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  1. Descartes and the Danger of Irresolution.Shoshana Brassfield - 2013 - Essays in Philosophy 14 (2):162-178.
    Descartes's approach to practical judgments about what is beneficial or harmful, or what to pursue or avoid, is almost exactly the opposite of his approach to theoretical judgments about the true nature of things. Instead of the cautious skepticism for which Descartes is known, throughout his ethical writings he recommends developing the habit of making firm judgments and resolutely carrying them out, no matter how doubtful and uncertain they may be. Descartes, strikingly, takes irresolution to be the source of remorse (...)
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  • Love: self-propagation, self-preservation, or ekstasis?Jennifer Whiting - 2013 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (4):403-429.
    My title refers to three accounts of interpersonal love: the rationalist account that Terence Irwin ascribes to Plato; the anti-rationalist but strikingly similar account that Harry Frankfurt endorses in his own voice; and the ‘ekstatic’ account that I – following the lead of Martha Nussbaum – find in Plato's Phaedrus. My claim is that the ekstatic account points to important features of interpersonal love to which the other accounts fail to do justice, especially reciprocity and a regulative ideal of equality.
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  • Descartes on the passions: Function, representation, and motivation.Sean Greenberg - 2007 - Noûs 41 (4):714–734.
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  • Irresolution and Other Weaknesses of Soul in Descartes.Matthew Homan - forthcoming - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie.
    This paper contributes to a better understanding of Cartesian irresolution by clarifying its relation to akrasia and wantonness. It argues that irresolution (qua passion) is the same as neither akrasia nor wantonness, but is, like them, a kind of weakness of soul. If akrasia consists in having what Descartes calls ‘firm and decisive judgments’ (F&D judgments) but failing to act on them, and wantonness consists in not having any F&D judgments at all, but acting completely at the behest of the (...)
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  • The Uses of Thought and Will: Descartes’ Practical Philosophy of Freedom.Mark C. R. Smith - 2022 - The European Legacy 27 (3-4):310-320.
    I offer a reading of the role of freedom in Descartes’ Meditations and other writings that sees freedom’s role in “assenting to ideas” as a matter of psychological possibility, and its role in acti...
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  • Descartes, Passion, and the Ability to Do Otherwise.Christopher Gilbert - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Research 38:275-298.
    What does Descartes regard as necessary for human freedom? I approach this topic from a distinctive angle by focusing on the role of the passions in Descartes’s account of free will. My goal is to show that (1) Descartes takes us to have the ability to do otherwise when we judge or choose under the influence of the passions, and that (2) while such ability does not constitute freedom in the fullest Cartesian sense, it does ensure that the judgments and (...)
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  • Freedom and strength of will in Hoffman and Albritton.Gary Watson - 1995 - Philosophical Studies 77 (2-3):261 - 271.
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