The noema is one of the most daring and controversial concept of the Husserlian theory of intentionality. It was first introduced by Husserl in 1912, within some research manuscripts, but was only fully developed in Ideen. In this paper I claim that the noema is an ambiguous notion, the result of a theoretical operation, the epoché, whose aim is contradictory. In an effort to keep open the epoché, and therefore maintain distance with respect to every transcendent object, Husserl is forced (...) to multiply intentional objects and complicate the notions of sense and noema. Given that, I propose to overcome the paradoxes of noema through the language of game theory. Game theory offers a very fruitful descriptive model that allows us to save the original Husserlian approach without the contradictions of the epoché. For this reason, I propose to re-interpret intentionality as social game, and the noema as Nash equilibrium. By replying to possible objections, I will show that this approach gives us many theoretical advantages. The general aim of the paper is a global reformulation of the phenomenalogical method. (shrink)

This monograph proposes a new way of implementing interaction in logic. It also provides an elementary introduction to Constructive Type Theory. The authors equally emphasize basic ideas and finer technical details. In addition, many worked out exercises and examples will help readers to better understand the concepts under discussion. One of the chief ideas animating this study is that the dialogical understanding of definitional equality and its execution provide both a simple and a direct way of implementing the CTT approach (...) within a game-theoretical conception of meaning. In addition, the importance of the play level over the strategy level is stressed, binding together the matter of execution with that of equality and the finitary perspective on games constituting meaning. According to this perspective the emergence of concepts are not only games of giving and asking for reasons, they are also games that include moves establishing how it is that the reasons brought forward accomplish their explicative task. Thus, immanent reasoning games are dialogical games of Why and How. (shrink)

Frege famously held that numbers play the role of objects in our language and thought, and that this role is on display when we use sentences like "The number of Jupiter's moons is four". I argue that this role is an example of a general pattern that also encompasses persons, times, locations, reasons, causes, and ways of appearing or acting. These things are 'objects' simply in the sense that they are answers to questions: they are the sort of thing we (...) search for and specify during investigation or inquiry. I support this epistemological conception of objects by studying specificational sentences, a class of sentences which includes Frege's original example. I defend an analysis of such sentences as question-answer pairs, and show how to formally represent this analysis using game-theoretical semantics. (shrink)

Sweet Analytics, ‘tis thou hast ravish'd me,Bene disserere est finis logices.Is to dispute well logic's chiefest end?Affords this art no greater miracle?(Christopher Marlow, Doctor Faustus, Act 1,...

This paper presents a dialogue system called Lorenzen–Hamblin Natural Dialogue (LHND), in which participants can commit formal fallacies and have a method of both identifying and withdrawing formal fallacies. It therefore provides a tool for the dialectical evaluation of force of argument when players advance reasons which are deductively incorrect. The system is inspired by Hamblin’s formal dialectic and Lorenzen’s dialogical logic. It offers uniform protocols for Hamblin’s and Lorenzen’s dialogues and adds a protocol for embedding them. This unification required (...) a reformulation of the original description of Lorenzen’s system to distinguish “between different stances that a person might take in the discussion”, as suggested by Hodges. The LHND system is compared to Walton and Krabbe’s Complex Persuasion Dialogue using an example of a dialogue. (shrink)

History based models suggest a process-based approach to epistemic and temporal reasoning. In this work, we introduce preferences to history based models. Motivated by game theoretical observations, we discuss how preferences can dynamically be updated in history based models. Following, we consider arrow update logic and event calculus, and give history based models for these logics. This allows us to relate dynamic logics of history based models to a broader framework.

This paper introduces a game theoretical semantics for a particular logic of formal inconsistency called mbC.

This paper provides an analysis of the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction, as applied both to properties and to relations. In contrast to other accounts, the approach taken here locates the source of a property’s intrinsicality or extrinsicality in the manner in which that property is ‘logically constituted’, and thus – plausibly – in its nature or essence, rather than in e.g. its modal profile. Another respect in which the present proposal differs from many extant analyses lies in the fact that it does (...) not seek to analyse the ‘global’ distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties on the basis of the ‘local’ distinction between having a property intrinsically and having it extrinsically. Instead, the latter distinction is explicated on the basis of the former. (shrink)

It is well known that reductio ad absurdum arguments raise a number of interesting philosophical questions. What does it mean to assert something with the precise goal of then showing it to be false, i.e. because it leads to absurd conclusions? What kind of absurdity do we obtain? Moreover, in the mathematics education literature number of studies have shown that students find it difficult to truly comprehend the idea of reductio proofs, which indicates the cognitive complexity of these constructions. In (...) this paper, I start by discussing four philosophical issues pertaining to reductio arguments. I then briefly present a dialogical conceptualization of deductive arguments, according to which such arguments are best understood as a dialogue between two participants—Prover and Skeptic. Finally, I argue that many of the philosophical and cognitive difficulties surrounding reductio arguments are dispelled or at least further clarified once one adopts a dialogical perspective. (shrink)

Recently logic has shifted emphasis from static systems developed for purely theoretical reasons to dynamic systems designed for application to real world situations. The emphasis on the applied aspects of logic and reasoning means that logic has become a pragmatic tool, to be judged against the backdrop of a particular application. This shift in emphasis is, however, not new. A similar shift towards “interactive logic” occurred in the high Middle Ages. We provide a number of different examples of “interactive logic” (...) in the Middle Ages, all species of the disputation game obligatio. These games display a recognition of the importance of interaction in logical contexts and the way that interactive logic differs from single-agent inference. (shrink)

The increased interactivity and connectivity of computational devices along with the spreading of computational tools and computational thinking across the fields, has changed our understanding of the nature of computing. In the course of this development computing models have been extended from the initial abstract symbol manipulating mechanisms of stand-alone, discrete sequential machines, to the models of natural computing in the physical world, generally concurrent asynchronous processes capable of modelling living systems, their informational structures and dynamics on both symbolic and (...) sub-symbolic information processing levels. Present account of models of computation highlights several topics of importance for the development of new understanding of computing and its role: natural computation and the relationship between the model and physical implementation, interactivity as fundamental for computational modelling of concurrent information processing systems such as living organisms and their networks, and the new developments in logic needed to support this generalized framework. Computing understood as information processing is closely related to natural sciences; it helps us recognize connections between sciences, and provides a unified approach for modeling and simulating of both living and non-living systems. (shrink)

This volume presents mathematical game theory as an interface between logic and philosophy.

This monograph proposes a new way of studying the different forms of correlational inference, known in the Islamic jurisprudence as qiyās. According to the authors’ view, qiyās represents an innovative and sophisticated form of dialectical reasoning that not only provides new epistemological insights into legal argumentation in general but also furnishes a fine-grained pattern for parallel reasoning which can be deployed in a wide range of problem-solving contexts and does not seem to reduce to the standard forms of analogical reasoning (...) studied in contemporary philosophy of science and argumentation theory. After an overview of the emergence of qiyās and of the work of al-Shīrāzī penned by Soufi Youcef, the authors discuss al-Shīrāzī’s classification of correlational inferences of the occasioning factor. The second part of the volume deliberates on the system of correlational inferences by indication and resemblance. The third part develops the main theoretical background of the authors’ work, namely, the dialogical approach to Martin-Löf's Constructive Type Theory. The authors present this in a general form and independently of adaptations deployed in parts I and II. Part III also includes an appendix on the relevant notions of Constructive Type Theory, which has been extracted from an overview written by Ansten Klev. The book concludes with some brief remarks on contemporary approaches to analogy in Common and Civil Law and also to parallel reasoning in general. (shrink)

The paper aims to bring together and unify two traditions in studying dialogue as a game: dialogical logic introduced by Lorenzen ; and persuasion dialogue systems as specified by Prakken. We propose a system which allows the elimination of both informal and formal fallacies. To this end, we reconstruct dialogical logic in terms of speech acts as suggested in.

We present a setting in which the search for a proof of B or a refutation of B can be carried out simultaneously: in contrast, the usual approach in automated deduction views proving B or proving ¬B as two, possibly unrelated, activities. Our approach to proof and refutation is described as a two-player game in which each player follows the same rules. A winning strategy translates to a proof of the formula and a counter-winning strategy translates to a refutation of (...) the formula. The game is described for multiplicative and additive linear logic . A game theoretic treatment of the multiplicative connectives is intricate and our approach to it involves two important ingredients. First, labeled graph structures are used to represent positions in a game and, second, the game playing must deal with the failure of a given player and with an appropriate resumption of play. This latter ingredient accounts for the fact that neither player might win. (shrink)

Dialogue semantics for logic are two-player logic games between a Proponent who puts forward a logical formula φ as valid or true and an Opponent who disputes this. An advantage of the dialogical approach is that it is a uniform framework from which different logics can be obtained through only small variations of the basic rules. We introduce the composition problem for dialogue games as the problem of resolving, for a set S of rules for dialogue games, whether the set (...) of S-dialogically valid formulas is closed under modus ponens. Solving the composition problem is fundamental for the dialogical approach to logic; despite its simplicity, it often requires an indirect solution with the help of significant logical machinery such as cut-elimination. Direct solutions to the composition problem can, however, sometimes be had. As an example, we give a set N of dialogue rules which is well-justified from the dialogical point of view, but whose set N of dialogically valid formulas is both non-trivial and non-standard. We prove that the composition problem for N can be solved directly, and introduce a tableaux system for N. (shrink)

We now move to the demonstration of the left-to-right direction of the equivalence result. Let us assume that there is a winning $$\mathbf {P}$$ P -strategy in the dialogical game for $$\varphi $$ φ.

Paraconsistent logics are the formal systems in which absurdities do not trivialise the logic. In this paper, we give Hintikka-style game theoretical semantics for a variety of paraconsistent and non-classical logics. For this purpose, we consider Priest’s Logic of Paradox, Dunn’s First-Degree Entailment, Routleys’ Relevant Logics, McCall’s Connexive Logic and Belnap’s four-valued logic. We also present a game theoretical characterisation of a translation between Logic of Paradox/Kleene’s K3 and S5. We underline how non-classical logics require different verification games and prove (...) the correctness theorems of their respective game theoretical semantics. This allows us to observe that paraconsistent logics break the classical bidirectional connection between winning strategies and truth values. (shrink)

We associate with any game G another game, which is a variant of it, and which we call . Winning strategies for have a lower recursive degree than winning strategies for G: if a player has a winning strategy of recursive degree 1 over G, then it has a recursive winning strategy over , and vice versa. Through we can express in algorithmic form, as a recursive winning strategy, many common proofs of non-constructive Mathematics, namely exactly the theorems of the (...) sub-classical logic Limit Computable Mathematics [6], Hayashi and Nakata [7]). (shrink)

Denotational semantics of logic programming and its extensions have been studied thoroughly for many years. In 1998, a game semantics was given to definite logic programs by Di Cosmo, Loddo, and Nicolet, and a few years later it was extended to deal with negation by Rondogiannis and Wadge. Both approaches were proven equivalent to the traditional semantics. In this paper we define a game semantics for disjunctive logic programs and prove soundness and completeness with respect to the minimal model semantics (...) of Minker. The overall development has been influenced by the games studied for PCF and functional programming in general, in the styles of Abramsky–Jagadeesan–Malacaria and Hyland–Ong–Nickau. (shrink)

In this paper we show how ideas coming from two areas of research in logic can reinforce each other. The first such line of inquiry concerns the "dynamic turn" in logic and especially the formalisms inspired by Propositional Dynamic Logic (PDL); while the second line concerns research into the logical foundations of Quantum Physics, and in particular the area known as Operational Quantum Logic, as developed by Jauch and Piron (Helve Phys Acta 42: 842-848, 1969), Pirón (Foundations of Quantum Physics, (...) 1976). By bringing these areas together we explain the basic ingredients of Dynamic Quantum Logic, a new direction of research in the logical foundations of physics. (shrink)

As machine learning has gradually entered into ever more sectors of public and private life, there has been a growing demand for algorithmic explainability. How can we make the predictions of complex statistical models more intelligible to end users? A subdiscipline of computer science known as interpretable machine learning (IML) has emerged to address this urgent question. Numerous influential methods have been proposed, from local linear approximations to rule lists and counterfactuals. In this article, I highlight three conceptual challenges that (...) are largely overlooked by authors in this area. I argue that the vast majority of IML algorithms are plagued by (1) ambiguity with respect to their true target; (2) a disregard for error rates and severe testing; and (3) an emphasis on product over process. Each point is developed at length, drawing on relevant debates in epistemology and philosophy of science. Examples and counterexamples from IML are considered, demonstrating how failure to acknowledge these problems can result in counterintuitive and potentially misleading explanations. Without greater care for the conceptual foundations of IML, future work in this area is doomed to repeat the same mistakes. (shrink)

In the present paper we confront Martin- Löf’s analysis of the axiom of choice with J. Hintikka’s standing on this axiom. Hintikka claims that his game theoretical semantics for Independence Friendly Logic justifies Zermelo’s axiom of choice in a first-order way perfectly acceptable for the constructivists. In fact, Martin- Löf’s results lead to the following considerations:Hintikka preferred version of the axiom of choice is indeed acceptable for the constructivists and its meaning does not involve higher order logic.However, the version acceptable (...) for constructivists is based on an intensional take on functions. Extensionality is the heart of the classical understanding of Zermelo’s axiom and this is the real reason behind the constructivist rejection of it.More generally, dependence and independence features that motivate IF-Logic, can be formulated within the frame of constructive type theory without paying the price of a system that is neither axiomatizable nor has an underlying theory of inference – logic is about inference after all.We conclude pointing out that recent developments in dialogical logic show that the CTT approach to meaning in general and to the axiom of choice in particular is very natural to game theoretical approaches where metalogical features are explicitly displayed at the object language-level. Thus, in some way, this vindicates, albeit in quite of a different manner, Hintikka’s plea for the fruitfulness of game-theoretical semantics in the context of the foundations of mathematics. (shrink)

We introduce an implication-free fragment image of ω-arithmetic, having Exchange rule for sequents dropped. Exchange rule for formulas is, instead, an admissible rule in image. Our main result is that cut-free proofs of image are isomorphic with recursive winning strategies of a set of games called “1-backtracking games” in [S. Berardi, Th. Coquand, S. Hayashi, Games with 1-backtracking, Games for Logic and Programming Languages, Edinburgh, April 2005].We also show that image is a sound and complete formal system for the implication-free (...) fragment of LCM , Seventh International Conference on Typed Lambda Calculi and Applications, in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 3461, 2005, pp. 11–22. Invited paper]). A simple syntactical description of this fragment was still missing. No sound and complete formal system is known for LCM itself. (shrink)

This note comments on the paper ‘Dialogue protocols for formal fallacies’ by Kacprzak and Yaskorska (this issue). Points discussed include the use of the notions of ‘claiming’, ‘conceding’ and ‘commitment’, and the role of Lorenzen dialogues as a device for checking whether a proposition is a tautology.