Discussion about the application of scientific knowledge in robotics in order to build people helpers is widespread. The issue herein addressed is philosophically poignant, that of robots that are “people”. It is currently popular to speak about robots and the image of Man. Behind this lurks the dialogical mind and the questions about the significance of an artificial version of it. Without intending to defend or refute the discourse in favour of ‘recreating’ Man, a lesser familiar question is brought forth: (...) “and what if we were capable of creating a very convincible replica of man (constructing a robot-person), what would the consequences of this be and would we be satisfied with such technology?” Thorny topic; it questions the entire knowledge foundation upon which strong AI/Robotics is positioned. The author argues for improved monitoring of technological progress and thus favours implementing weaker techniques. (shrink)

The raison d’être of this article is that many a spry-eyed analyst of the works in intelligent computing and robotics fail to see the essential concerning applications development, that of expressing their ultimate goal. Alternatively, they fail to state it suitably for the lesser-informed public eye. The author does not claim to be able to remedy this. Instead, the visionary investigation offered couples learning and computing with other related fields as part of a larger spectre to fully simulate people in (...) their embodied image. For the first time, the social roles attributed to the technical objects produced are questioned, and so with a humorous illustration. (shrink)

Previous neural network models of concept learning were mainly implemented with supervised learning schemes. However, studies of human conceptual memory have shown that concepts may be learned without a teacher who provides the category name to associate with exemplars. A modular neural network architecture that realizes concept acquisition through two functionally distinct operations, categorizing and naming, is proposed as an alternative. An unsupervised algorithm realizes the categorizing module by constructing representations of categories compatible with prototype theory. The naming module associates (...) category names to the output of the categorizing module in a supervised mode. In such a modular architecture, the interface between the modules can be conceived of as an “information relay” that encodes, constrains, and propagates important information. Five experiments were conducted to analyze the relationships among internal conceptual codes and simple conceptual and lexical development. The first two experiments show a prototype effect and illustrate some basic characteristics of the system. The third experiment presents a bottom‐up model of the narrowing down of children's early lexical categories that honors mutual exclusivity. The fourth experiment introduces top‐down constraints on conceptual coding. The fifth experiment exhibits how hierarchical relationships between concepts are learned by the architecture, and also demonstrates how a spectrum of conceptual expertise may gradually emerge as a consequence of experiencing more with certain categories than with others. (shrink)

Complexity is pleased to announce the installment of Prof Hiroki Sayama as its new Chief Editor. In this Editorial, Prof Sayama describes his feelings about his recent appointment, discusses some of the journal’s journey and relevance to current issues, and shares his vision and aspirations for its future.

The Platonic description of the cognitive development of the human being is a crucial part of his philosophy. This account emphasizes not only the existence of phases of rational growth but also the need that the cognitive progress of the individuals is investigated further. I will reconstruct what rational growth is for Plato in light of the deliberate choice of the philosopher to leave incomplete his schematization of human intellectual development. I will argue that this is a means chosen by (...) Plato to stimulate his readers to use his text as a starting point for an enquiry into the capabilities of human intellection. I will illustrate the presence of two phases in the process of human rational growth, highlighting the different techniques utilized by Plato to promote cognitive development during each of them. When the individuals are in the first phase of intellectual growth, they are rationally stimulated via conventional discursive material transmitted in written form. Human rational progress at the level of sophistication of theoretical adulthood is promoted through mathematics. (shrink)

In a brief overview this article discusses that, in the multifaceted field of cognitive sciences, the problem of consciousness and mind is far from being resolved. The article then argues that this problem is worked out in careful detail in Peirce’s work. Intelligence, hence mind, for Peirce, is distinct from consciousness. Without being dissociable, they are, in fact, distinct but complementary. Hence, Peirce’s ideas should be recovered not only for the sake of their relevance, but also because cognitivists have a (...) lot to learn from Peirce. (shrink)

The central thesis of this paper is that contemporary theoretical physics is grounded in philosophical presuppositions that make it difficult to effectively address the problems of subject-object interaction and discontinuity inherent to quantum gravity. The core objectivist assumption implicit in relativity theory and quantum mechanics is uncovered and we see that, in string theory, this assumption leads into contradiction. To address this challenge, a new philosophical foundation is proposed based on the phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Martin Heidegger. Then, through (...) the application of qualitative topology and hypernumbers, phenomenological ideas about space, time, and dimension are brought into focus so as to provide specific solutions to the problems of force-field generation and unification. The phenomenological string theory that results speaks to the inconclusiveness of conventional string theory and resolves its core contradiction. (shrink)

John Dewey viewed philosophy as an intelligent means of realizing change, emphasizing the ubiquity of process, context and relations. The revolution in Organizational Behavior known as Process Re-engineering is an approach to organizational thinking recognizing the importance of process, context and relations at all levels of organizational activity. Because Dewey’s philosophy affords primacy to process and change, context and relations, it is fundamentally aligned with PR. Compelling connections between PR and Dewey’s philosophy are established concerning primacy of process, importance of (...) context, inquiry as experimental, value dimensions of outcomes, work as a means to self-realization, and increasing recognition of the future as an open possibility. While Dewey’s philosophy and PR stand as examples of intelligent understanding and reconstruction of process, recent developments in formal systems ontology point to dangerous consequences resulting from an eclipse of the material conditions of experience through the imposition of a formal architectonic. (shrink)

(1991). Gödel, Turing, chaitin and the question of emergence as a meta‐principle of modern physics. some arguments against reductionism. World Futures: Vol. 32, Creative Evolution in Nature, Mind, and Society, pp. 185-195.

This paper reassesses the criticism of the Lucas-Penrose anti-mechanist argument, based on Gödel’s incompleteness theorems, as formulated by Krajewski : this argument only works with the additional extra-formal assumption that “the human mind is consistent”. Krajewski argues that this assumption cannot be formalized, and therefore that the anti-mechanist argument – which requires the formalization of the whole reasoning process – fails to establish that the human mind is not mechanistic. A similar situation occurs with a corollary to the argument, that (...) the human mind allegedly outperforms machines, because although there is no exhaustive formal definition of natural numbers, mathematicians can successfully work with natural numbers. Again, the corollary requires an extra-formal assumption: “PA is complete” or “the set of all natural numbers exists”. I agree that extra-formal assumptions are necessary in order to validate the anti-mechanist argument and its corollary, and that those assumptions are problematic. However, I argue that formalization is possible and the problem is instead the circularity of reasoning that they cause. The human mind does not prove its own consistency, and outperforms the machine, simply by making the assumption “I am consistent”. Starting from the analysis of circularity, I propose a way of thinking about the interplay between informal and formal in mathematics. (shrink)

The explosion of data grows at a rate of roughly five trillion bits a second, giving rise to greater urgency in conceptualizing the infosphere and understanding its implications for knowledge and public policy. Philosophers of technology and information technologists alike who wrestle with ontological and epistemological questions of digital information tend to emphasize, as Floridi does, information as our new ecosystem and human beings as interconnected informational organisms, inforgs at home in ambient intelligence. But the linguistic and conceptual representations of (...) Big Data—the massive volume of both structured and unstructured data—and the real world practice of data-mining for patterns and meaningful interpretation of evidence reveal tension and ambiguity in the bold promise of data analytics. This paper explores the tacit epistemology of the rhetoric and representation of Big Data and suggests a richer account of its ambiguities and the paradox of its real world materiality. We argue that Big Data should be recognized as manifesting multiple and conflicting trajectories that reflect human intentionality and particular patterns of power and authority. Such patterns require attentive exploration and moral appraisal if we are to resist simplistic informationist ontologies of Big Data, and the subtle forms of control in the political ecology of Big Data that undermine its promise as transformational knowledge. (shrink)