Results for 'Gary Watson'

325 found
Order:
  1. La responsabilité et les limites du mal. Variations sur un thème de Strawson.Gary Watson - 2012 - Les ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum 7 (1):146-178.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. A Moral Dialog - Reactive Attitudes According to Gary Watson, Peter Strawson.Montaque Reynolds - manuscript
    What do our reactive attitudes towards perceived moral infractions truly represent? According to Gary Watson, Peter Strawson argues that agents can become exempted from negative or positive reactive attitudes under type 2 pleas. These are conditions wherein we might not consider the agent to qualify for moral judgement based on certain biological, cognitive or psychological traits that they might exhibit. Gary Watson feels that this account is not conclusive, that it does not fully represent the inhibition (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. Behaviourism and Psychology.Gary Hatfield - 2003 - In Thomas Baldwin, The Cambridge History of Philosophy 1870–1945. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 640-48.
    Behaviorism was a peculiarly American phenomenon. As a school of psychology it was founded by John B. Watson (1878-1958) and grew into the neobehaviorisms of the 1920s, 30s and 40s. Philosophers were involved from the start, prefiguring the movement and endeavoring to define or redefine its tenets. Behaviorism expressed the naturalistic bent in American thought, which came in response to the prevailing philosophical idealism and was inspired by developments in natural science itself. There were several versions of naturalism in (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  4. Mental Acts and Mechanistic Psychology in Descartes' Passions.Gary Hatfield - 2007 - In Neil G. Robertson, Gordon McOuat & Thomas C. Vinci, Descartes and the Modern. Cambridge Scholars Press. pp. 49-71.
    This chapter examines the mechanistic psychology of Descartes in the _Passions_, while also drawing on the _Treatise on Man_. It develops the idea of a Cartesian “psychology” that relies on purely bodily mechanisms by showing that he explained some behaviorally appropriate responses through bodily mechanisms alone and that he envisioned the tailoring of such responses to environmental circumstances through a purely corporeal “memory.” An animal’s adjustment of behavior as caused by recurring patterns of sensory stimulation falls under the notion of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  5. Descartes: A Biography; Cogito, Ergo Sum: The Life of René Descartes. [REVIEW]Gary Hatfield - 2008 - Isis 99 (1):177-178.
    Review of Desmond M. Clarke. Descartes: A Biography. xi + 507 pp., apps., figs., bibl., index. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. $40 (cloth).; Richard Watson, Cogito, Ergo Sum: The Life of René Descartes. viii + 375 pp., figs., bibl., index. Boston: David R. Godine, 2002. $35 (cloth).
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  6. Praise as Moral Address.Daniel Telech - 2021 - Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility 7.
    While Strawsonians have focused on the way in which our “reactive attitudes”—the emotions through which we hold one another responsible for manifestations of morally significant quality of regard—express moral demands, serious doubt has been cast on the idea that non-blaming reactive attitudes direct moral demands to their targets. Building on Gary Watson’s proposal that the reactive attitudes are ‘forms of moral address’, this paper advances a communicative view of praise according to which the form of moral address distinctive (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  7. Silence & Salience: On Being Judgmental.Neal Tognazzini - 2020 - In Sebastian Schmidt & Gerhard Ernst, The Ethics of Belief and Beyond: Understanding Mental Normativity. Abingdon, UK: Routledge. pp. 256-269.
    This chapter explores the concept of judgmentalism: what it is and why it’s morally problematic. After criticizing an account offered by Gary Watson, the paper argues for a broader understanding of what it is to be judgmental, encompassing not just the overall beliefs that we form about someone else, but also the very pattern of our thoughts about those with whom we are involved in interpersonal relationships. The thesis is that to care about someone is to be oriented (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  8. Blame, Communication, and Morally Responsible Agency.Coleen Macnamara - 2015 - In Randolph K. Clarke, Michael McKenna & Angela M. Smith, The Nature of Moral Responsibility: New Essays. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 211-236.
    Many important theorists – e.g., Gary Watson and Stephen Darwall – characterize blame as a communicative entity and argue that this entails that morally responsible agency requires not just rational but moral competence. In this paper, I defend this argument from communication against three objections found in the literature. The first two reject the argument’s characterization of the reactive attitudes. The third urges that the argument is committed to a false claim.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   27 citations  
  9. Strawson, Moral Responsibility, and the "Order of Explanation": An Intervention.Patrick Todd - 2016 - Ethics 127 (1):208-240.
    P.F. Strawson’s (1962) “Freedom and Resentment” has provoked a wide range of responses, both positive and negative, and an equally wide range of interpretations. In particular, beginning with Gary Watson, some have seen Strawson as suggesting a point about the “order of explanation” concerning moral responsibility: it is not that it is appropriate to hold agents responsible because they are morally responsible, rather, it is ... well, something else. Such claims are often developed in different ways, but one (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   29 citations  
  10. Knowing Yourself—And Giving Up On Your Own Agency In The Process.Derek Baker - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (4):641-656.
    Are there cases in which agents ought to give up on satisfying an obligation, so that they can avoid a temptation which will lead them to freely commit an even more significant wrong? Actualists say yes. Possibilists say no. Both positions have absurd consequences. This paper argues that common-sense morality is committed to an inconsistent triad of principles. This inconsistency becomes acute when we consider the cases that motivate the possibilism–actualism debate. Thus, the absurd consequences of both solutions are unsurprising: (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  11. The Communication Argument and the Pluralist Challenge.Shawn Tinghao Wang - 2021 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 51 (5):384-399.
    Various theorists have endorsed the “communication argument”: communicative capacities are necessary for morally responsible agency because blame aims at a distinctive kind of moral communication. I contend that existing versions of the argument, including those defended by Gary Watson and Coleen Macnamara, face a pluralist challenge: they do not seem to sit well with the plausible view that blame has multiple aims. I then examine three possible rejoinders to the challenge, suggesting that a context-specific, function-based approach constitutes the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  12. Moral ignorance and blameworthiness.Elinor Mason - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (11):3037-3057.
    In this paper I discuss various hard cases that an account of moral ignorance should be able to deal with: ancient slave holders, Susan Wolf’s JoJo, psychopaths such as Robert Harris, and finally, moral outliers. All these agents are ignorant, but it is not at all clear that they are blameless on account of their ignorance. I argue that the discussion of this issue in recent literature has missed the complexities of these cases by focusing on the question of epistemic (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   49 citations  
  13. Conversation and Responsibility by Michael McKenna. [REVIEW]Paul Russell - 2017 - Philosophical Review 126 (2):285-95.
    Michael McKenna’s Conversation and Responsibility is an ambitious and impressive statement of a new theory of moral responsibility. McKenna’s approach builds upon the strategy advanced in P.F. Strawson’s enormously influential “Freedom and Resentment” (which was published in 1962). The account advanced aims to provide Strawson’s theory with the sort of detail that is required to fill significant gaps and respond to a wide range of criticisms and objections that have been directed against it. ....Conversation and Responsibility belongs on the top (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  14. Remaking the science of mind: Psychology as a natural science.Gary Hatfield - 1995 - In Christopher Fox, Roy Porter & Robert Wokler, Inventing Human Science: Eighteenth Century Domains. University of California Press. pp. 184–231.
    Psychology considered as a natural science began as Aristotelian "physics" or "natural philosophy" of the soul, conceived as an animating power that included vital, sensory, and rational functions. C. Wolff restricted the term " psychology " to sensory, cognitive, and volitional functions and placed the science under metaphysics, coordinate with cosmology. Near the middle of the eighteenth century, Krueger, Godart, and Bonnet proposed approaching the mind with the techniques of the new natural science. At nearly the same time, Scottish thinkers (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   42 citations  
  15. Review of Gary Varner, Personhood, Ethics, and Animal Cognition: Situating Animals in Hare’s Two-Level Utilitarianism. [REVIEW]Gary Comstock - 2013 - Environmental Values 22 (3):417-420.
    With his 1998 book, In Nature’s Interests? Gary Varner proved to be one of our most original and trenchant of environmental ethicists. Here, in the first of a promised two volume set, he makes his mark on another field, animal ethics, leaving an even deeper imprint. Thoroughly grounded in the relevant philosophical and scientific literatures, Varner is as precise in analysis as he is wide-ranging in scope. His writing is clear and rigorous, and he explains philosophical nuances with extraordinary (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16. The Sensory Core and the Medieval Foundations of Early Modern Perceptual Theory.Gary Hatfield & William Epstein - 1979 - Isis 70 (3):363-384.
    This article seeks the origin, in the theories of Ibn al-Haytham (Alhazen), Descartes, and Berkeley, of two-stage theories of spatial perception, which hold that visual perception involves both an immediate representation of the proximal stimulus in a two-dimensional ‘‘sensory core’’ and also a subsequent perception of the three dimensional world. The works of Ibn al-Haytham, Descartes, and Berkeley already frame the major theoretical options that guided visual theory into the twentieth century. The field of visual perception was the first area (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   52 citations  
  17. Introspective evidence in psychology.Gary Hatfield - 2005 - In Peter Achinstein, Scientific Evidence: Philosophical Theories & Applications. The Johns Hopkins University Press.
    In preparation for examining the place of introspective evidence in scientific psychology, the chapter begins by clarifying what introspection has been supposed to show, and why some concluded that it couldn't deliver. This requires a brief excursus into the various uses to which introspection was supposed to have been put by philosophers and psychologists in the modern period, together with a summary of objections. It then reconstructs some actual uses of introspection (or related techniques, differently monikered) in the early days (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   34 citations  
  18. (1 other version)The Senses and the Fleshless Eye: The Meditations as Cognitive Exercises.Gary Hatfield - 1986 - In Amélie Rorty, Rorty. Univ of California Press. pp. 45–76.
    According to the reading offered here, Descartes' use of the meditative mode of writing was not a mere rhetorical device to win an audience accustomed to the spiritual retreat. His choice of the literary form of the spiritual exercise was consonant with, if not determined by, his theory of the mind and of the basis of human knowledge. Since Descartes' conception of knowledge implied the priority of the intellect over the senses, and indeed the priority of an intellect operating independently (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   58 citations  
  19. On the Nonexistence of Computer Ethics.Gary Jason - 1990 - Social Philosophy Today 4:197-206.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  20. The history of philosophy as philosophy.Gary Hatfield - 2005 - In Tom Sorell & Graham Alan John Rogers, Analytic philosophy and history of philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 82-128.
    The chapter begins with an initial survey of ups and downs of contextualist history of philosophy during the twentieth century in Britain and America, which finds that historically serious history of philosophy has been on the rise. It then considers ways in which the study of past philosophy has been used and is used in philosophy, and makes a case for the philosophical value and necessity of a contextually oriented approach. It examines some uses of past texts and of history (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  21. Color perception and neural encoding: Does metameric matching entail a loss of information?Gary Hatfield - 1992 - In David Hull & Mickey Forbes, PSA 1992: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Volume One: Contributed Papers. Philosophy of Science Association. pp. 492-504.
    It seems intuitively obvious that metameric matching of color samples entails a loss of information, for spectrophotometrically diverse materials appear the same. This intuition implicitly relies on a conception of the function of color vision and on a related conception of how color samples should be individuated. It assumes that the function of color vision is to distinguish among spectral energy distributions, and that color samples should be individuated by their physical properties. I challenge these assumptions by articulating a different (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  22. Sense-data and the mind–body problem.Gary Hatfield - 2004 - In Ralph Schumacher, Perception and Reality: From Descartes to the Present. Mentis. pp. 305--331.
    The first two sections of the paper characterize the nineteenth century respect for the phenomenal by considering Helmholtz’s position and James’ and Russell’s move to neutral monism. The third section displays a moment’s sympathy with those who recoiled from the latter view -- but only a moment’s. The recoil overshot what was a reasonable response, and denied the reality of the phenomenal, largely in the name of the physical or the material. The final two sections of the paper develop a (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  23. Sense-data and the philosophy of mind: Russell, James, and Mach.Gary Hatfield - 2002 - Principia 6 (2):203-230.
    The theory of knowledge in early twentieth-century Anglo American philosophy was oriented toward phenomenally described cognition. There was a healthy respect for the mind-body problem, which meant that phenomena in both the mental and physical domains were taken seriously. Bertrand Russell's developing position on sense-data and momentary particulars drew upon, and ultimately became like, the neutral monism of Ernst Mach and William James. Due to a more recent behaviorist and physicalist inspired "fear of the mental", this development has been down-played (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  24. The cognitive faculties.Gary Hatfield - 1998 - In Daniel Garber & Michael Ayers, The Cambridge history of seventeenth-century philosophy. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 953–1002.
    During the seventeenth century the major cognitive faculties--sense, imagination, memory, and understanding or intellect--became the central focus of argument in metaphysics and epistemology to an extent not seen before. The theory of the intellect, long an important auxiliary to metaphysics, became the focus of metaphysical dispute, especially over the scope and powers of the intellect and the existence of a `pure' intellect. Rationalist metaphysicians such as Descartes, Spinoza, and Malebranche claimed that intellectual knowledge, gained independently of the senses, provides the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   34 citations  
  25. The Artistic Expression of Feeling.Gary Kemp - 2020 - Philosophia 49 (1):315-332.
    In the past 60 years or so, the philosophical subject of artistic expression has generally been handled as an inquiry into the artistic expression of emotion. In my view this has led to a distortion of the relevant territory, to the artistic expression of feeling’s too often being overlooked. I explicate the emotion-feeling distinction in modern terms, and urge that the expression of feeling is too central to be waived off as outside the proper philosophical subject of artistic expression. Restricting (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  26. Was the scientific revolution really a revolution in science?Gary Hatfield - 1996 - In Jamil Ragep & Sally Ragep, Tradition, Transmission, Transformation: Proceedings of Two Conferences on Pre-Modern Science Held at the University of Oklahoma. Brill. pp. 489–525.
    This chapter poses questions about the existence and character of the Scientific Revolution by deriving its initial categories of analysis and its initial understanding of the intellectual scene from the writings of the seventeenth century, and by following the evolution of these initial categories in succeeding centuries. This project fits the theme of cross cultural transmission and appropriation -- a theme of the present volume -- if one takes the notion of a culture broadly, so that, say, seventeenth and eighteenth (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  27. Animals.Gary Hatfield - 2008 - In John Carriero & Janet Broughton, Companion to Descartes. Blackwell. pp. 404–425.
    This chapter considers philosophical problems concerning non-human (and sometimes human) animals, including their metaphysical, physical, and moral status, their origin, what makes them alive, their functional organization, and the basis of their sensitive and cognitive capacities. I proceed by assuming what most of Descartes’s followers and interpreters have held: that Descartes proposed that animals lack sentience, feeling, and genuinely cognitive representations of things. (Some scholars interpret Descartes differently, denying that he excluded sentience, feeling, and representation from animals, and I consider (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   32 citations  
  28. Science, Certainty, and Descartes.Gary Hatfield - 1988 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:249 - 262.
    During the 1630s Descartes recognized that he could not expect all legitimate claims in natural science to meet the standard of absolute certainty. The realization resulted from a change in his physics, which itself arose not through methodological reflections, but through developments in his substantive metaphysical doctrines. Descartes discovered the metaphysical foundations of his physics in 1629-30; as a consequence, the style of explanation employed in his physical writings changed. His early methodological conceptions, as preserved in the Rules and sketched (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  29. Pattern and chaos: New images in the semantics of paradox.Gary Mar & Patrick Grim - 1991 - Noûs 25 (5):659-693.
    Given certain standard assumptions-that particular sentences are meaningful, for example, and do genuinely self-attribute their own falsity-the paradoxes appear to show intriguing patterns of generally unstable semantic behavior. In what follows we want to concentrate on those patterns themselves: the pattern of the Liar, for example, which if assumed either true or false appears to oscillate endlessly between truth and falsehood.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  30. Do Machines Have Prima Facie Duties?Gary Comstock - 2015 - In Machine Medical Ethics. Springer. pp. 79-92.
    A properly programmed artificially intelligent agent may eventually have one duty, the duty to satisfice expected welfare. We explain this claim and defend it against objections.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  31. On the Rationality of Propaganda.Gary James Jason - 2024 - Philosophy International Journal 7 (3):1-14.
    In this article, I set forth a theory of propaganda explaining what it is, how it relates to marketing, and the nature and types of ideology. I discuss the criteria by which we can judge the rationality or deceitfulness of propaganda. I defend the view that while propaganda can be perfectly rational, it rarely is, and I explain why that is the case. I finish by explaining why the question of the rationality or deceitfulness of propaganda is different from the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  32. Computational Theories of Conscious Experience: Between a Rock and a Hard Place.Gary Bartlett - 2012 - Erkenntnis 76 (2):195-209.
    Very plausibly, nothing can be a genuine computing system unless it meets an input-sensitivity requirement. Otherwise all sorts of objects, such as rocks or pails of water, can count as performing computations, even such as might suffice for mentality—thus threatening computationalism about the mind with panpsychism. Maudlin in J Philos 86:407–432, ( 1989 ) and Bishop ( 2002a , b ) have argued, however, that such a requirement creates difficulties for computationalism about conscious experience, putting it in conflict with the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  33. The brain's 'new' science: Psychology, neurophysiology, and constraint.Gary Hatfield - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (3):388-404.
    There is a strong philosophical intuition that direct study of the brain can and will constrain the development of psychological theory. When this intuition is tested against case studies on the neurophysiology and psychology of perception and memory, it turns out that psychology has led the way toward knowledge of neurophysiology. An abstract argument is developed to show that psychology can and must lead the way in neuroscientific study of mental function. The opposing intuition is based on mainly weak arguments (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  34. Psychological Experiments and Phenomenal Experience in Size and Shape Constancy.Gary Hatfield - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (5):940-953.
    Some experiments in perceptual psychology measure perceivers’ phenomenal experiences of objects versus their cognitive assessments of object properties. Analyzing such experiments, this article responds to Pizlo’s claim that much work on shape constancy before 1985 confused problems of shape ambiguity with problems of shape constancy. Pizlo fails to grasp the logic of experimental designs directed toward phenomenal aspects of shape constancy. In the domain of size perception, Granrud’s studies of size constancy in children and adults distinguish phenomenal from cognitive factors.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  35. Psychology old and new.Gary Hatfield - 2003 - In Thomas Baldwin, The Cambridge History of Philosophy 1870–1945. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 93–106.
    During the period 1870-1914 the existing discipline of psychology was transformed. British thinkers including Spencer, Lewes, and Romanes allied psychology with biology and viewed mind as a function of the organism for adapting to the environment. British and German thinkers called attention to social and cultural factors in the development of individual human minds. In Germany and the United States a tradition of psychology as a laboratory science soon developed, which was called a 'new psychology' by contrast with the old, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  36. Does the superfluid part of a supersolid, superfluid, or superconducting body have, of itself, “inertia?”.Gary Stephens - 2009 - Annales de la Fondation Louis de Broglie 34 (1):89-101.
    The contention discussed here, is that one might be able to get around the puzzle contained in the results of Kim and Chan:— That a quantity of inertial mass is effectively lost, (a so called non-classical-rotational inertia NCRI,) but that being a “supersolid” there is no path for the normal fraction to slip past the 1 – 2 % supersolid fraction, which (it is supposed) remains stationary within the annulus. As a solution we argue that the effective loss of inertial (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  37. The Tyranny -- or the Democracy -- of the Ideal?Blain Neufeld & Lori Watson - 2018 - Cosmos + Taxis 5 (2):47-61.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  38. The Workings of the Intellect: Mind and Psychology.Gary Hatfield - 1997 - In Patricia A. Easton, Logic and the Workings of the Mind the Logic of Ideas and Faculty Psychology in Early Modern Philosophy. pp. 21-45.
    Two stories have dominated the historiography of early modern philosophy: one in which a seventeenth century Age of Reason spawned the Enlightenment, and another in which a skeptical crisis cast a shadow over subsequent philosophy, resulting in ever narrower "limits to knowledge." I combine certain elements common to both into a third narrative, one that begins by taking seriously seventeenth-century conceptions of the topics and methods central to the rise of a "new" philosophy. In this revisionist story, differing approaches to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  39. Whither internalism? How internalists should respond to the extended mind hypothesis.Gary Bartlett - 2008 - Metaphilosophy 39 (2):163–184.
    A new position in the philosophy of mind has recently appeared: the extended mind hypothesis (EMH). Some of its proponents think the EMH, which says that a subject's mental states can extend into the local environment, shows that internalism is false. I argue that this is wrong. The EMH does not refute internalism; in fact, it necessarily does not do so. The popular assumption that the EMH spells trouble for internalists is premised on a bad characterization of the internalist thesis—albeit (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  40. First Philosophy and Natural Philosophy in Descartes.Gary Hatfield - 1985 - In Alan Holland, Philosophy, Its History and Historiography. Reidel. pp. 149-164.
    Descartes was both metaphysician and natural philosopher. He used his metaphysics to ground portions of his physics. However, as should be a commonplace but is not, he did not think he could spin all of his physics out of his metaphysics a priori, and in fact he both emphasized the need for appeals to experience in his methodological remarks on philosophizing about nature and constantly appealed to experience in describing his own philosophy of nature. During the 1630s, he offered empirical (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  41. Causal feature learning for utility-maximizing agents.David Kinney & David Watson - 2020 - In David Kinney & David Watson, International Conference on Probabilistic Graphical Models. pp. 257–268.
    Discovering high-level causal relations from low-level data is an important and challenging problem that comes up frequently in the natural and social sciences. In a series of papers, Chalupka etal. (2015, 2016a, 2016b, 2017) develop a procedure forcausal feature learning (CFL) in an effortto automate this task. We argue that CFL does not recommend coarsening in cases where pragmatic considerations rule in favor of it, and recommends coarsening in cases where pragmatic considerations rule against it. We propose a new technique, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  42. (2 other versions)The explanation game: a formal framework for interpretable machine learning.David S. Watson & Luciano Floridi - 2020 - Synthese 198 (10):1–⁠32.
    We propose a formal framework for interpretable machine learning. Combining elements from statistical learning, causal interventionism, and decision theory, we design an idealised explanation game in which players collaborate to find the best explanation for a given algorithmic prediction. Through an iterative procedure of questions and answers, the players establish a three-dimensional Pareto frontier that describes the optimal trade-offs between explanatory accuracy, simplicity, and relevance. Multiple rounds are played at different levels of abstraction, allowing the players to explore overlapping causal (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  43. The Rhetoric and Reality of Anthropomorphism in Artificial Intelligence.David Watson - 2019 - Minds and Machines 29 (3):417-440.
    Artificial intelligence has historically been conceptualized in anthropomorphic terms. Some algorithms deploy biomimetic designs in a deliberate attempt to effect a sort of digital isomorphism of the human brain. Others leverage more general learning strategies that happen to coincide with popular theories of cognitive science and social epistemology. In this paper, I challenge the anthropomorphic credentials of the neural network algorithm, whose similarities to human cognition I argue are vastly overstated and narrowly construed. I submit that three alternative supervised learning (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  44. Clinical applications of machine learning algorithms: beyond the black box.David S. Watson, Jenny Krutzinna, Ian N. Bruce, Christopher E. M. Griffiths, Iain B. McInnes, Michael R. Barnes & Luciano Floridi - 2019 - British Medical Journal 364:I886.
    Machine learning algorithms may radically improve our ability to diagnose and treat disease. For moral, legal, and scientific reasons, it is essential that doctors and patients be able to understand and explain the predictions of these models. Scalable, customisable, and ethical solutions can be achieved by working together with relevant stakeholders, including patients, data scientists, and policy makers.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  45. Against a Mahāyāna Absolute: Why Absolutism Need Not Be a Conclusion of Mahāyāna Philosophy.Gary Donnelly - 2018 - Dissertation, University of Liverpool
    This work will argue that Mahāyāna philosophy need not result in endorsement of some cosmic Absolute in the vein of the Advaitin ātman-Brahman. Scholars such as Bhattacharya, Albahari and Murti argue that the Buddha at no point denied the existence of a cosmic ātman, and instead only denied a localised, individual ātman (what amounts to a jīva). The idea behind this, then, is that the Buddha was in effect an Advaitin, analysing experience and advocating liberation in an Advaitin sense: through (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  46. Carnap on Analyticity and Existence: A Clarification, Defense, and Development of Quine’s Reading of Carnap’s Views on Ontology.Gary Ebbs - 2019 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 7 (5):1-31.
    Does Carnap’s treatment of philosophical questions about existence, such as “Are there numbers?” and “Are there physical objects?”, depend on his analytic–synthetic distinction? If so, in what way? I answer these questions by clarifying, defending, and developing the reading of Carnap’s paper “Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology” that W. V. Quine proposes, with little justification or explanation, in his paper “On Carnap’s Views on Ontology”. The primary methodological value of studying Quine’s reading of “Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology” is that it prompts (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  47. Interpreting the probabilities in Plantinga’s evolutionary argument against naturalism.Gary Neels - forthcoming - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion:1-13.
    In this paper, I examine Plantinga’s (1993, 2000, 2011) Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism (EAAN). While there has been much discussion about Plantinga’s use of probabilities in the argument, I contend that insufficient attention has been paid to the question of how we are to interpret those probabilities. In this paper, I argue that views Plantinga defends elsewhere limit the range of interpretations available to him here. The upshot is that the EAAN is more limited in its applicability than Plantinga alleges.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  48. The Prolegomena and the Critiques of Pure Reason.Gary Hatfield - 2001 - In Volker Gerhardt, Rolf-Peter Horstmann & Ralph Schumacher, Kant Und Die Berliner Aufklärung: Akten des IX Internationalen Kant-Kongresses. New York: Walter de Gruyter. pp. 185-208.
    This chapter considers Kant's relation to Hume as Kant himself understood it when he wrote the Critique of Pure Reason and the Prolegomena. It first seeks to refine the question of Kant's relation to Hume's skepticism, and it then considers the evidence for Kant's attitude toward Hume in three works: the A Critique, Prolegomena, and B Critique. It argues that in the A Critique Kant viewed skepticism positively, as a necessary reaction to dogmatism and a spur toward critique. In his (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  49. Far-Persons.Gary Comstock - 2017 - In Woodhall Andrew & Garmendia da Trindade Gabriel, Ethics and/or Politics: Approaching the Issues Concerning Nonhuman Animals. Palgrave. pp. 39-71.
    I argue for the moral relevance of a category of individuals I characterize as far-persons. Following Gary Varner, I distinguish near-persons, animals with a " robust autonoetic consciousness " but lacking an adult human's " biographical sense of self, " from the merely sentient, those animals living "entirely in the present." I note the possibility of a third class. Far-persons lack a biographical sense of self, possess a weak autonoetic consciousness, and are able to travel mentally through time a (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  50. The Birth of a Nation and the Birth of Cancel Culture.Gary James Jason - 2022 - Liberty 7.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
1 — 50 / 325