dispositions between a certain soul and a certain body. (shrink)

The article introduces readers to the study of disability, both with respect to the interdisciplinary field of disability studies and the field of philosophy of disability. We then offer an overview of three central areas of philosophical inquiry where feminist work in philosophy and disability has made significant contributions: (1) metaphysics and ontology, (2) epistemology and phenomenology, and (3) ethical, social, and political philosophy.

Se propone un examen crítico de la última obra de J.-L. Marion titulada, dedicada a la unión de alma y cuerpo, y cuya tesis principal es: los problemas que esta unión suscita confunden dos términos, cuerpo y mi cuerpo. Esta confusión lleva a que se apliquen al primero categorías propias del segundo. Se examinan las "paradojas ónticas" que mi cuerpo (la carne) inaugura (a); se despeja la tesis de dos interpretaciones de las meditaciones primera y sexta (b); se discute la (...) "excepción a la metafísica" instaurada por el conocimiento de mi cuerpo (c); se arriesga, siguiendo una indicación del autor, la apertura a una dimensión ética que exige examinar ya no la unión de cuerpo y alma, sino la unión por el amor a un semejante y a la comunidad de semejantes (d). -/- The article carries out a critical examination of J.-L. Marion's latest work, "Sur la pensée passive de Descartes", whose main thesis is that the problems posed by the union of body and soul confuse two terms: body and my body. This confusion leads to the application to the former of categories inherent to the latter. The paper examines the "ontic paradoxes" that my body (the flesh) gives rise to (a); it clarifies the thesis of two interpretations of the First and Sixth Meditations (b); it discusses the "exception to metaphysics" established by the knowledge of my body (c); and, following an indication by the author, it proposes an opening to the ethical dimension, which demands an examination of the union, through love, with a fellow human being and with the community of human beings, rather than of the union of body and soul (d). -/- Neste artigo, propõe-se um exame crítico da última obra de J.-L. Marion, intitulada "Sur la pensée passive de Descartes", dedicada à união de alma e corpo, e cuja tese principal é: os problemas que essa união suscita confundem dois termos, corpo e meu corpo. Essa confusão leva a que se apliquem ao primeiro categorias próprias do segundo. Examinam-se os "paradoxos ônticos" que meu corpo (a carne) inaugura; a tese de duas interpretações das medita ccedil;ões primeira e sexta é esclarecida; arrisca-se, seguindo uma indicação do autor, a abertura a uma dimensão ética que exige examinar já não a união de corpo e alma, mas sim a união pelo amor a um semelhante e à comunidade de semelhantes. (shrink)

Many critics, Descartes himself included, have seen Hobbes as uncharitable or even incoherent in his Objections to the Meditations on First Philosophy. I argue that when understood within the wider context of his views of the late 1630s and early 1640s, Hobbes's Objections are coherent and reflect his goal of providing an epistemology consistent with a mechanical philosophy. I demonstrate the importance of this epistemology for understanding his Fourth Objection concerning the nature of the wax and contend that Hobbes's brief (...) claims in that Objection are best understood as a summary of the mechanism for scientific knowledge found in his broader work. Far from displaying his confusion, Hobbes's Fourth Objection in fact pinpoints a key weakness of Descartes's faculty psychology: its unintelligibility within a mechanical philosophy. (shrink)

This paper aims to describe the Cartesian conception on the universals, as well as the way in which this conception could be related to the position developed by Locke in the Essay. Firstly, some considerations about the role of sensorial knowledge in Cartesian philosophy are analyzed. Secondly, some considerations about Locke’s conception of idea are reviewed. Then, the Cartesian concept of universal is reviewed considering his position in the Principia. Finally, Descartes’ and Locke’s view about universals are compared highlighting the (...) role that both thinkers assign to the sensory experience in their theory of knowledge. (shrink)

El presente artículo reconstruye la lectura fenomenológica del autor contemporáneo francés Jean-Luc Marion de las Confesiones de San Agustín, en su libro Au lieu de soi. Marion se presenta como un filósofo que busca llevar la filosofía más allá de la ontología, en particular a través de una fenomenología de la donación. La donación se caracteriza por una triple desaparición: la del donatario, la del donador, y finalmente lo dado. El uso de la metáfora del espacio muestra la apariencia de (...) dos espacios vacíos, relacionado por un movimiento múltiple. El artículo concluye con algunoscuestionamientos acerca de la desaparición del yo y de Dios en la lectura de las Confesiones. (shrink)

This paper offers a new interpretation for Wittgenstein`s treatment of mathematical identities. As it is widely known, Wittgenstein`s mature philosophy of mathematics includes a general rejection of abstract objects. On the other hand, the traditional interpretation of mathematical identities involves precisely the idea of a single abstract object – usually a number –named by both sides of an equation.

Se interroga la atencionalidad propia del amor en cuanto que experiencia privilegiada y primordial del cuidado. En busca de un acceso al fenómeno del amor, se propone interrogarlo conforme al tipo de atención que promueve, asumiendo y discutiendo los recursos aportados por la fenomenología husserliana, así como por las fenomenologías contraintencionales, en particular la de Waldenfels. De este modo, si para describir este fenómeno es preciso dar cuenta del fundamento afectivo de la atención, también hay que reconocer que el amor (...) es vivido como un hecho original o un acontecimiento que implica para el amante una reorientación existencial y atencional. (shrink)

Several scholars have argued that Wittgenstein held the view that the notion of number is presupposed by the notion of one-one correlation, and that therefore Hume's principle is not a sound basis for a definition of number. I offer a new interpretation of the relevant fragments on philosophy of mathematics from Wittgenstein's Nachlass, showing that if different uses of ‘presupposition’ are understood in terms of de re and de dicto knowledge, Wittgenstein's argument against the Frege-Russell definition of number turns out (...) to be valid on its own terms, even though it depends on two epistemological principles logicist philosophers of mathematics may find too ‘constructivist’. (shrink)

What we represent to ourselves behind the appear- ances exists only in our understanding . . . [having] only the value of memoria technica or formula whose form, because it is arbitrary and irrelevant, varies . . . with the standpoint of our culture.

Jean-Luc Marion’s phenomenology of giveness constitutes one of the most outstanding attempts to set up a universal theory of the phenomenologically given as a whole within the framework of contemporary philosophical thought. The aim of the present study is to apply the main categories of this phenomenological theory concerning gift to the singular type of phenomenon represented by the pure indeterminate and anonymous being to which Emmanuel Levinas refers by the name of il y a in his early writings. Therefore, (...) this concerns examining the multiple specific modes of giveness proper to the impersonal “there is” and also its paradoxical relationship both with the donor and with the receiver of such gift in order to show the possibility of a “third way” of phenomenological investigation. This is a way equally distant from the western traditional concept of Being as “stable presence” and from Levinas’ proposal geared to substitute ontology for ethics as “first philosophy”. (shrink)

Purpose of this work is to find the key to understanding the paradox of Descartes’ way of philosophizing during the recourse to the text of "early writings". Realization of the set purpose involves the consistent solving of such tasks: by referring to the research literature, to outline the forms of transition to modern methodology; to explicate the main reasons for philosophy anthropologization by Descartes; to analyze the role of art as the main form of expressing Descartes’ worldview in the "early (...) writings". Theoretical basis. Studies by Descartes experts and the phenomenological tradition. Originality. The analysis of the "early writings" allows to determine the origins of the main doctrine of Descartes’ philosophizing. Its role is manifested in the course of clarifying the main motives of the anthropological approach of the French philosopher. That entails their rootedness in the Copernican-based scientific revolution of the New Age. A prerequisite for the authentic comprehension of the radical change carried out by Descartes is the attention to the paradigmatic significance of art, which is most fully asserted in the "early writings". It is substantiated that the appeal of young Descartes to the experience of art influences his understanding of science, as well as the awareness of human presence in the development of the scientific picture of the world and the distinction of the main components of human nature – mind and will. Conclusions. During the analysis of the contemporary literature devoted to Descartes, there is outlined the tendency to go beyond the notions of naivety and simplicity of his position, one of the manifestations of which is the increased attention to anthropology. The main motives for its actualization are rooted in the scientific revolution of the New Age, which are the form of completion of the radical worldview change initiated by Copernicus. It is about the vision of man as the main component of the universe, attention thereto in the search for the source point and the decisive authority for the world development, reflection of the thinker’s desire to build his own ethical doctrine based on human nature. While comprehending the "early wri-tings", the author focuses on the interpretation by young Descartes of art as a form of expression of truth, which enables the authentic comprehension of human nature. These ideas became the basis for the further work of the thinker, and today they open up new perspectives of exploring the anthropological foundation for later works. (shrink)

The work of Iris Marion Young (1949–2006) comprises major contributions in the areas of feminist phenomenology, international justice, political theory, and ethical responses to differences. Many of Young's articles, such as ‘Throwing like a Girl’, ‘Pregnant Embodiment’, ‘Women Recovering our Clothes’, ‘Gender as Seriality’, and ‘House and home’, in addition to her books Justice and the Politics of Difference (1990) and Inclusion and Democracy (2000) are particularly significant. My paper shows how Young's earlier essays in feminist phenomenology concerning the lived (...) body can be linked to her later political thought, despite her own separation of these two strands in her work. Furthermore, I explore her legacy by examining how feminists have challenged her self-criticisms and have also developed Young's ideas in these fields, including her work on oppression and responsibility. (shrink)

The main point for criticizing the Cartesians for Vico is the notion of method, interpreted as exceptionally discursive procedure, devoid of spontaneity and creative force which are necessary for discovering new truths. These qualities are embodied for Vico in the Latin term ingenium, loan translation of which is found in Italian (ingegno) and is absent in French. The criticism of Cartesianisn suggested by Vico does not consider the fundamental bilingualism of this philosophy and wide use of the term ingenium in (...) the corps of Descartes’ Latin works. The analysis of the latter proves that the early Descartes’ notion intuitus mentis, as well as the concept of natural light of mind are, in the end, based exactly on ingenium, but not on the discursive methodical procedures. Human soul, following Descartes, reveals its content in several hypostastes and each method of revelation corresponds to specific terminology. Soul as mens is not the same as soul as ingenium. But even the early Descartes’ study of soul is marked by peculiar nominalism, proclamation of the real existence of individual soul as a separate entity. Therefore later, stating his ego cogito, Descartes states exactly the individual substance, not thinking in general. The terminological couple ingenium/mens is not translatable already in the French texts of Descartes himself (both merge in the French esprit), however their Ukrainian translations do not consider neither this untranslatability nor obvious references of Descartes’ esprit to other Latin compliances which differ each time. The article also analyses frequency in usage of the terms ingenium and mens in early and late Descartes’ Latin works; it has been proved that the augmentation of the meaning of metaphysical problems gradually turned mens into the main subject of Descartes’ research and deactualised the problem of ingenium. (shrink)

The article deals with the problem of phenomenological interpretation of Cartesian idea of evidence. The author demonstrates that implicit but constitutive characteristic of evidence is a property of excessiveness. The analysis of its conceptual versions and methodological representations in Husserl, Marion and Derrida’s philosophies deconstructs some stereotype interpretations of evidence as an attribute of I-centric philosophical systems and also as a carrier of qualities of fullness and presence. The author claims that excessiveness of evidence has two main aspects: (1) non-belonging (...) to the system assured by this very evidence and (2) tendency to self-surpassing (hyperbolization). The excessiveness of evidence is shown in particular with regard to the system of thinking governed by the “truth-falsehood” opposition. The author brings to light a trend to the increasing of degrees of evidence as a consequence of phenomenological critique and deconstruction as methodological hyperbolizations of Cartesian doubt. The common ground between Marionian and Derridian critiques of Husserl’s conception of evidence is found that is inconsistency between the principle of fulfillment of intention and the unrealizable regulative of the “Idea in Kantian sense” as two main ways of representation of evidence idea in Husserlian phenomenology. It is shown that in accordance with the paradigm of possibility as the common denominator of phenomenological attitude in general the very same criticized evidence becomes assimilated in Marion’s conception of “saturated phenomena” (a principle of hyperbolical givenness) and in Derridian deconstruction (hyperbolicity-excessiveness as heterogeneity and impossibility within the framework of his critique of presence). The author uncovers the essential connection between the idea of evidence and basic elements of deconstructive discourse, such as the metaphorical concept of secret and the quasi-concept différance. (shrink)

In ihrer Theorie globaler Gerechtigkeit hat Iris Marion Young ein Modell von Verantwortung erarbeitet, das sich nicht vergangenheitsorientiert mit der Haftung Einzelner befasst, sondern mit der in sozialen Verbindungen geteilten Verantwortung, der es sich künftig zu stellen gelte. Dieses Modell hat allerdings einen Haken: Wenn diese Verantwortlichkeit schon aus dem Eingebundensein in soziale Strukturen erwächst, kann jede Einzelne sich damit aus der Affäre ziehen, dass sie zwar verantwortlich in, nicht aber für diese Strukturen ist. Wenn man den verschiedenen Verantwortungsmodellen unterschiedliche (...) Pflichten zuordnet, bleibt eine Frage offen: Gibt es eigentlich eine Pflicht, die geteilte Verantwortung auch zu übernehmen? Warum soll sich jemand verantwortlich erklären für die Effekte von Strukturen, die er sich gar nicht ausgesucht hat? An dieser Stelle bringt Thomas Nagels Idee politischer Verantwortung weiter: Nagel zufolge sind wir für politische Maßnahmen auch dann verantwortlich, wenn wir sie uns nicht im Einzelnen ausgesucht haben, solange sie in unserem Namen geschehen. Dieses Argument des liberalen Nationalismus lässt sich auf die globale politische Ökonomie übertragen: auch dort nämlich geschehen die meisten Dinge in unserem Namen. Da die Grammatik der „Verpflichtung“ in nationaler Politik und globaler politischer Ökonomie Parallelen aufweist, sollten wir auch in Letzterer unsere Verantwortung übernehmen. (shrink)

I analyze the complex relations between Pascal and the three figures of Montaigne, Descartes, and St. Augustine, and the relations the first two figures bear to St. Augustine. For Pascal's philosophy, one is in effect a resource , another a way of thinking that he makes his own , and yet another serves as a model . I further investigate Pascal's anti-Augustinism, that is, some of the points of resistance in Pascal against the thought of St. Augustine. Central to this (...) investigation is the famous rapprochement between the cogitos of Augustine and Descartes, which requires a consideration of what, for Pascal, it means "to say the same thing." This analysis leads us to two conclusions: first, Augustine's The City of God should be placed among the number of works that Pascal did not read; second, there are fundamental philosophical reasons for Pascal to reject certain theses central to that work. Above all, there should no longer be any need to assume a merely abstract conception of an unproblematic Augustinianism in Pascal. (shrink)

Este artículo tiene por objeto destacar la relevancia de una noción de “muerte impersonal” en el horizonte de una indagación no antropocentrada de lo biopolítico. En tanto no se rige por la teleología del principio antrópico, la filosofía contemporánea considera lo impersonal como una resistencia al biopoder, aunque suele concentrarse en los avatares del concepto de Vida. Aquí, avanzamos en el examen de los rasgos de la muerte impersonal en dos pensadores cuyas obras resultan fundamentales para estas líneas de trabajo (...) contemporáneas. En Nietzsche, analizamos la cuestión de la “muerte libre” y la imagen de la ceniza, dando cuenta de las posibilidades que allí se vislumbran para una reivindicación de lo impersonal. Luego, subrayamos sus semejanzas y derivaciones en los conceptos blanchotianos de “momento deseado” y “tiempo muerto”. (shrink)

The author addressed the question of the reflexive in the space of phenomenological knowledge. Phenomenological interpretations of reflection in this context are seen as a kind of methodological operation. The article presents the analysis of the space of phenomenological anthropology in the context of contemporary knowledge. The author discusses phenomenological interpretations of the reflective and emotional in experience that allow contemporary philosophical anthropological thought to use practical achievements of modern psychology. The author analyzes the issue of reflexivity in the space (...) of phenomenological psychology and existential analysis in the philosophical and anthropological context, taking into account the peculiarities of the formation of different approaches and directions, connections to previous philosophical tradition. The author focuses on the analysis of the phenomenon of experience using the concept of reduction. It has been considered primarily the real action, which does not manifest itself in actual behavior. However it is about experienced action and for the phenomenological consciousness the notion of the reduction is used toward the world of the senses, which are known to us. Theme of reflexivity is considered in the context of contemporary philosophical anthropological knowledge, and at the same time the author focuses on the variety of issues of phenomenological psychology and existential analysis that covers issues of ontology and epistemology, anthropology and ethics, focuses on the complex set of common principles and attitudes of phenomenological, philosophical and anthropological researches. In the space of interaction between philosophy and psychiatry traditional philosophical problems are set up in a different and urgent way: problem of the ontological foundations of being, the criteria of validity of experience, human existence, procedures and methods of knowledge on human, boundaries and borders of understanding. The author notes that the philosophical anthropology and phenomenological psychiatry demonstrate excellent example of interdisciplinary communication, philosophical understanding of the specific knowledge, understanding the human emotional experience as fine line between different states of consciousness. Also, this article presents reflection of the theme which suggests a permanently existing boundary on anthropological and transcendental dimensions. (shrink)

La seducción que irradia el retrato adquiere nuevas significaciones con la llegada de la fotografía. El retrato fotográfico durante el siglo XIX, como imagen de exactitud radical, concretó diversos fenómenos entre el público, entre los cuales se encuentra la negación de la propia imagen. La experiencia de Gérard de Nerval respecto a sus dos retratos muestra su concepción de la fotografía en la última etapa de su vida, así mismo desvela problemas de orden estético en cuanto a la recepción de (...) una nueva forma de representación del cuerpo y la propia imagen. (shrink)

L’articolo si propone di analizzare la presenza di Descartes nella Critica della ragion pura, con particolare attenzione ai paralogismi della psicologia razionale e alla confutazione dell’idealismo. L’aspetto più rilevante dell’analisi kantiana non concerne l’interpretazione del pensiero cartesiano fornita dal filosofo tedesco, data la scarsa conoscenza che Kant possedeva dei testi di Descartes. Ad essere interessante, al contrario, soprattutto se considerata alla luce della sua successiva ricezione, è l’immagine di Descartes che emerge dalle pagine della Critica. A questo riguardo, è possibile (...) affermare che Kant abbia contribuito al ritorno sulla scena del pensiero tedesco del Descartes metafisico, una maschera filosofica che svolgerà un ruolo centrale nella ricostruzione della storia della filosofia proposta dall’idealismo post-kantiano. (shrink)