According to traditional Western theism, God is maximally great (or perfect). More explicitly, God is said to have the following divine attributes: omnipotence, omniscience, and omnibenevolence. In this paper, I present three puzzles about this conception of a maximally great (or perfect) being. The first puzzle about omniscience shows that this divine attribute is incoherent. The second puzzle about omnibenevolence and omnipotence shows that these divine attributes are logically incompatible. The third puzzle about perfect rationality and omnipotence shows that these (...) divine attributes are logically incompatible. (shrink)

In this essay I address the contemporary discussion of the problem of omnipotence and God's ability to sin, or POGAS. After some preliminary distinctions I distinguish three versions of the problem. I argue that two versions pose genuine problems for the the traditional Judeo-Christian concept of God. One of these versions is shown to be equivalent to the modal problem of evil. This version of the problem relies on a standard definition of omnipotence and the claim that there are some (...) states of affairs such that necessarily it is not morally permissible for anyone to bring them about. ;In the middle portion of the essay I look at several proposed solutions to POGAS that involve the concept of omnipotence. The radical omnipotence theory holds that an omnipotent being can bring about any state of affairs including impossible ones; it is rejected because the intellectual cost is too high. Next I distinguish two other approaches to redefining omnipotence. One approach is a Thomist approach. This involves defining omnipotence as the ability to bring about all metaphysically possible states of affairs. To solve POGAS those in the Thomist tradition further restrict those states of affairs that an omnipotent being can be expected to be capable of bringing about. Secondly, I address several Anselmian understandings of omnipotence An Anselmian understanding of omnipotence is one which allows that there may be possible states of affairs which an omnipotent being cannot bring about. However, an omnipotent being must be such that it can do whatever it wills and such that nothing can control it. These Anselmian solutions reveal a further problem, the problem of necessary omnipotence, or PONO. PONO shows that, on a plausible understanding of omnibenevolence, it is impossible for any being to be necessarily omnibenevolent. Finally I argue that both POGAS and PONO can be solved by adopting an Anselmian understanding of omnipotence as well as a revised understanding of omnibenevolence which allows that morally significant alternatives may involve only morally permissible options. (shrink)

In this paper, I expose a conundrum regarding divine creation as Leibniz conceives of such creation. What energizes the conundrum is that the concept of omnibenevolence—“consequential omnibenevolence”—that the Leibnizian argument for the view that the actual world is the best of all possible worlds presupposes, appears to sanction the conclusion that God has no practical reasons to create the actual world.